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Abstract
This thesis examines the phenomenon of sell-side financial analysts (analysts hereafter) 
“doing” corporate governance. The term “doing” is used in the current study to 
designate the various ways in which some analysts in the US and the UK, across the past 
decade or so, have made corporate governance visible. The thesis examines how this has 
occurred, and the mechanisms and devices that have made it possible. Analysts, it is 
suggested, can be viewed as “agents of transparency”, in so far as they have taken the 
evaluation of companies beyond the financials, to include corporate governance issues.
The thesis focuses primarily on the corporate governance reports produced by analysts, 
the official documents issued by various organisations and institutions, selected financial 
and business newspapers and magazines, together with other documents such as 
textbooks of corporate governance, as well as academic and practioner publications on 
corporate governance. Through an examination of these materials, the thesis investigates 
the pre-conditions that made possible the appearance and development of the corporate 
governance work pursued by analysts in the early twenty-first century. It examines the 
evaluations performed by analysts of the corporate governance procedures adopted by 
companies. In particular, it focuses on the ways in which analysts benchmarked the 
corporate governance procedures of companies against formal regulations, and how 
comparisons of the governance procedures adopted by different companies were 
undertaken and facilitated by analysts. Benchmarking, and the making of comparisons 
of corporate governance practices through a range of devices, are examined. The thesis 
also examines the linking of corporate governance to the financials (such as profitability, 
stock price performance, and equity valuation) in the investment analyses performed by 
analysts. It concentrates on the way in which analysts integrated corporate governance 
issues in the investment decision making process. Attention is paid to the ideas that 
shaped and articulated the integration, as well as to the tools and devices deployed by 
analysts.
This thesis argues that greater attention is needed to the “doing” of corporate governance
by analysts, and its implications for these “agents of transparency” that have broadened 
the parameters through which transparency is assessed.
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C h a p t e r  1
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS MAKE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VISIBLE:
AN INTRODUCTION
1. Doing corporate governance: the work of sell-side financial analysts
This thesis is about viewing financial analysts as agents o f transparency. It examines 
how sell-side financial analysts (analysts hereafter)1 have made corporate governance 
visible and operable, how this has occurred, and the mechanisms and devices that have 
made it possible. Doing corporate governance is the term that is used to designate the 
phenomenon under investigation here, the ways in which some analysts in the US and 
the UK have started to work across the past decade on corporate governance issues. This 
thesis takes this “doing” of corporate governance by analysts as the central object of 
enquiry. It investigates the various ways in which analysts have evaluated companies 
beyond the financials to consider corporate governance issues. It examines also the 
various ways in which analysts have come to act as a key link between notions of 
corporate governance and the financials.
Sell-side investment research has traditionally been organised in the equity research 
divisions of brokerage firms. Most analysts who perform sell-side research specialise by 
industry sectors, and study companies in a specific sector. These analysts have often 
been termed equity research analysts. In general, these analysts write equity research 
reports in which they offer investment recommendations to the investing public. 
Traditionally, they have concentrated mainly on the financial and operational aspects of 
corporations (Gullapalli, 2004). Since the early 21st century, however, some of these 
analysts in the US and the UK have started to show interest in corporate governance 
issues, and have brought corporate governance within the boundaries of their work
1 The term “analysts” in this thesis generally refers to sell-side financial analysts, unless otherwise stated.
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territory. These equity research analysts work on governance issues mostly on an 
individual basis within the industry sector teams in which they are typically based. 
Analysts in so-called Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) or Environmental, Social, 
and Corporate Governance (ESG) teams have also started to pursue corporate 
governance research. These teams are also normally located in the equity research 
divisions of brokerage firms. Analysts who work in these teams are sometimes termed 
SRI analysts, or corporate governance analysts. Since both equity research analysts and 
SRI and corporate governance analysts work in the equity research divisions of 
brokerage firms, or on the so-called “sell-side”, this thesis adopts a broader notion of 
“sell-side financial analysts” to include under this umbrella both types of analysts. The 
phenomenon of some sell-side financial analysts in the US and the UK starting to work 
on corporate governance issues from the early 21st century is captured by the term doing 
corporate governance in this thesis.
The “doing” of corporate governance by analysts consists of at least two aspects. First, 
analysts have undertaken evaluations of the corporate governance procedures adopted 
by companies. Second, analysts have attempted to link corporate governance to the 
financials (such as profitability, stock price performance, and equity valuation) in 
investment analyses. The corporate governance reports produced by these analysts allow 
us to identify these two aspects of doing corporate governance. These reports document 
the corporate governance evaluations, and the integration of corporate governance 
within the investment analyses performed by analysts . They demonstrate, it is 
suggested, that analysts have explicitly brought corporate governance within the 
boundaries of their work territory. In addition, the doing of corporate governance by 
analysts has also been reported in the financial press (Gullapalli, 2004; Sweeney, 2004), 
as well as highlighted in official documents issued by various organisations and 
institutions, such as the United Nations (The UN Global Compact, 2004, 2005, 2009; 
The UNEP FI, 2004), the British Trade Union Congress (TUC, 2005), the Conference 
Board (cf. Tonello, 2006), among the others.
2 This thesis differentiates the corporate governance reports produced by analysts from the traditional 
equity research reports. Corporate governance reports mainly concentrate on issues related to corporate 
governance. Analysts do not issue earnings forecasts or offer investment recommendations through 
corporate governance reports.
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This thesis specifically concerns the doing of corporate governance by those analysts 
who have documented the corporate governance evaluations or the integration of 
corporate governance within investment analyses in written reports . Accordingly, this 
thesis focuses on the corporate governance work undertaken by a subset of analysts in 
the US and the UK, rather than the whole analyst population. By concentrating on those 
analysts who have produced corporate governance reports to document their work on 
corporate governance, this thesis aims to explore what is at stake in doing corporate 
governance.
Through this “doing” of corporate governance, as will be argued later in the thesis, 
analysts have made corporate governance visible and transparent. Analysts can be 
viewed as agents o f transparency who have contributed to making operable the 
perceived ideal of “transparency” in financial markets. More specifically, analysts have 
created new visibilities of the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies, 
transformed the link between corporate governance and the financials from hypothetical 
and potential to material, visible, and factual, and made visible the category of corporate 
governance as a risk factor in the investment decision making process.
1.1 Sell-side financial analysts
While doing corporate governance is a relatively recent activity undertaken by some 
sell-side financial analysts in the US and the UK, the more traditional financial analysis 
work performed by these analysts has been subject increasingly to social scientific 
analysis that has gone beyond conventional econometric analyses in recent years (e.g. 
Beunza & Garud, 2007; Fogarty & Rogers, 2005; Zuckerman, 1999). Sell-side financial 
analysts are expected to be independent of the companies that they follow. They have 
always been regarded as important information intermediaries between investors and 
investee companies in financial markets. They gather information about companies from 
various sources4, re-arrange it, and disseminate it mainly through the equity research
3 There may be some analysts who have considered corporate governance in investment analyses but do 
not produce reports with corporate governance as the main topic.
4 Miller and O ’Leary (2000: 2) suggest that “analysts base their evaluations o f  long-term value creation
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reports to constituents of the investing public. By making information about companies 
available, or by changing the manner in which the information is disclosed and 
represented, analysts help reveal and make visible the operation and financial 
performance of companies. The information about companies contained in equity 
research reports, as well as the investment recommendations and price targets offered by 
analysts, may inform the buy, hold, and sell decisions of investors as well as fund 
managers. The expectation of a wide range of investors on specific companies is to a 
great extent influenced by the information provided by analysts. Indeed, analysts have 
been depicted as “gatekeepers” in the corporate system (e.g. Coffee, 2006; Fuchita & 
Litan, 2006; Healy & Palepu, 2003). This means that analysts are considered potentially 
capable of shedding light on opportunistic corporate behaviour, and may provide 
additional monitoring of companies, and hence can play a significant role in influencing 
corporate conduct.
Sell-side financial analysts are often contrasted with the other type of analysts in 
financial markets, namely, buy-side financial analysts5. Buy-side analysts typically work 
for institutional investors in fund management firms. While not producing written 
reports for the investing public, buy-side analysts make intensive use of the reports 
produced by sell-side analysts in their investment analyses. As buy-side analysts work 
closely with and on behalf of institutional investors, they have not only been concerned 
about the operational and financial aspects of corporations. Buy-side analysts have also 
long opined on the governance of companies, and examined the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by investee companies (Gullapalli, 2004). Relative to the on-going 
concern about corporate governance on the part of buy-side analysts, the relatively 
recent “doing” of corporate governance by some analysts on the sell-side represents a 
new phenomenon that deserves special consideration. The availability of the corporate 
governance reports produced by sell-side analysts also allows us to examine how 
corporate governance has been made visible and operable by these analysts.
capacity [o f companies] on a broad range o f  information”. This information includes both financial and 
non-financial information. Some o f  the information is based on formal disclosure by the company, but 
some o f  it comes from industry-wide sources and third-party sources. The notion o f  “information 
ecosystem” is deployed by Miller and O ’Leary (2000) to characterise the “complex and dynamic” flows 
o f  various sources o f  information.
5 Coffee (2006) identifies a third group o f  analysts, namely, independent analysts. These analysts typically 
work for broker-dealer firms that do not provide investment banking services.
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1.2 Expanding the mechanisms o f corporate governance
The notion of “corporate governance” is subject to varying interpretations, which makes 
arriving at a single definition of corporate governance a difficult task (e.g. Keasey, 
Thompson, & Wright, 2005a; Solomon, 2007). This thesis concentrates on the diverse 
mechanisms of corporate governance, whether it is the actors, agencies, or devices 
deployed, that have been commonly perceived as having the potential to affect the 
conduct of corporations. It has been widely perceived that the main mechanisms of 
corporate governance include the Board of Directors (especially non-executive 
directors) and board committees, internal control, external financial audit, and 
institutional investor voting and engagement with companies, among others (Brennan & 
Solomon, 2008). These, and other prevailing mechanisms of corporate governance, have 
been developed and proposed with the aim of making corporations accountable, 
transparent, and responsible in financial markets (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; OECD, 2004b). 
These mechanisms have been strongly emphasised in various codes, principles, and 
guidelines of corporate governance. For instance, the UK Cadbury Report (1992) 
stressed the need for boards of directors in listed companies to be effective, and made 
recommendations for best practice of the corporate boards. The UK Smith Report (2003) 
and the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US Congress, 2002) both dealt with issues regarding 
the relationship between external auditors and the companies they audit, and the role and 
responsibilities of audit committees of companies. Furthermore, the importance of active 
engagement of institutional investors with their investee companies, and of dialogue 
between these two parties was initially pointed out in the Cadbury Report (1992), and 
was then emphasised in the Combined Code (1998) and the Higgs Report (2003) issued 
in Britain. These mechanisms of corporate governance have also come to feature in 
textbooks of corporate governance, and have been critically discussed and debated in 
academic research (e.g. Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 2005b; Mallin, 2004; Solomon, 
2007).
However, other mechanisms of corporate governance have also been considered as able 
to influence the way in which corporations are governed, although they have been little
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discussed in formal regulations or textbooks of corporate governance. For instance, the 
World Bank (2000:9) considered that “private sector agents, self-regulating bodies, the 
media, investment and corporate governance analysts, and civic society” are potentially 
able to “[...] reduce information asymmetry, improve monitoring of the firms, and shed 
light on opportunistic behaviour”. Sir Adrian Cadbury, who chaired the committee to 
develop the first corporate governance code in Britain in 1992, recently proposed that 
broader constituents of the investing public are potentially capable of influencing 
corporate behaviour as well as the expectations of institutional investors (Cadbury, 
2006). As suggested by Cadbury (2006: 41), these broader constituents include “the 
media in all its forms, financial advisers, analysts and commentators, financial 
institutions, and the body politic”. Also, according to Engwall (2006), prior academic 
research in corporate governance employed a too narrow conception of corporate 
governance, which tended to focus only on the relationships between shareholders and 
management. He suggested that the roles that “other significant counterparts and 
stakeholders of the corporation”, such as governments, the media, and civil society6 
(ibid: 162), can play in governing corporate conduct need to be researched. In addition, 
in the editorial for a recent special issue on Corporate Governance and Accountability in 
the Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Brennan and Solomon (2008) 
explicitly pointed out that research into mechanisms of corporate governance needs to 
be broadened and frontiers of corporate governance research be pushed forward. The 
doing of corporate governance by analysts that this thesis examines represents a new 
phenomenon that merits study within this overall line of enquiry. This thesis brings sell- 
side financial analysts within the study of corporate governance. It investigates in what 
way the doing of corporate governance by analysts can be viewed as contributing to 
expanding the mechanisms of corporate governance.
1.3 A focus on analysts in both the US and the UK
This thesis focuses on the subsets of analysts who have worked on corporate governance 
in the US and the UK. These analysts largely come from international brokerage houses 
and investment banks that operate on both sides of the Atlantic. Within the same
6 Engwall (2006) considered three counterparts, namely, governments, the media, and civil society in his 
study.
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international brokerage firm, on-the-job training for analysts in the US and the UK 
respectively is likely to be similar, if not exactly the same. Analysts in these two 
geographical jurisdictions may have developed and acquired very similar analytical 
skills and shared common views on certain issues in the investment research process. 
Also, in both countries, there has been an increasing number of people in the financial 
services industry who have studied or been studying for the Chartered Financial Analyst 
(CFA) investment professional qualification which has been regarded by The Economist
n
as “the gold standard among investment analysis designations” . These clearly include 
existing analysts, as well as those who intend to become analysts. “Corporate
o
governance” has formally been included in the CFA curriculum since 2006 , and 
regarded as an element that constitutes the “framework for making investment 
decisions” (The CFA Institute, 2008:20). Analysts who have been studying for, or have 
obtained the CFA in both countries, will have been equipped with a basic understanding 
of issues related to corporate governance9. Furthermore, analysts on both sides of the 
Atlantic started to work on corporate governance issues more or less at the same time, 
namely, from the early 21st century. At that particular historical moment, corporate 
governance was perceived as a problem both in the US and the UK. Improving standards 
of corporate governance and reforming the corporate systems were considered as 
important agendas put forward by governments, regulators, institutional investors, 
corporations, professional associations, and other stakeholders in both countries.
In addition, both the US and the UK operate so-called Anglo-Saxon systems of 
corporate governance. Within such systems, most companies listed on the stock
7 See http://www.cfainstitute.org/cfaprog/overview/facts.html.
8 This information was obtained through personal contact by the author o f  this thesis with the CFA 
Institute via email in November 2009.
9 Some analysts may have worked as auditors or accountants before they become research analysts at 
brokerage firms. These analysts may have acquired knowledge o f  corporate governance through their 
prior professional accountancy training with professional bodies such as the ICAEW (Institute o f  
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales), the ACCA (Association o f  Chartered Certified 
Accountants), CIMA (Chartered Institute o f  Management Accountants), and others. “Corporate 
governance” has been included in the syllabuses for the training programmes o f  these professional 
accountancy bodies. For example, as informed by the Innovation & Technical Development Manager o f  
the ICAEW (via email contact by the author o f  this thesis on 21/01/2010), the term “corporate 
governance” first appeared in the syllabus for the Associate Chartered Accountant (ACA) qualification 
granted by the ICAEW in 2000. However, this phrase had already been used in the draft o f  this syllabus in 
1998. This manager also suggested that elements o f  corporate governance had been dotted around the 
ACA syllabuses in auditing and business management, though not under the umbrella term, even before 
1998.
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exchanges are controlled by managers who are responsible for the day-to-day operation 
of the firms, but owned by outside shareholders10. The outside shareholders are 
predominantly institutional investors11, including pension funds, insurance companies, 
unit trusts, investment trusts, and other financial institutions, but they also include 
individual investors. Increasingly, institutional investors in both the US and the UK have 
been trying to gain a greater influence over the management of companies by more 
actively exercising their voting rights and closely engaging with investee companies 
(e.g. Solomon, 2007). Nevertheless, several differences still exist between the corporate 
governance systems operated in the US and the UK. For instance, the approach to 
regulating corporate governance in the two countries differs, with the US adopting a 
“rule-based” regulatory approach, and Britain having a “principle-based” regulatory 
culture. However, the main mechanisms of corporate governance that have come to 
prevail in these two countries can be regarded as broadly similar. Mechanisms of 
corporate governance, such as the board of directors (especially non-executive directors) 
and board committees, internal control, external financial audit, institutional investor 
voting and engagement with companies that have been mentioned in the previous 
section, have been strongly emphasised in the corporate governance regulations and 
principles issued in these two countries. Also, it has been suggested that there is a trend 
toward an international convergence of ideas on what constitutes best practice for 
corporate governance (e.g. Mallin, 2004; Solomon, 2007). The regulatory elements 
contained in rules, codes, principles, and guidelines of corporate governance worldwide 
have tended to converge over the last two decades.
There are structural and procedural differences between the doing of corporate 
governance by analysts in the US and the UK. The corporate governance reports written
10 This system is also termed “outsider” (e.g. Short, Keasey, Hull, & Wright, 1998) or “market-based” 
(e.g. Zysman, 1983) system o f  corporate governance.
11 As noted by Mallin (2006: 76), throughout the 20th century, institutional share ownership increased in 
both the US and the UK. In Britain, according to the figures compiled by the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS), ownership by insurance companies increased from 10% in 1963 to 17% in 2004 while that o f  
pension funds increased from 6% to 16%. For the largest 1000 US corporations, according to a report 
issued by The Conference Board (2008), institutional investors increased their holdings from an average 
o f  46.6% o f  total stock in 1987, to an average o f  61.4% by 2000, and then to an 76.4% by 2007. It is 
further argued by Solomon (2007: 110) that “[ .. .]  the growing concentration o f  shareholding by a 
relatively small number o f  institutional investors is resulting in the evolution o f  a capitalist system in the 
UK and in the USA that bears little resemblance to the fragmented and dispersed stock market o f  Berle 
and Means (1932)”.
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by analysts in the US have typically been produced by equity research analysts on an 
individual basis within the industry sector teams. These analysts have tended to focus on 
performing evaluations of the corporate governance procedures of companies. In 
contrast, analysts in the UK have made more attempts at linking corporate governance to 
the financials in investment analyses, and these have been mostly undertaken by analysts 
in the specialised SRI or ESG teams within the equity research divisions of brokerage 
firms. Although this is the general pattern, exceptions exist. Rather than explore the 
reason behind this general pattern or the exceptions, this thesis concentrates on the 
process through which the doing of corporate governance by analysts in the US and the 
UK as an overall phenomenon emerged, and the mechanisms and devices that analysts 
have deployed for doing corporate governance.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section sets out in more detail 
the specific questions that this thesis addresses regarding the doing of corporate 
governance by analysts. It also elaborates on the key theme of the thesis, namely, the 
notion of analysts as agents o f transparency. The theoretical lenses and concepts which 
inform and underpin the empirical analysis of this research are then introduced. Next, 
the various empirical materials that this thesis draws upon in order to address the 
research questions are highlighted. This chapter ends with an overview of the remaining 
chapters of the thesis.
2. Analysts make corporate governance visible
Various questions can be asked about the doing of corporate governance by analysts. 
This section highlights the research focus of the thesis and sets out the specific research 
questions that this thesis addresses. It also further introduces the key theme that this 
thesis intends to put forward, namely, analysts as agents o f transparency making 
corporate governance visible.
2.1 Research focus and questions
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The first issue that this thesis addresses is how and in what settings the doing of
corporate governance by analysts emerged. It is often suggested that the corporate
governance work undertaken by analysts more or less commenced subsequent to the
outbreak of a series of highly debated corporate scandals in the early 21st century, such
as Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing (e.g. Gullapalli, 2004; Sweeney, 2004), and
1
that it coincided with a series of regulatory initiatives that followed these much-cited 
events. However, this thesis locates the emergence of the doing of corporate governance 
by analysts in the US and the UK within a broad social and historical context. More 
specifically, this thesis investigates the issues debated, and the actions and activities 
undertaken by a multiplicity of different actors and agencies that made it possible for 
analysts to bring corporate governance within the boundaries of their work territory at a 
particular historical moment. The agents and agencies included national and 
international governmental and non-governmental organisations, professional groups, 
institutional investors, and financial institutions. These issues, actions, activities, 
together with the individuals, organisations, and institutions involved, are not viewed as 
constituting the direct and proximate cause of the emergence of the corporate 
governance work pursued by analysts. Instead, they are understood in this thesis as 
providing the conditions o f possibility for the doing of corporate governance by analysts 
to appear and develop. They are viewed as the dispersed factors that gave rise to and 
facilitated the emergence of the corporate governance work performed by analysts in the 
US and the UK in the early 21st century.
In addition to examining the historical and social settings in which the doing of 
corporate governance by analysts appeared, this thesis investigates the two aspects of the 
phenomenon. The first aspect is the evaluations undertaken by analysts of the corporate 
governance procedures of companies. Analysts have been considered as the evaluating 
audiences of corporations, and have traditionally focused on the operational and 
financial aspects of companies. The corporate governance evaluations performed by 
analysts indicate that the evaluating activities undertaken by analysts have been
12 For instance, the enactment o f  the Sarbanes-Oxley A ct (2002) and the N ew York Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Rules (2003) in the US, the revision o f  the Combined Code o f  Corporate 
Governance (2003) in the UK, the revision o f  the OECD Principles o f  Corporate Governance (OECD, 
2004b).
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extended to the field of corporate governance. While the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies have frequently been evaluated, assessed, and 
monitored by various organisations external to companies, such as corporate governance 
rating firms, this thesis reveals the specific features of the corporate governance 
evaluations undertaken by analysts. Corporate governance practices and procedures are 
specified by a variety of regulatory bodies and codes, including stock market listing 
rules, international and national governance codes, company laws, and financial 
regulations. This thesis pays special attention to the questions of how regulations of 
corporate governance have been drawn upon, and how regulatory requirements have 
been unpacked and re-interpreted by analysts in their corporate governance evaluations. 
Also, making comparisons of the operational and financial aspects of different 
companies has traditionally been practised by analysts in their equity research process 
(e.g. Beunza & Garud, 2007). This thesis examines to what extent making comparison 
has been deployed by analysts also in their corporate governance evaluations, and 
through what mechanisms comparisons have been made and represented. Regarding the 
first aspect of the doing of corporate governance by analysts, the thesis also considers 
how the perceptions of companies’ corporate governance procedures held by financial 
market participants such as institutional investors can be altered and transformed by the 
corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts.
The linking of corporate governance to the financials and the integration of governance 
issues within investment analyses represents the second aspect of the doing of corporate 
governance by analysts. The agenda put forward by financial market participants for 
integrating corporate governance in the investment decision making process started to 
surface in the early 21st century (e.g. The UN Global Compact, 2004,2005,2009; The 
UNEP FI, 2004). Nevertheless, a common and consistent understanding of how to 
incorporate corporate governance issues in asset management, securities brokerage 
services, and the associated buy-side and sell-side research functions is seen not to exist 
yet (The UN Global Compact, 2004:1). The integration of corporate governance within 
the investment analyses undertaken by analysts can be thought of as an emerging form 
of economic calculation. What constitutes this particular form of economic calculation 
and how such integration has been performed by analysts are the specific research
- 2 0 -
questions that this thesis addresses regarding the second aspect of the doing of corporate 
governance by analysts. To address these questions, on one hand, this thesis tracks the 
extant prevailing ideas related to the potential link between corporate governance and 
the financials, the ideas about the importance of incorporating governance issues in the 
investment decision making process, as well as the perceptions of what analysts could 
and should do to link corporate governance to the financials. On the other hand, the 
thesis examines the concrete work pursued by analysts, in particular, the devices and 
tools deployed by analysts, in linking governance issues to the financials. This thesis 
further considers how these devices and tools can help bring the category of corporate 
governance, which is commonly perceived as a risk factor, into the investment decision 
making process, and how they can transform and re-present the link between corporate 
governance and the financials.
In the next section, the notion of agents o f transparency is set out in greater detail, and 
the concept of “transparency” in the context of this thesis is designated and elaborated 
upon.
2.2 Analysts as agents o f transparency
“Transparency” is a term that has been widely and pervasively used in debates over 
business governance, public policy making, and institutional design during the last two 
decades of the 20th century13. Hood (2006) has even argued that transparency has 
established some kind of “quasi-religious” authority and significance as a “doctrine of 
governance”. Transparency has also been considered as an idea or an “organising 
principle” that guides various efforts on economic, political, and social administration, 
control, and reform (cf. Garsten & Lindh-de-Montoya, 2008). For instance, in the arena 
of corporate governance reform, together with notions of accountability, responsibility, 
and integrity, transparency has been frequently referred to as a guiding principle that has 
informed the development and formulation of detailed codes and rules of corporate 
governance (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; OECD, 2004b). Although the concept of transparency
13 Hood (2006) has suggested that the notion o f  transparency is not an invention o f  the twentieth century. 
Instead, he identifies that “the idea o f  disclosure or transparency in corporate governance pre-dates the 
twentieth century” (ibis: 17).
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has gained increasing currency, a single definition of transparency is rarely found. 
Instead, it has been suggested that the term “transparency” embraces many different 
strains and can be interpreted in heterogeneous ways depending on the context in which 
it is used (e.g. Garsten & Lindh-de-Montoya, 2008; Hood, 2006). However, there is a 
general perception that transparency is about visibility, making things visible and 
comparable, and ensuring that there are adequate flows of information about a certain 
object (e.g. Garsten & Lindh-de-Montoya, 2008; Hood, 2006). The current study 
endorses this particular conception of transparency. More specifically, for this thesis, 
“transparency” refers to the visibility of the corporate governance procedures adopted by 
companies, the visibility of the link between corporate governance and the financials, as 
well as the visibility of the category of corporate governance as a risk factor in the 
investment decision making process.
This thesis argues that the evaluations of the corporate governance procedures of 
companies performed by analysts contribute to making the governance of corporations 
visible in financial markets. The corporate governance evaluations undertaken by 
analysts constitute activities of monitoring, assessing, and evaluating which have 
flourished in various aspects of social and economic life. It has been suggested that these 
activities are often defended and justified on the ground of transparency (e.g. Garsten & 
Lindh-de-Montoya, 2008; Hood, 2006). However, this thesis pays more attention to the 
new visibility of the governance of corporations that can be created through the 
corporate governance evaluations undertaken by analysts due to the deployment of 
certain evaluative techniques by analysts. The focus here is on the form and format of 
visibility of the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies, rather than on 
whether visibility is enhanced or weakened.
A similar conception of transparency is adopted regarding the link between corporate 
governance and the financials, and the category of corporate governance as a risk factor 
in the investment decision making process. It is, again, the form and format of visibility 
that is the main focus here, rather than the increase or decrease in visibility. More 
specifically, this thesis concentrates on the form and format in which the potential link 
between corporate governance and the financials is transformed and rendered visible.
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The thesis also attends to the way in which corporate governance as a risk factor is made 
visible so that it can be easily picked up and readily incorporated into investment 
analyses. While arguing that analysts are capable of making aspects of corporate 
governance (namely, the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies, the 
link between corporate governance and the financials, and the category of corporate 
governance as a risk factor) visible, or more specifically, of creating and inventing new 
visibility of corporate governance, this thesis further proposes that analysts can be 
thought of as agents o f transparency in financial markets. The techniques and tools 
deployed by analysts in making corporate governance visible and transparent, can be 
viewed, to follow Grossman, Luque, and Muniesa (2008b: 98), as “transparency-making 
devices”. Analysts, with the deployment of the transparency making devices, 
operationalise the idea of “transparency” through doing corporate governance.
3. Theoretical lenses and concepts
In order to inform the empirical investigation of these issues, this thesis draws upon 
some additional and related concepts. These are introduced here, although they are 
further elaborated upon in later chapters.
3.1 “Eventalisation ” and the “arena ” analysis
This thesis investigates the multiple and dispersed factors that gave rise to the doing of 
corporate governance by analysts in the US and the UK in the early 21st century. To 
capture this emphasis on the “multiple surfaces of emergence” of the corporate 
governance work pursued by analysts, the thesis draws upon the genealogical approach 
to history formulated by Michel Foucault, and particularly the notion of 
“eventalisation”.
The genealogical approach to history focuses on the “history of the present”, as opposed 
to the “origin of the present” sought by traditional historical analysis (e.g. Castel, 1994; 
Miller & Napier, 1993; Smart, 2002). Genealogy lightens “the weight of causality”
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(Foucault, 1991b: 77). It analyses a phenomenon based on the multiple processes that 
constitute it, and reveals the complexity, fragility, and contingency surrounding the 
phenomenon or event in question (Foucault, 1991b: 76; Smart, 2002: 56). Such an 
analysis has also been termed by Foucault (1991b) “eventalisation”. As Smart (2002:58) 
has further explained, eventalisation “[...] aims to rediscover the complex of factors, 
connections, strategies and forces which precipitate the establishment of an event which 
in turn subsequently achieves the status of self-evidence and necessity [... and] reveals 
events to be a product of a multiplicity of processes and to be located in a complex field 
of relations”. To follow and operationalise the genealogical approach and the related 
notion of “eventalisation”, this thesis discovers the multiple processes and complex 
relations between various issues, events, agents, and agencies out of which the doing of 
corporate governance by analysts emerged.
The genealogical approach to history has been drawn upon by scholars in accounting to 
examine the emergence of new modes of calculation (e.g. Burchell, Clubb, & Hopwood, 
1985; Mennicken, 2008; Miller, 1991; Miller & Napier, 1993; Robson, 1991,1994). The 
concept of “arena” originated and further developed by these scholars has affinities with 
the Foucauldian genealogy, as it examines the complex interplay of heterogeneous 
elements that conditions the emergence of calculations. The notion of “arena” was 
initially developed by Burchell et al (1985) in their study of the rise of value-added 
accounting in the UK in the 1970s. According to Burchell et al. (1985: 390), an arena is 
conceptualised as a particular domain of operation that exists between certain issues, 
institutions, bodies of knowledge, practices, and actions. Within an arena, there exist 
shifting patterns of relations between the various agencies functioning in the domain, 
along with its associated problems and solutions (Burchell et al., 1985). In the case of 
the value-added “event”, Burchell et al. (1985) identify three arenas that constituted the 
“accounting constellation” within which value-added accounting emerged in Britain in 
the 1970s14.
This initial formulation of the notion of “arena” has been developed further in later 
studies of accounting changes, especially by Robson (1991; 1994) and Mennicken
14 These three arenas are: the explication o f standards for corporate financial reporting, the management o f  
the national economy, and the system o f  industrial relations.
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(2008). According to Robson (1994: 48), an accounting arena is constituted by a 
particular problematisation of a certain accounting technique. “Problematisation” is 
regarded by Robson (1994: 48) as the process through which something (e.g. an 
accounting technique) comes to be viewed as a significant problem. This process is often 
characterised by a diverse and heterogeneous group of agents and agencies pronouncing 
on the deficiencies or failures of exiting technique and calling for new tool to emerge 
(Miller & O’Leary, 1994). The problematisation of an object is often linked to wider 
concerns and broader objectives in the economy and society that are articulated in the 
form of arguments, rationales, and vocabularies deployed (Miller, 1991). In other words, 
the problem with a particular calculative tool is defined in relation to the social, 
institutional, and historical settings in which it operates, instead of being explained by 
reference to its ultimate function (e.g. Mennicken, 2008: 78; Robson, 1991).
The linkages and relays between the wider discourses and rationales and certain 
calculative technique are established through processes of translation (e.g. Mennicken, 
2008; Miller, 1991; Robson, 1991). “Translation” can be conceptualised as a process 
which involves creating convergences, coherences, equivalences, and homologies by 
relating claims, concerns, and interests that were previously different (e.g. Callon, 1980; 
Callon & Law, 1982; Robson, 1991). Through processes of translation, particular 
problems and questions are offered new interpretations, allowing aspirations and ideas to 
be channelled in specific directions (Latour, 1987: 117; Miller, 1991:738). This enables 
the problem associated with a particular calculative technique to be expressed in a way 
that it is consistent with wider concerns and issues in the economy and society, and that 
can be shared by a diverse and heterogeneous group of agents and agencies.
The process of problematisation also concerns the formulation and articulation of the 
proposed solution to the problem (Foucault, 1984b). Problematisation is to be 
understood as “the parallel emergence of problems and their solutions” (Hull, 1997: 
220), and there exists a “reciprocal relationship” between the problem and the solution 
(Miller & O'Leary, 1993). To propose something as a solution to the problem and to 
persuade others that this is the solution, alliances are normally formed, and arguments 
are mobilised by the use of languages and discourses in a way that the interests of other
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groups, parties, and organisations are reframed and restated towards a common interest 
(Latour, 1987: 108-121)15. This implies that the process through which a solution gets 
articulated and potentially accepted by the various organisations and institutions in the 
economy and society also involves processes of translation.
The notions of eventalisation and arena, together with the related concepts of 
problematisation and translation, inform the empirical analysis of this thesis on the 
emergence of the “doing” of corporate governance by analysts. Three arenas are 
identified for the current study, and these are investment research, the regulatory 
framework for sell-side financial analysts, and corporate governance16. These arenas 
constituted the multiple conditions that made possible the emergence of the corporate 
governance work undertaken by analysts in the US and the UK in the early 2 1st century. 
In each of the arenas identified, certain issues came to be seen as a problem (e.g. the 
short-term focus of traditional sell-side investment research) by a diverse and 
heterogeneous group of actors and agencies with originally different interests, claims, 
and work agendas. The problem also came to be seen as being attached to and connected 
with certain broader aspirations and objectives in the economy and society, such as 
restoring investor confidence in financial markets. The corporate governance work 
performed by analysts, it is argued, was perceived and articulated as a proposed solution 
to the specific problem identified in each arena, and considered as being able to help 
realise and achieve the broader aspirations, objectives, and ideals.
3.2 “Programme” and “technology”
The broader policy objectives, together with the aspirations of various actors and agents 
linked with the doing of corporate governance by analysts, have a programmatic nature 
that has been given particular attention in the “govemmentality”17 literature (e.g. Miller 
& Rose, 1990; Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose & Miller, 1992). According to this literature,
15 This process is sometimes understood as “enrolment”, in which the interests o f  others are incorporated 
into the solution that one suggests (Callon & Law, 1982; Robson, 1991: 552).
16 These three arenas are delineated in detail in Chapter 2.
17 Foucault (1991a: 102) defined “govemmentality” as an “ensemble formed by the institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise o f  this very 
specific albeit complex form o f  power”.
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a range of authorities and administrators seek to govern and act upon the actions of 
others, and set out these aspirations in a particular language or vocabulary that 
represents the domain to be governed in such a way that it is rendered amenable to 
government. The term “programme” refers to the “discursive nature of modes of 
governing, the conceptualising and imagining of the economic domain and its 
constituent components and associated problems as something that could be acted upon 
and calculated” (Miller, 2008b: 8-9). Programmes of government are ideals to be sought 
and aspirations to be realised (Miller & Rose, 1990; 2008). Programmes are often 
depicted in “government reports, White Papers, Green Papers, papers from business, 
trade unions, financiers, political parties, charities and academics proposing this or that 
scheme for dealing with this or that problem” (Miller & Rose, 1990:4). In the context of 
this study, this means attending to the ideals, aspirations, and objectives through which 
the idea of corporate governance for the financial markets was articulated. For instance, 
“re-establishing the integrity of the financial services industry” and “restoring investor 
confidence in the capital markets” can be viewed as programmes. These aspirations and 
objectives were widely articulated when the technology stock bubble burst and the 
financial markets declined in the late 1990s, and after the downfall of Enron, 
WorldCom, and the other corporate giants in the early 2 1st century. Also, “transparency” 
can itself be understood as a programme. Improving the information disclosure of firms, 
and making particular aspects of companies visible, has become one of the key 
objectives to be achieved under the corporate governance reform since the early 1990s. 
“Transparency” has also been inscribed into different principles and codes of corporate 
governance to guide the formulation of the more detailed “best practices” of corporate 
governance (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; OECD, 2004b).
To govern, technologies of government also need to be deployed to intervene upon the 
objects that are the concern of the authorities. “Technologies” are defined by Miller 
(2008b: 9) as “the [...] devices and instruments that [make] it possible to operationalise 
[...] aspirations, and to act upon others [...]”. As proposed by Rose and Miller (1992: 
183), technologies include “techniques of notation, computation and calculation; 
procedures of examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and 
presentational forms such as tables [...]”, among the others. They are more or less
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material, humble, and mundane in nature, but are often attached to and linked with 
certain ideals and aspirations that these technologies can potentially help to achieve and 
realise (Miller, 2008b: 9). This implies that no matter how humble and mundane the
1 fttechnologies are, technologies and programmes always go hand in hand . Accounting, 
which is one form of economic calculation, has been viewed as technology of 
government (e.g. Miller, 1991; Power, 1997; Robson, 1994). Accounting is often seen as 
being linked to various programmatic ideals and aspirations that it helps achieve and 
realise. For instance, the technique of discounted cash flow was called upon to help 
facilitate better investment decisions in the hope of achieving economic growth in 
Britain in the 1960s (Miller, 1991). The language of “efficiency” was central to the 
ambitions of standard costing to transform British enterprises in the early decades of the 
20th century (Miller & O’Leary, 1987). Also, the rise of Russian auditing practices was 
conditioned by, and implicated in, the wider transition from a planned to a market 
economy in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Mennicken, 2009).
Inscriptions have also been viewed as technologies of government (Rose & Miller, 
1992). The term “inscription” was originally developed by Latour and his colleagues in 
social studies of science and technology (e.g. Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). 
As paraphrased by Robson (1992: 689), inscriptions refer to “the various techniques of 
“marking” an object or event that is to be known -  writing, recording, drawing, 
tabulating”. Inscriptions can take the form of graphs, diagrams, photographs, equations, 
models, written reports, and computer programs. Inscriptions have been considered as 
representational devices through which a setting is transformed and represented in a new 
form. More specifically, by means of inscription, reality is rendered visible, measurable, 
comparable, calculable, and amenable to be acted upon (Rose & Miller, 1992). The 
information generated from processes of inscribing is not a neutral recording of what 
happens in the domain. Instead, it is “a way of acting upon the real [... and of] mak[ing] 
the domain in question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention” (Rose & 
Miller, 1992: 185). Inscribing a realm into a form that is visible, measurable, and
18 The formulation o f  the notions o f  “programmes” and “technologies” more or less parallels the 
development o f  the notions o f  “ideas”, “things”, and “marks” by Hacking (1992) who regards these as 
elements o f  laboratory experimentation. In particular, “ideas”, which refer to the intellectual elements o f  
an experiment, has affinities with the notion o f  “programmes”.
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comparable also facilitates and enables the formation of “centres of calculation” (Latour, 
1987; see also Rose & Miller, 1992). These are the locales in which information about a 
domain is transported and accumulated so that certain persons or groups can be in the 
know about the domain, engage in certain calculations, and act upon the domain “at a 
distance”19. For the current study, the notion of “inscription” is central to informing the 
examination of the mechanisms and devices deployed by analysts when doing corporate 
governance. Inscriptions, it is suggested, relate to the narratives, tables, lists, charts, 
graphs, and financial and statistical models deployed by analysts in their evaluations of 
the corporate governance procedures of companies and in their integration of 
governance issues within investment analyses. The notion of “inscription” helps this 
thesis to make sense of the way in which the mechanisms and devices deployed by 
analysts have transformed and represented the governance procedures of companies, the 
link between corporate governance and the financials, and the category of corporate 
governance as a risk factor in the investment decision making process. These 
mechanisms and devices will be further conceptualised in this thesis as transparency 
making devices, as they can help make aspects of corporate governance known, visible, 
and transparent.
Like other technologies, inscriptions can be viewed as being linked to certain idealised 
schemata and aspirations that they can potentially help to operationalise, realise, and 
achieve20. Some scholars have even claimed that the very material, humble, and 
mundane techniques and tools can be viewed as being constituted by both 
“programmatic” and “technological” dimensions (Miller, 2008a, 2008b; Power, 1997). 
In his study of the “audit society”, Power (1997: 6) has regarded the “programmatic” 
aspect as relating to “the ideas and concepts which shape the mission of the practice and 
which, crucially, attach the practice to the broader policy objectives which exist in the 
political sphere”. The “technological” aspect is referred to as “the more or less concrete
19 As suggested by Miller (1991:738), “action at a distance” refers to “the possibility o f  a particular point 
becoming a centre with the capacity to influence other points that are distant, yet without resorting to 
direct intervention”. This implies that with the information about a domain being transported to and 
accumulated at a “centre o f  calculation”, the authority can act upon the domain from the centre based on 
the information available without directly encountering with the domain.
20 For instance, as Miller and Rose (1990) note, the input-output table, which was an important component 
o f a system o f  national account for post-war France, was linked to the notions o f  “growth”, “progress”, 
and “solidarity” that constituted the political vocabularies through which the project o f  modernising 
French society was formulated.
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tasks and routines which make up the world of practitioners” (Power, 1997: 6). Miller 
and his colleagues (Mennicken, Miller, & Samiolo, 2008; Miller, 2008a, 2008b) further 
suggest that when studying economic calculation, both programmatic and technological 
dimensions need to be conjointly analysed, and the linkage and interplay between the
91two aspects attended to .
This conceptualisation of economic calculation as having both programmatic and 
technological dimensions particularly has important implications for the investigation 
into the integration of corporate governance within the investment analyses performed 
by analysts. It informs this thesis that the concrete and routine work pursued by analysts 
to integrate governance issues within investment analyses can be viewed as being 
attached to and connected with certain wider ideas and broader policy objectives. These, 
as will be further discussed in later part of the thesis, include the ideas related to the 
potential link between corporate governance and the financials, the ideal and objective 
of incorporating governance issues into the investment decision making process, and the 
perceptions of what analysts could and should do to link corporate governance to the 
financials. The techniques and tools deployed by analysts to integrate corporate 
governance within investment analyses, it is argued, can potentially be seen as making 
the ideas operable, and helping to realise and achieve the aspirations and objectives.
3.3 “Critic ” and “carrier ”
Analysts have been depicted by some economic sociologists as the “critics” of the 
financial markets. While the notion of “critic” has been used to study evaluations 
performed by analysts of the operational and financial aspects of companies, this thesis 
draws upon this concept to inform the examination of their corporate governance 
evaluations.
The notion of “critic” originates from the economic sociology literature on the cultural
21 This conceptualisation o f  economic calculation differs from that o f  the so-called “technological turn” in 
economic sociology. This “technological turn” in economic sociology has tended to concentrate on the 
technological aspect, and largely downplay the programmatic dimension (e.g. Beunza, Hardie, & 
MacKenzie, 2006; Callon, 2005; Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007; Muniesa, M illo,
& Callon, 2007).
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product markets (e.g. Baumann, 2001; Becker, 1982; Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Hirsch,
001972; Shrum, 1991). Critics function in mediated markets , for which the cultural 
product market is an example. Critics evaluate the quality of product, which is normally 
uncertain, based on the aesthetic systems in a cultural field, and normally document 
critical reviews in written texts, such as newspapers and magazines. The aesthetic 
systems are generally viewed as the ideology and philosophy of justifying classification 
of things as “arts” (cf. Baumann, 2007)23. Critics are regarded as “institutional regulators 
of innovation” (Boskoff, 1964; Hirsch, 1972; Shrum, 1991) who endorse, facilitate, and 
filter cultural innovation. It has been suggested that producers of cultural products “[...] 
are highly responsive to feedback from institutional regulators” (Hirsch, 1972:649). The 
structural characteristics of the equity stock market are similar to those of a mediated 
market. As Zuckerman (1999) argues, industries correspond to the product categories by 
which equity shares are classified, and analysts are the product critics. Also, the value of 
stock is uncertain so that investors face significant difficulties in stock valuation. 
Investors hence rely heavily on the recommendations made by analysts who evaluate the 
performance of companies and document the evaluation in the form of equity research 
reports. Like other critics, analysts are considered to be influential. For example, it has 
been noted that a firm will suffer from an “illegitimacy discount” in its valuation if it 
fails to conform to the model of how firms should be structured as perceived by 
analysts24 (Zuckerman, 1999).
Critical reviews performed by critics can be viewed as activities of evaluating, 
scrutinising, and auditing that have flourished in various aspects of social and economic 
life (e.g. Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006) and contributed to the formation of the
22 Mediated markets can also be regarded as interpersonally dis-embedded markets, in which buyers and 
sellers do not have direct contact with each other in market transactions. Instead, they are mediated by a 
third party who mobilise the actions o f  buyers and sellers and shape market patterns. Critics can be 
viewed as mediators who make markets, and who facilitate transactions in mediated markets (e.g. 
Zuckerman, 1999).
23 Becker (1982) distinguishes critics from aestheticians. Aestheticians develop aesthetic systems in a 
cultural field (cf. Baumann, 2007), while critics apply aesthetic systems to evaluate specific art work. 
However, Selden (1975) argues against such a division o f  labour between aesthetics and criticism. 
According to Selden (1975), critics do not simply apply aesthetic systems, but also contribute to the 
development o f  the aesthetic systems in a cultural field.
24 According to Zuckerman (1999), a firm which operates in more than one industry will fail to gain 
reviews by analysts who normally focus only on one industry, owing to confusions over the identity o f  the 
firm. A s a consequence, the demand for the firm’s shares tends to be depressed, and the shares are traded 
at a discount.
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“audit society” (Power, 1997). These activities do not constitute formal laws or 
regulations. But, they can generate governing effects, shaping and normalising objects 
being assessed (Miller, 1996; Power, 1997; Wedlin, 2006). The domain being monitored 
and evaluated can potentially be rendered as “governable” or “auditable” objects25 (cf. 
Miller & O'Leary, 1987; Miller & Rose, 1990; Power, 1996). It can be argued that the 
capacity of critics to function as institutional regulators and influence market 
transactions attributes both to the position captured by critics in mediated markets and to 
the governing effect that can be generated from the activities of evaluating and 
scrutinising that critics perform.
If aesthetics, defined as the philosophy of art, guides and informs cultural critics, the 
regulatory requirements of “best practices” as inscribed in formal regulations of 
corporate governance can be seen as the guiding principle for analysts assessing the 
quality of the governance procedures of companies. However, laws and regulations are 
often ambiguous, and the meaning contained in them and the interpretation of them are 
not always transmitted in a straightforward manner (e.g. Edelman, Abraham, & 
Erlanger, 1992; Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Scott, 2003). This means that analysts, who 
have relatively little tradition and experience in dealing with regulatory issues related to 
corporate governance, may potentially interpret regulations of corporate governance in 
diverse ways. The concept of “carrier” helps this thesis to examine this aspect of the 
operationalisation of corporate governance regulations by analysts. Meanwhile, the other 
element that can be seen as being carried by analysts in their corporate governance 
evaluations is the information about the corporate governance procedures of companies. 
The concept of “carrier” can again be helpful in informing the examination of how such 
information has been transformed and represented by analysts.
25 According to Power (1996), audits “make things auditable”. This means that audits transform and 
structure individuals or organisations being audited in a way that conforms to “the need to be monitored 
ex-post” (Power, 1994: 7).
26 In this thesis, the term “best practice” does not only refer to the so-called “best practice o f  corporate 
governance” set out in principles or codes o f  corporate governance (i.e. soft regulations/laws), such as the 
UK Com bined Code o f  Corporate Governance, the OECD Principles o f  Corporate Governance, and the 
ICGN Statement on G lobal Corporate Governance Principles. It also refers to the regulatory requirements 
related to corporate governance that are prescribed in company law and stock market listing rules (i.e. 
hard laws).
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Carriers27 play significant roles in the framing, packaging, and circulating of ideas 
(Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002: 8). When ideas are adopted or spread, they are 
unpacked, transformed, edited, and reinterpreted by carriers. As Sahlin-Andersson and 
Engwall (2002: 23) have argued, “certain aspects of the idea may be described, passed 
on, or imitated, while other parts are ignored”. The form, focus, content, and meaning of 
the original idea are subject to transformation. For Scott (2003: 879), carriers “are not 
neutral vehicles, but mechanisms that significantly influence the nature of the elements 
they transmit”. As Hwang and Powell (2005) and Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall (2002) 
have further suggested, although carriers may not be dominant members of a given field 
or interested in shaping the field with regard to their own interests, their actions may to 
some extent challenge the dominant institutions and indirectly induce institutional 
change. Nevertheless, ideas are not circulated by carriers without any constraint. While 
labelling those who carry ideas as “editors”, Sahlin-Andersson (1996) argues that there 
exist certain editing rules that operate mainly by implicitly restricting the process of 
representing and re-telling. These rules attend to the context in which the editing is 
made, the text which is being edited, and the recipient of the edited text (Sahlin- 
Andersson, 1996: 85). In this thesis, “best practices” of corporate governance contained 
in formal regulations are considered, to a certain extent, as constraining the 
understanding of various corporate governance issues by financial market participants, 
including analysts. Nevertheless, as will be argued in later part of this thesis, as carriers, 
analysts are still able to transform these “best practices” in their corporate governance 
evaluations, albeit perhaps only to a modest extent.
The theoretical lenses and concepts introduced above help this thesis to make sense of 
the doing of corporate governance by analysts, in particular, its emergence and the two 
aspects of it. They also inform the selection of and concentration on certain empirical 
materials examined in this thesis.
27 They are also termed translators (Czamiawska & Sevon, 1996), knowledge entrepreneurs (Abrahamson 
& Fairchild, 2001), teachers o f  norms (Finnemore, 1993), editors (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996), and “others” 
(Meyer, 1996).
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4. Empirical materials
The main empirical materials used in this thesis are the corporate governance reports 
written by analysts, the official documents issued by various organisations and 
institutions, selected financial and business newspapers and magazines, together with 
other documents such as textbooks of corporate governance as well as academic and 
practioner publications on corporate governance. These textual documents help to 
address the research focus and questions of this thesis highlighted in section 2 of this 
chapter. The selection of these texts was informed by the theoretical lenses and concepts 
that this thesis draws upon, including notions of critic, carrier, technology, and 
programme.
Analysts have been conceptualised as critics who undertake critical reviews of the 
relative merits of corporations, particularly with respect to corporate governance in the 
context of this thesis. Like other critics, analysts document their evaluations and 
assessments of companies in reports which institutional investors can potentially get 
access to. Critical reviews documented in the form of written texts have been considered 
as highly important materials for research that examines the work of critics. They 
potentially provide useful insights into the ways in which critical reviews on certain 
objects are performed by critics. A number of prior studies on critics have focused on 
these textual documents, and drawn upon them as the main empirical materials (e.g. 
Baumann, 2001; Beunza & Garud, 2007; Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Shrum, 1991). In 
particular, the technologies, namely, the mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by 
critics in the critical review process are largely reflected in and can be identified from 
these written texts. For instance, largely based upon the film reviews available to the
•JQ
public in popular periodicals, Baumann (2001) identifies eight techniques deployed by 
film critics as “critical devices” in film reviews in an attempt to demonstrate the role of 
film critics in the legitimation of film as an art form in the US between 1925 and 1985. 
Also, when studying how analysts value stocks under extreme uncertainty, Beunza and 
Garud (2007) formulate their grounded theory largely based upon the equity research
28 According to Baumann (2001:415-416), these include positive and negative commentary, naming the 
director, comparison o f  directors, comparison o f  films, film is interpreted, merit in failure, art versus 
entertainment, and too easy to enjoy.
- 3 4 -
reports written by analysts. They have even argued that these reports provide “[...] a 
window into the cognitive processes followed by analysts in real time” (ibis: 14).
To follow Baumann (2001) and Beunza and Garud (2007), this thesis concentrates on 
the corporate governance reports written by analysts in order to identify and examine the 
technologies deployed by analysts in their evaluations of the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies. These reports are also intensively drawn upon in 
order to investigate the tools and devices deployed by analysts in their integration of 
governance issues within investment analyses. To align with some recent research on 
analysts which has seriously attended to the work product generated by analysts,
90namely, their written reports (e.g. Beunza & Garud, 2007; Fogarty & Rogers, 2005) , 
this thesis focuses on the arguments made and presented by analysts in the narratives of 
the corporate governance reports. The current study, however, extends this research by 
paying special attention to the tables, lists, charts, figures, and graphs that have been 
created by analysts and included in their corporate governance reports. By concentrating 
on the narratives, tables, lists, charts, figures, and graphs, which can all be viewed as 
“inscriptions”, the various technologies deployed by analysts in doing corporate 
governance can potentially be identified and investigated.
The concentration on the corporate governance reports produced by analysts is also 
informed by the concept of “carrier”. As suggested by Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 
(2002), as ideas are adopted and circulated, carriers present them most commonly in the 
form of written or oral texts. These texts provide a potentially useful source based on 
which researchers can investigate the way in which ideas are unpacked, elaborated upon, 
edited, and interpreted by carriers. In the current study, the ideas that are carried by 
analysts in their corporate governance evaluations are largely constituted by the 
regulatory requirements of corporate governance contained in stock market listing rules,
29 A s mentioned by Beunza and Garud (2007: 17-18), in the analysts ranking issued by the Institutional 
Investor magazine in 2003, investors were asked to rank in importance eight different dimensions o f  
analyst merit: industry knowledge, written reports, special services, servicing, stock selection, earnings 
estimates, market making, and quality o f  sales force. The top two criteria, according to the result, were 
“written reports” and “industry knowledge”. Beunza and Garud (2007: 18) argue that the arguments and 
ideas that analysts present in the equity research reports are more useful to investors than the brief 
numbers in the form o f  earning forecasts and price targets. This has led Beunza and Garud (2007) to 
concentrate on the equity research reports produced by analysts as the main empirical materials in their 
study.
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international and national governance codes and principles, company laws, and financial 
regulations. The ways in which regulations of corporate governance have been 
operationalised, unpacked, and re-interpreted by analysts are identified in this thesis 
mainly from the narratives of the corporate governance reports written by analysts. 
Meanwhile, the other element which can be thought of as being carried by analysts in 
their governance evaluations is the information about the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by corporations. As suggested by the concept of “carrier”, the form, 
format, and focus of this information can potentially be edited and transformed by 
analysts. By focusing on the corporate governance reports written by analysts, 
particularly on the various tables and lists contained in the reports, the manner in which 
the information about the governance procedures of companies has been summarised, 
compiled, and re-presented by analysts is investigated.
For this study, a total of 55 corporate governance reports produced by analysts based in 
the US and the UK have been collected. A majority of them (46) have been obtained 
from the Investext Plus database initially available from the British Library. Key words 
in the field of corporate governance were typed in so as to search reports specifically 
related to the issue of corporate governance produced by analysts on the database. These 
key words included “corporate governance”, “governance”, “board of directors”, “audit 
committee”, “remuneration committee”, among others. Six reports have been obtained 
through personal contacts with analysts and other practioners in financial markets. Three 
further reports have been found on the Internet30. The chart in Appendix 1 shows the 
distribution of these reports between 2000 and 2008. These reports are all in PDF 
format. They were first coded sentence-by-sentence with the aim of identifying the 
mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by analysts in their corporate governance 
evaluations and integration. The codes were then combined and incorporated into
30 The Investext Plus database was available for access from the British Library. The British Library, 
however, terminated its subscription to this database in early 2009. No analyst report can be obtained from 
the database in the British Library since then. This thesis draws upon the corporate governance reports 
that were published before 2009. Although the corporate governance reports produced by analysts have 
been obtained from three main different sources, there are some other reports that can not be possibly  
reached at all. Therefore, it is practically impossible to find out the total number o f  the corporate 
governance reports written by analysts. However, it is not the purpose o f  this thesis to generalise how  
analysts do corporate governance across the whole analyst population. Instead, the availability o f  some o f  
these corporate governance reports allows this thesis to examine how some analysts do corporate 
governance in detail.
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themes. These themes were indicative of the background against which a particular 
corporate governance report was written, and the ways in which analysts operationalised 
regulations of corporate governance, facilitated comparisons of the governance 
procedures adopted by different companies, and combined the examination of 
governance issues with that of the financials in investment analyses. Tables, figures, and 
graphs that are included in the reports were also compared and contrasted in order to 
find out their similarities and differences, and the circumstances under which these 
representational devices were utilised by analysts.
In addition to technologies, this thesis also focuses on programmes or the programmatic 
that technologies help to make operable. For this study, programmes relate to certain 
ideals to be sought, and certain aspirations and objectives to be realised and achieved 
that are widely articulated in financial markets. Through the elaboration and deployment 
of a particular language or vocabulary, as previously discussed, programmes take shape 
within “government reports, White Papers, Green Papers, papers from business, trade 
unions, financiers, political parties, charities and academics [...]” (Miller & Rose, 1990:
4). The ideas, aspirations, and objectives that are discursively represented and articulated 
through specific languages or vocabularies can be identified from such textual 
documents. To identify and trace the emergence, development, and articulation of these 
ideas, aspirations, and objectives in financial markets, and particularly with respect to 
the corporate governance work performed by analysts, this thesis attends to a variety of 
other textual documents in addition to the corporate governance reports written by 
analysts. These include official documents issued by national and international 
governmental and non-governmental organisations, professional associations, and 
informal networks formed between institutional investors and asset management firms, 
selected financial and business newspapers and magazines, textbooks of corporate 
governance, and academic and practioner publications on corporate governance.
For instance, the reports issued by the United Nations Global Compact and the United 
Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative are drawn upon to trace the ideas 
related to the importance of integrating corporate governance in the investment decision 
making process, and to the potential role analysts could and should play in this field.
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These ideas that appeared and developed in financial markets in the early 21st century 
are viewed as shaping and giving significance to the concrete work performed by 
analysts in their attempts to link governance issues to the financials. The investigation 
into the dispersed factors that gave rise to the emergence of the overall phenomenon of 
the doing of corporate governance by analysts also draws upon official documents 
issued by various organisations and institutions. Based on these documents, this thesis 
traces how certain issues were considered as problems in relation to wider concerns and 
broader objectives in financial markets. For instance, the documents issued by the 
British Trade Union Congress, the Centre for Financial Market Integrity of the Chartered 
Financial Analyst Institute, the Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics, the 
Enhanced Analytic Initiative, and others, are drawn upon in this research to trace how 
the short-term focus of traditional sell-side investment research was perceived as 
problematic in the early 21st century in relation to the more general problem of “short- 
termism” in financial markets at that time. Also, as identified from some of these 
documents, investment research performed by analysts that considers extra-financial 
issues (EFIs)31, such as corporate governance, was perceived and articulated as a 
proposed solution to the problem associated with the short-term focus of traditional sell- 
side research in particular, and to the problem of “short-termism” in financial markets in 
general.
The various textual documents that this thesis draws upon to study the doing of 
corporate governance by analysts are the primary materials on which this thesis is based. 
They are supplemented by materials obtained from seven semi-structured interviews. 
These interviews have been undertaken with two sell-side financial analysts, three 
corporate governance specialists on the so-called “buy-side”, and two other practioners 
who have expertise in corporate governance, and who have regularly contributed to 
debates on corporate governance. Appendix 2 provides relevant information on these
31 The Enhanced Analytics Initiative (EAI) defines “extra-financial issues” (EFIs) as “fundamentals that 
have the potential to impact companies' financial performance [...] or reputation in a material way, yet are 
generally not part o f  traditional fundamental analysis”. Examples o f  EFIs include: “future political or 
regulatory risks, the alignment o f  management and board with long-term company value, the quality o f  
human resources management, risks associated with governance structure, the environment, branding, 
corporate ethics and stakeholder relations”. The EAI regards itself as “an international collaboration 
between asset owners and asset managers aimed at encouraging better investment research”. For more 
information about the EAI, see http://www.enhanced-analvtics.com.
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interviews. The interviewees were mainly invited to share information on new 
developments in the field of corporate governance, and about sell-side research on 
corporate governance and other extra-financial issues. Interviewees who are not analysts 
were also asked for their perceptions of the corporate governance work performed by 
analysts. For this thesis, selected information obtained from these interviews is used to 
supplement and triangulate (cf. Flick, 2004) the materials drawn from the various 
textual documents.
5. Outline of the thesis
The following three chapters address the issues that have been highlighted earlier 
regarding the doing of corporate governance by analysts in the US and the UK across 
the past decade.
Chapter 2 examines the emergence of the “doing” of corporate governance by analysts. 
It examines the multiple and dispersed factors that conditioned the appearance and 
development of the corporate governance work pursued by some analysts in the US and 
the UK in the early 21st century. The empirical analysis is informed by the notion of 
“eventalisation” under the Foucauldian genealogy in general, and by the conceptual lens 
of “arena” in particular. Three branches of this genealogy are charted, corresponding to 
the three key arenas traced in this chapter, namely investment research, the regulatory 
framework for sell-side financial analysts, and corporate governance. Each arena 
identified and traced is characterised by the complex interplay of heterogeneous 
elements, including rationales, discourses, institutions, practices and events, that made 
possible the emergence of the corporate governance work performed by analysts at a 
particular historical moment.
Chapter 3 concerns the first aspect of the doing of corporate governance by analysts,
32 The triangulation here, according to Flick (2004), can be regarded as “triangulation o f  data”. This refers 
to the combination o f  data “drawn from different sources and at different time, in different places or from 
different people” (ibis: 178). Flick has also identified the other three forms o f  triangulation, which are 
triangulation o f  theories, investigator triangulation, and methodological triangulation.
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namely, the evaluations of the corporate governance procedures of companies performed 
by analysts. This chapter examines the ways in which such evaluations were performed 
by analysts, in particular the mechanisms and devices deployed by analysts. It also 
considers how the perceptions of companies’ corporate governance procedures held by 
financial market participants such as institutional investors can be altered and 
transformed by the corporate governance evaluations that analysts performed. This 
chapter concentrates on the evaluations performed by analysts of the structural issues 
concerning the corporate board33. The notion of “critic” is drawn upon as a key 
theoretical reference point, supplemented by the concepts of “carrier” and “inscription”. 
This chapter reports that analysts performed corporate governance evaluations by 
directly and explicitly benchmarking the corporate governance procedures of companies 
against “best practices” contained in regulations of corporate governance; and by 
making comparison, which comprised a mixture of narrative comparison, tabular 
comparison, and rankings. The chapter argues that new visibilities of the governance of 
corporations were created through the corporate governance evaluations undertaken by 
analysts.
Chapter 4 concerns the second aspect of the doing of corporate governance by analysts, 
namely, the linking of corporate governance to the financials. It investigates the way in 
which the integration of governance issues within investment analyses was explored by 
analysts, and what constituted this particular form of economic calculation. The 
empirical analysis is mainly informed by notions of the “programmatic” and 
“technological” aspects of calculative practices. This chapter argues that the concrete 
work performed by analysts to link corporate governance to the financials was shaped 
and animated by certain ideas, discourses, and idealised schemata articulated in financial 
markets. These included the idea related to the potential link between corporate 
governance and the financials, the ideal of incorporating governance issues in 
investment analyses, the perception that analysts could and should play a crucial role in 
linking corporate governance to the financials, among others. The tools and devices
33 These issues include whether there is a strong balance o f  independent directors on the board and in 
board committees, whether the chairman and the CEO are separated, whether the chairman is independent, 
whether the full board is elected annually, whether the former CEO is still on the board, whether board 
vacancies that are filled by directors are elected by shareholders, among others.
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deployed by analysts, as the chapter suggests, made operable these ideas and helped 
realise the perceived ideals and aspirations in financial markets. This chapter also argues 
that these tools and devices made visible the link between corporate governance and the 
financials, and helped articulate the category of corporate governance as a risk factor in 
the investment decision making process.
The last chapter, i.e. chapter 5, summarises the findings from chapters 2, 3, and 4. It 
considers the implications of the doing of corporate governance by analysts, particularly 
by further elaborating upon the key theme of this thesis, namely, the notion of analysts 
as agents o f transparency. Reflections on the theoretical lenses drawn upon to inform 
the empirical analysis and on the use of textual documents as the main empirical 
materials for the thesis are then presented. This chapter, and the thesis overall, concludes 
by discussing the implications of the current study for future research.
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C h a p t e r  2
THE EMERGENCE OF THE DOING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BY 
ANALYSTS: CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the emergence of the doing of corporate governance by analysts. 
It examines how, and in what settings, the doing of corporate governance by some 
analysts appeared and developed in the US and the UK in the early 21st century. The 
chapter locates the emergence of the corporate governance work performed by analysts 
within a broad social and historical context. More specifically, it focuses on the various 
factors that conditioned and gave rise to the doing of corporate governance by analysts, 
instead of searching for the direct and proximate cause of the phenomenon. This chapter 
attends to the multiple locales in which the complex interplay of heterogeneous 
elements, including rationales, discourses, institutions, practices, and events, made it 
possible for the doing of corporate governance by analysts to achieve a degree of 
coherence and stability as an externally recognised phenomenon.
The empirical analysis in this chapter is informed by the genealogical approach to 
history formulated by Michel Foucault (e.g. 1984a; 1991b), and particularly the notion 
of “eventalisation”. The Foucauldian genealogy analyses a phenomenon in accordance 
with the multiple processes that constitute it, and reveals the complexity, fragility, and 
contingency surrounding the phenomenon in question (Foucault, 1991b: 76; Smart, 
2002: 56). More specifically, as informed by the notion of “eventalisation”, this chapter 
views the emergence of the corporate governance work pursued by analysts as the 
outcome of a multiplicity of processes, and of a complex field of relations between 
various issues, events, agents, and agencies (cf. Smart, 2002: 58). This chapter 
specifically draws upon the concept of “arena” that has affinities with the Foucauldian 
genealogy, and that has been formulated and utilised by scholars in accounting to
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examine the complex interplay of heterogeneous elements that conditions the emergence 
of new modes of calculation (e.g. Burchell et al., 1985; Mennicken, 2008; Robson, 
1991, 1994). An arena, as introduced in chapter 1, is conceptualised as a particular 
domain of operation that exists between certain issues, institutions, bodies of 
knowledge, practices, and actions (Burchell et al., 1985: 390). This concept helps with 
the organisation of the empirical materials of this chapter, and guides the tracing of the 
dispersed locales in which the corporate governance work performed by some analysts 
in the US and the UK appeared and developed at a particular historical moment.
Robson (1991: 548) has further proposed that an arena is constituted by processes of 
“translation between non-accounting discourses and rationales [...] and the 
problematisation of particular accounting techniques”. The empirical analysis of the 
specific arenas in this chapter is accordingly framed by the notions of 
“problematisation” and “translation”. Problematisation is the process through which 
something comes to be viewed as a significant problem (ibis: 48). This chapter focuses 
on the processes through which a particular issue was constructed as a significant 
problem by a diverse and heterogeneous group of agents and agencies in financial 
markets in each arena. This notion also directs the attention of the present empirical 
analysis to the simultaneous emergence of a problem and its solution, and the processes 
by which a solution to the problem was proposed and articulated.
Translation is a process which involves creating convergences, coherences, 
equivalences, and homologies by relating claims, concerns, and interests that were 
previously different (e.g. Callon, 1980; Callon & Law, 1982; Robson, 1991). This 
concept focuses the attention of this chapter on analysing how local problems came to 
be seen as being attached to and linked with wider concerns and debates in financial 
markets, and how the originally different claims and interests of a diverse group of 
agents and agencies were transformed and subsequently became convergent, coherent, 
and equivalent. According to the concept of translation, this chapter also attends to the 
actions, mostly discursive in nature, taken by various parties, organisations, and 
institutions to promote and legitimise proposals and solutions to certain problems by 
translating the interests of others, and encouraging other parties, organisations, and
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institutions to join their formal or informal networks.
The empirical analysis of this chapter is based upon official documents issued by 
various organisations and institutions, selected financial newspapers and magazines, the 
corporate governance reports written by analysts, as well as interview material. Three 
arenas are identified as providing the conditions of possibility for some analysts in the 
US and the UK to bring corporate governance within the boundaries of their work 
territory in the early 21st century. These three arenas are labelled as: investment research, 
the regulatory framework for sell-side financial analysts, and corporate governance34. 
What linked these three arenas together was their attention paid to the corporate 
governance work performed by sell-side financial analysts. These three arenas are 
delineated in detail in the next three sections. The final section summarises the chapter 
and provides some further comments.
2. Investment research
Investment research in financial markets has traditionally been undertaken in both the 
so-called buy-side firms, i.e. fund management firms, and the so-called sell-side firms, 
i.e. investment banks and brokerage houses35. Investment research is expected to attend 
to the strategy and fundamentals of corporations, provide insight into the investment 
potential of companies, and generate investment recommendations. From the early 21st 
century onward, however, investment research in both the US and the UK financial 
markets started to be criticised for its short-term focus. This problem tended to be more 
visible for research undertaken by sell-side firms, given that the results from sell-side 
investment research are in general more widely disseminated (e.g. Groysberg, Healy, & 
Chapman, 2008).
In the UK, in a speech given in the Investor Relations Conference in 2005, John
34 Consistent with previous studies that draw upon the conceptual lens o f  “arena” (e.g. Burchell et al., 
1985; Mennicken, 2008; Robson, 1991,1994), these are labels that indicate and name the specific locales 
or aspects o f  institutional life in which the phenomenon under investigation appeared and developed.
35 Investment research is also provided by “independent” sell-side firms, which are broker-dealers that do 
not provide investment banking services.
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Sunderland, the Chair of Cadbury Schweppes and President of the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI), explicitly pointed out the short-term focus of sell-side investment 
research. He argued:
“The pressure on the sell side has in my view made analysts very 
focused on the near term and in some instances their understanding of 
our business fundamentals is less than it used to be.” (Sunderland,
2005 quoted in TUC, 2005)
Meanwhile, in the US, concerns about more or less the same issue were expressed by 
William H. Donaldson, the former Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC):
“Over time, analysts have become obsessed with the question of 
whether a company meets its quarterly EPS numbers, and not with 
whether a company is built to last. And because of the considerable 
clout of the sell-side analyst, this shift from long-term-thinking to 
short-term results has echoed through to company managements and 
to professional investors. The focus on short-term results has, I 
believe, had a counter-productive influence on companies, on 
investors and on analysts themselves.” (Donaldson, 2005)
The comment made by Donaldson above appeared to suggest that the short-term focus 
of sell-side investment research was closely attached to the wider and more general 
problem of “short-termism” in the investing public. “Short-termism”, in general, was 
referred to as the excessive focus of some participants in financial markets on short-term 
and quarterly earnings, while lacking attention to the strategy, fundamentals, and 
conventional approaches to long-term value creation (CFA & Business Roundtable, 
2006). The debate over the issue of short-termism commenced in the 1980s (e.g.
Ashdown & Holme, 1986; Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Hutton, 1995; Jacobs, 1991;
36 “Short-termism” was considered as an issue for concern in both the US and the UK at least from the 
1980s. Investment research did not appear to be tied to short-termism at that time. In the 1980s, short- 
termism in the US and the UK was considered to be largely constituted by, for instance, the “short-term 
horizons” o f  corporate managers in the way they conducted businesses and the demand for short-term 
returns by institutional investors in stock markets. For detailed discussions on short-termism in the last 
two decades o f  the 20th century in the US, see for instance, Hayes & Abernathy (1980), Jacobs (1991), and 
Porter (1992). For the case in the UK, see for example, Ashdown & Holme (1986) and Moore (1998). 
Short-termism that came to be viewed as salient in the early 21st century can be thought o f  as a sort o f  re­
activation o f  the same issue from the earlier decades. The short-term focus o f  investment research came 
into the overall picture o f  short-termism in the early 21st century.
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Moore, 1998; Porter, 1992). In parallel the significant changes in the landscape of the 
business world on both sides of the Atlantic in the early 21st century37 (e.g. Tonello, 
2006), the issue of short-termism was considered as salient, and attracted the attention 
from the investing public. The potentially negative consequences of short-termism were, 
once again, rehearsed by various commentators. These included: undermining market 
credibility, discouraging long-term value creation and investment, decreasing market 
efficiency, reducing investment returns, and impeding efforts to strengthen corporate 
governance (e.g. CFA & Business Roundtable, 2006; Samuelson & Preisser, 2006; 
Tonello, 2006; TUC, 2005). In addition, it was suggested that short-termism would not 
only harm business, but it could also negatively affect employees, the natural 
environment, and the wider society (e.g. Samuelson & Preisser, 2006; Tonello, 2006; 
TUC, 2005). As a consequence, corporate leaders, investors, financial intermediaries, 
governmental bodies, and other constituents of the investing public showed serious 
concerns about short-termism, and called for fundamental reforms to address the issue.
In the US, at a Business Roundtable corporate governance forum in 2003, the former 
Chairman of the SEC, William H. Donaldson, called upon business leaders
“[... to] manage the business for long-term results and to get away 
from the attitude that you’re managing the business out of a straight 
jacket that has been put upon you to create earnings per share on a 
regular basis.”38
In the Chartered Financial Analysts (CFA) Institute annual conference in 2005, 
Donaldson further pointed out that short-termism was a critical issue faced by the 
financial industry at that time. Corporate leaders were well aware of the salience of
37 According to Tonello (2006), these changes included: the investing public recognised the need to restore 
credibility o f  financial markets and investor confidence that were undermined by the wave o f  corporate 
scandals since the early 21st century; institutional investors had taken serious steps to monitor the 
management o f  their portfolio companies by investigating the possibility o f  directing assets toward 
investment with a greater long-term focus; institutional investors had encouraged companies to set out 
compensation schemes based on a more balanced combination o f  financial and extra-financial indicators 
o f  performance; several empirical research had reported results supporting the linkage between 
environmental, social and corporate governance factors and improved stock prices and shareholder value; 
regulators, financial intermediaries and institutional investors had put strong effort to focus sell-side 
financial research on long-term corporate value; among others.
38 See The N ew Environment in Corporate Governance: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, Business 
Roundtable Forum on Corporate Governance (10 Sep. 2003).
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short-termism, too. In a study conducted by the Business Roundtable Institute for 
Corporate Ethics in 2004, chief executive officers (CEOs) in many of the largest US 
corporations argued that the most pressing ethical issue faced by the business 
community was “short-term investor expectation”39. In July 2005, the Conference Board 
conducted a high-level Summit to involve leaders of major corporations and the 
investment community to discuss the issue of short-termism. Participants in the Summit 
agreed that it was “time to deal with short-termism”, and their consensus regarding the 
issue and the possible way to address it were documented in a report, titled Revisiting 
Stock Market Short-Termism (Tonello, 2006). Also, in recognition of the magnitude and 
potential impact of short-termism, the CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity and the 
Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics conducted a series of symposia to 
discuss the issue from September 2005. These symposia brought together various groups 
of stakeholders to study the issue of short-termism, and to seek proposals for tackling 
the problem. These stakeholder groups consisted of corporate leaders, asset managers, 
investors, and analysts. A report, titled Breaking the Short-Term Cycle (CFA & Business 
Roundtable, 2006), was published in 2006. This report summarised the discussions and 
recommendations made by the various participants in the symposia as to how corporate 
leaders, asset managers, investors, and analysts could re-focus on long-term value. 
Notwithstanding the distinct agendas of the CFA institute, the Business Roundtable 
Institute for Corporate Ethics, and the Conference Board, these organisations and 
institutions came to share a common view that “short-termism” was an issue of concern 
in the US financial markets. The interests and attentions of these organisations and 
institutions were channelled in a way that they all more or less regarded “short-termism” 
as a problem that was needed to be tackled, and for which a solution was needed (cf. 
Latour, 1987).
In the UK, short-termism was also perceived as problematic in the early 21st century. A 
diverse group of agents and agencies had expressed their concerns about the issue. 
Short-termism was identified as a major on-going concern for the British economy in a 
report jointly submitted by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) to the Chancellor regarding the productivity initiative of the
39 M apping the Terrain survey, Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics (2004), at 
www.corporate-ethics.org
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British government in 200140. The British accountancy profession had also shown 
concerns about short-termism. As Charles Tilley, the Chief Executive of the Chartered 
Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA), commented:
“[T]he nature of City expectations that drive the aggressive earnings 
game and the resulting “short-termism” is a cycle that needs to be 
broken.”41
Arguments regarding the salience of short-termism also came from a different direction, 
namely the TUC. The TUC conducted a study on the issue of short-termism, and offered 
a series of recommendations in order to address and hopefully mitigate the problem. The 
study was documented in a report, titled Investment Chains: Address Corporate and 
Investor Short-Termism (TUC, 2005). This study argued that criticism of short-termism 
had been made in relation to a range of the basic components of the investment system 
(TUC, 2005: 18). These basic components included pension funds and their trustees, 
fund managers, hedge funds, and analysts. The way in which short-termism was 
triggered by these components of the investment chain was highlighted:
“Pension funds and their trustees may be too concerned with relative 
performance over a short time period. Fund managers may be trading 
in and out of companies too much in response to short-term news or 
views. The growing use of hedge funds as part of pension funds’ 
investment strategies may be reducing investor time horizons even 
further. Analysts may be taking a short-term view of a company’s 
prospects, or losing touch with the long-term drivers of success.”
(TUC, 2005: 18)
Similarly, as documented in Tonello (2006), participants in the high-level 
Corporate/Investor Summit held by the Conference Board in July 2005 argued that 
short-termism was a chain composed of three major links: the corporate link, the 
investor link, and the financial analyst link, and that effort should come from all these 
market participants to tackle the problem. According to the studies conducted by the 
TUC and Tonello (2006), the short-term view taken by analysts in their investment 
research formed part of the more general problem of short-termism in financial markets.
40 The UK Productivity Challenge: CBI/TUC Submission to the Productivity Review, November 2001
41 See http://wwwl.cim aglobal.com /cps/rde/xchg/SID-0AE7C4Dl- 
3D4C873A/live/root.xsl/8961 9001 .htm
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Possible attempts made by financial market participants to address the short-term focus 
of sell-side research can be considered as consistent with the effort exerted by these 
participants to tackle the wider problem of short-termism. In other words, the proposed 
solution for addressing the short-term focus of sell-side research could also constitute a 
potential solution to the wider problem of short-termism in financial markets.
The concern about short-termism, however, somehow seemed to parallel the increase in 
institutional share ownership and the explicit recognition of socially responsible 
investment (SRI) as an investment philosophy by institutional investors in both the US 
and the UK in the late 1990s. Institutional investors, largely comprised of pension 
funds and insurance companies, have become an increasingly powerful part of the 
investing public, given the significant size of their shareholdings (e.g. Mallin, 2004). 
Pension funds and insurance companies are expected to be long-term investors who 
recognise the mutual interest between shareholders, corporations, employees, the 
environment, and the wider community over the long term (e.g. PIRC, 1993). Also, 
from the late 1990s onward, socially responsible investment started to move from a 
fringe activity carried out by a small number of unit trusts and mutual funds in the US 
and the UK to an investment approach gradually accepted by pension funds and 
insurance companies (Sparkes, 2002). SRI questions the conventional thinking that the 
main purpose of investment is to maximise short-term financial returns (Sparkes, 2002:
5), and takes into consideration non-financial factors that may have a material impact 
on the long-term performance of investment. The increase in institutional share 
ownership and the acceptance of SRI by institutional investors facilitated and 
contributed to the development of a long-term approach to investment. “Long-term 
investment”, “long term financial returns”, and “creating long-term value” were 
gradually articulated as ideas and discourses of investment among others in financial 
markets. These ideas and discourses related to “long-termism” achieved a certain 
degree of acceptance by a number of financial market participants, despite the co­
existence of the issue of short-termism42. The short-term focus of sell-side investment
42 It is the ideas and discourses related to “long-termism” that are emphasised here. These discourses may 
not inevitably correspond with what some institutional investors or fund managers actually do in practice. 
But, empirical evidence on long-termism has been documented in the academic literature. For instance, 
see Solomon & Solomon (1999).
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research, however, was considered as an impediment to long-term investment:
“[.. .0]ne of the obstacles to investors taking a longer-term and more 
rounded assessment of corporate performance [... is] the current focus 
of much sell-side research”. (EAI, 2004)
Some institutional investors and asset managers started to call for investment research 
that takes a long-term view, and that provides integrated analysis of both financial and 
non-financial issues. As David Blood and A1 Gore from Generation Investment 
Management argued:
“[... A]nalysts need to take account of factors that are not routinely 
monetised on balance sheets -  including sustainability issues -  as 
opposed to solely focusing on short-term returns. This means 
analysing the implications for shareholder value of long term 
economic, environmental and social challenges. They include future 
political or regulatory risks, the alignment of management and board 
with long-term company value, quality of human resources 
management, risks associated with governance structure, the 
environment, restructurings/mergers and acquisitions, branding, 
corporate ethics and stakeholder relations.” (Financial Times 2005, 
quoted in TUC, 2005: 39)
Others, such as Neil Dwane, Chief Investment Office Europe of RCM, also strongly 
argued that it was necessary for investment research providers to consider material 
extra-financial issues in investment research:
“Traditional investment analysis is very well suited to short term 
investment but if you are trying to take a longer term view, the most 
informative notes are those that take the material extra-financial 
aspects of corporate performance into account.” (EAI, 2004)
According to these remarks, investment research that takes into account extra-financial 
issues, such as environmental, social, and corporate governance issues, appeared to be 
perceived as a possible solution for addressing the problem related to the short-term 
focus of sell-side investment research. As previously discussed, the short-term view taken 
by analysts in their investment research was considered as contributing to the wider 
problem of short-termism in financial markets (TUC, 2005; Tonello, 2006). Attempts
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made by financial market participants to address the short-term focus of sell-side research 
could be thought of as being potentially capable of tackling the wider problem of short- 
termism. Undertaking investment research that takes into consideration extra-financial 
issues not only can potentially correct the short-term focus of sell-side investment 
research. It may also help to unlock “the analyst link” (Tonello, 2006) in the investment 
system that had led to the problem of short-termism in general. In other words, long-term 
investment research appeared to serve as a proposed solution to the wider problem of 
short-termism in financial markets.
While a consensus on ways to integrate extra-financial criteria in investment research 
was not considered to exist yet (The UN Global Compact, 2004: 1), several guidelines 
started to be formulated by a series of industry-led initiatives. For instance, in June 2004, 
twenty financial institutions43 from nine countries were invited by Kofi Annan, the 
former United Nations (UN) Secretary General, to develop guidelines and 
recommendations on how to better integrate environmental, social, and corporate 
governance issues in asset management, securities brokerage services, and associated 
investment research functions. A report, titled Who Cares wins: Connecting Financial 
Markets to a Changing World (The UN Global Compact, 2004), was issued44. According 
to this report, analysts were recommended
“to better incorporate environmental, social and governance factors in 
their research where appropriate and to further develop the necessary 
investment know-how, models and tools in a creative and thoughtful 
way.” (The UN Global Compact, 2004: ii)
The report also urged investors to explicitly request and reward investment research that 
includes extra-financial aspects, and suggested that financial institutions should introduce 
appropriate training and incentives systems to direct the attention of analysts to 
environmental, social, and corporate governance issues within investment analyses (The 
UN Global Compact, 2004: ii-iii). This implied that certain incentive mechanisms needed
43 These largely comprised asset management firms, insurance companies, and investment banks.
44 This collaborative effort o f  the participating financial institutions was overseen by The United Nations 
Global Compact. The UN Global Compact is an UN initiative which encourages corporations in the world 
to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies, and to report on their implementation. For more 
information about The UN Global Compact, see http://www.unglobalcompact.org/.
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to be created to encourage and motivate analysts to provide investment research that 
covers both financial and extra-financial issues (EFIs). Largely for this purpose, the 
Enhanced Analytics Initiative (EAI) was founded by four European fund management 
firms in late 200445. As an international collaboration between asset owners and asset 
managers, the participating members of the initiative agreed to allocate a minimum of 5% 
of their broker commissions to sell-side firms based on how well analysts integrate 
analysis of extra-financial issues and intangibles. While referring extra-financial issues to 
issues including corporate governance, human capital management, value creation or 
destruction during mergers and acquisitions, or global environmental challenges such as 
climate change, this initiative aimed to “change the way the broker community analyses 
extra-financial issues and intangibles” (EAI, 2004). With the 5% broker commissions 
from these asset owners and managers, sell-side analysts were expected to be financially 
incentivised to engage in long-term investment analysis.
The EAI was an informal network formed by some asset owners and managers to 
facilitate long-term investment research, and to promote “long-term value” in the 
investing public. Since its establishment, the founding members sought to enhance the 
impact of the initiative, and to obtain greater support from a larger number of asset 
owners and managers. They attempted to enrol other institutional investors and fund 
management firms into their network. As the Chief Investment Officer of one of the 
founding members of EAI, Roderick Munsters of PGGM (The Netherlands), argued:
“EAI is confident that the quality and coverage of extra-financial 
issues will improve considerably in the near future but we know this 
depends on additional clients sending a clear signal to brokers about 
what they want. The most effective way for funds and their managers
45 The four founding members o f  the EAI were: BNP Paribas Asset Management, PGGM, RCM  
(including dbi /  dit | Allianz Dresdner Global Investors), and Universities Superannuation Scheme. Until 
December 2008, this Initiative represented total assets under management o f  €2 trillion (US$2.8 trillion) 
and had 30 members. From December 2008, the EAI joined forces with the United Nations Principles o f  
Responsible Investment (UN PRI). The EAI perceived this step as allowing it “to internationalise and 
extend the call for EFI research, with the benefit o f  PRI’s global reach and broad signatory base” (see  
http://www.enhancedanalvtics.com/portal/Librarv/Documents/EAI/NEWS/en LIB04792.pdf). The PRI 
extended the work o f  the EAI, and launched “the PRI Enhanced Research Portal”. This is “the first global, 
non-commercial database, dedicated to showcasing investment research which focuses on environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) issues and provides enhanced analysis to asset managers and owners” (see 
http://www.enhancedanalvtics.com/portal/Library/Documents/EAI/NEWS/en LIB05334.pdf; and 
http://www.unpri.org/research/index.php').
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to do this is to join EAI.” (EAI, 2005a)
In August 2005, The Global Compact, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
Switzerland, and the International Finance Corporation co-organised a conference that 
aimed to assess the progress made since the implementation of the recommendations set 
out in an earlier report, titled Who Cares wins: Connecting Financial Markets to a 
Changing World (The UN Global Compact, 2004). Participating financial institutions in 
the conference noted that the EAI had already generated impacts on the financial 
markets with its clear incentive mechanism applied to sell-side financial analysts (The 
UN Global Compact, 2005: 10). One indication of this was that the number of sell-side 
investment analyses focusing on extra-financial issues notably increased (EAI, 2006). 
Nevertheless, it was still suggested by the conference participants that the EAI, “needs 
to grow in order to make a difference [to investment research]” (The UN Global 
Compact, 2005: 10).
Other industry initiatives were also established since the publication of the report titled 
Who Cares wins: Connecting Financial Markets to a Changing World (The UN Global 
Compact, 2004). The most notable one was the Principles for Responsible Investment 
(PRI), which was initiated by the UN Secretary General and developed by a group of the 
largest institutional investors in the world. The Principles were issued in April 2006 after 
a few meetings between investors and experts from the investment industry, inter­
governmental and governmental organizations, civil society, and academia46. These 
Principles aimed to provide a framework to assist institutional investors in dealing with 
ESG issues. Signatories47 that had joined the PRI were highly recommended and 
required to “[...a]sk investment service providers (such as financial analysts, 
consultants, brokers, research firms, or rating companies) to integrate ESG factors [i.e. 
environmental, social, and corporate governance factors] into evolving research and
40
analysis” . The PRI did not seek to provide financial incentive for sell-side analysts to 
undertake extra-financial research. Nevertheless, the PRI was developed more or less in
46 The whole process was coordinated by the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI) and the UN Global Compact.
47 So far, the PRI has a total o f  821 signatories. These include 209 asset owners, 446 investment managers, 
and 166 professional service partners. For more details, see http://www.unpri.org/signatories/.
48 See http://www.unpri.org/principles/. in particular Principle 1.
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the same direction as the EAI, in that these two initiatives imposed some sort of pressure 
on sell-side analysts, and pressed analysts to adopt a long-term view in their research 
activities.
To sum up, sell-side investment research was criticised for its short-term focus. This 
issue was linked to the wider perceived problem of short-termism in financial markets 
that became salient once again in the early 21st century. Corporate leaders, investors, 
financial intermediaries, governmental bodies, and other constituents of the investing 
public showed serious concerns about short-termism, and called for fundamental 
reforms to tackle the problem. In parallel, due to the increasing growth in the size of 
institutional ownership and the recognition of SRI as an investment philosophy by 
institutional investors, “long-termism” was gradually articulated as an investment idea 
and discourse in financial markets in the early 21st century. Long term investment 
research, which includes research on corporate governance issues, and which has been 
strongly called for by an increasing number of asset owners and managers, was 
perceived to be a potential solution to the short-term focus of sell-side research in 
particular, and to the wider problem of short-termism in general. In short, the emergence 
of the problem of short-termism in general, and of the short-term focus of sell-side 
investment research in particular, the articulation of the investment ideas and discourses 
related to “long-termism” in financial markets, and the increasing demand for long-term 
investment research, together, made the incorporation of corporate governance by sell- 
side financial analysts into the boundaries of their work territory possible.
3. The regulatory framework for sell-side financial analysts
As compared to lawyers and accountants, sell-side financial analysts had been subject to 
limited regulation since the securities analyst profession started to gain recognition in 
the early 1990s (e.g. Coffee, 2006). However, from the early 21st century onward, sell- 
side financial analysts were subject to increasing regulatory scrutiny. This was triggered 
by the issue of analyst conflicts of interest, induced by the way in which sell-side 
research was traditionally organised and analysts rewarded.
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Sell-side research was traditionally undertaken under the roof of large broker-dealer 
firms. From the late 1990s, criticism of the analyst business model in place began to 
come from diverse perspectives. A heterogeneous group of agents and agencies in the 
investing public considered the way in which sell-side research was organised as 
problematic. For instance:
“Their [sell-side financial analysts’] primaryjob is to track companies 
in an industry. But increasingly, they are involved in investment 
banking activities, like taking companies public and arranging 
mergers -  lines of business that generate big fees for their employers 
[...] because of their numerous duties, they are pressed for time to do 
fundamental research on individual companies.” (Abelson, 1996)
And also:
“Investors felt they were not getting the type of unbiased advice 
that they wanted [from sell-side research].” (Sallie Krawcheck in 
Gilpin, 2002)
Hunt and Williams (2003) from McKinsey & Company even claimed that:
“For reasons that go well beyond the legal and reputation issues, the 
research business is fundamentally sick.”
Central to these criticisms, and the wider debate about how sell-side research should be 
organised and rewarded, was the issue of analyst conflicts of interest. This issue 
originated from the system of indirect payment to analysts. Traditionally, sell-side 
research largely depended on subsidies from other departments of the same broker- 
dealer firm to fund their research. Before 1975, the brokerage division of the broker- 
dealer firm took care of the cost of sell-side research out of the brokerage commissions 
that sell-side research helped generate, primarily from institutional investors. However, 
when fixed brokerage commissions were abolished and brokerage commissions started 
to be subject to competition in 1975, the profit centre of a contemporary large broker- 
dealer firm shifted away from brokerage to investment banking (Coffee, 2006: 251). 
Incentives appeared that could potentially induce analysts to seek to attract investment
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banking business by producing biased research, and by inflating the earnings estimate of 
the client companies that the broker-dealer firm had investment banking business with. 
Analysts were required to report to investment banking personnel, and their 
compensation was, to a large extent, closely tied to the investment banking fees that they 
helped generate. Meanwhile, the brokerage firm found it useful from a marketing 
standpoint to have popular, high-profile, and “star” analysts employed by the firm. 
These analysts were expected to be capable of capturing a bigger share of those lucrative 
investment banking fees (Coffee, 2006: 246; Morgenson, 2002). Conflicts of interest 
arising from these developments risked compromising the potential independence of 
analysts49, and resulted in sell-side research that was depicted as exhibiting “a lack of 
depth, a lack of objectivity and a lack of exclusivity” (Bodow, 2001).
The issue of analyst conflicts of interest in general, and of investment banking conflicts 
in particular, was even more strongly perceived as problematic when the technology 
stock bubble burst and the financial markets declined in the late 1990s, and after the 
downfall of Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate giants in the early 21st century (FSA, 
2002a; Morgenson, 2002; Richards, 2002). The stock market crash, and the outbreak of 
a series of corporate failures, drove down investor confidence in financial markets. Re­
establishing the integrity of the financial services industry, and restoring investor 
confidence in securities markets, became a key policy objective for the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) (e.g. Donaldson, 2003b). The way in which sell-side 
research was organised, which had been seen as problematic, was viewed as partially 
contributing to the loss of investor confidence due to the issue of analyst conflicts of 
interest (e.g. Donaldson, 2003b; Nazarethi, 2003). As Annette L. Nazarethi, Director of 
the Division of Market Regulation of the SEC put it:
“Over the past year or two, there has been the steady stream of 
revelations concerning alleged conflicts of interest that have 
compromised the integrity of the financial services industry. And the 
detrimental activity rooted in these conflicts has occurred [...] across 
a broad array of areas, including accounting and auditing, corporate 
governance, sell-side research, investment banking, and more 
recently, the mutual fund arena and SRO governance.” (Nazarethi,
49 Other types o f  analyst conflicts o f  interest were also identified. For detail o f  these, see for instance, 
Coffee (2006: 249-253)
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2003) [Emphasis added by Z. Tan]
The task of investigating analyst conflicts of interest, and reforming the way in which 
sell-side research was organised and rewarded, was consistent with the policy agenda for 
re-establishing the integrity of the financial services industry, and restoring investor 
confidence in financial markets (cf. Latour, 1987). This applied equally to the situation 
in the UK. As Gay Huey Evans, director of the Markets and Exchanges Division of the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), commented:
“[... T]o preserve confidence in the integrity of the UK’s financial 
markets, the standards applied to investment research [...] should be 
higher than they have been in the past.” (FSA, 2003d)
The solutions put forward by the SEC and the FSA for transforming the way in which 
sell-side research was organised were, of course, regulatory in nature. The SEC began 
examining analyst conflicts of interest in summer 1999 with its Division of Market 
Regulation reviewing industry practices regarding disclosure of analyst conflicts of 
interest. In the same year, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations 
(OCIE) of the SEC conducted examinations focusing on financial interests of analysts in 
companies that analysts covered. Investigations were also undertaken into analyst 
compensation arrangements and reporting structures, particularly whether analysts 
reported to investment banking personnel. In fall 2001, the SEC called upon the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) to work together to craft new rules in an attempt to address analyst conflicts of 
interest subsequent to the prior investigations solely undertaken by the SEC. After 
receiving public comments on the proposed new rules, the SEC approved the rule 
amendments in May 2002. These rules were designed to close a number of regulatory 
gaps, and to promote greater independence of research analysts (SEC, 2002). After the 
outbreak of corporate scandals, such as Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US-Congress,
2002) was enacted. The Act directed the SEC to re-formulate the rules approved in 2002. 
In July 2003, the SEC published a second set of proposed rule changes filed by the 
NYSE and the NASD as a way to further tackle the issue of analyst conflicts of interest 
(SEC, 2003c).
- 5 7 -
Actions were also taken by other regulatory bodies in the US to address the issue of 
analyst conflicts of interest. The most notable event was the investigation led by the 
former New York Attorney General (NYAG), Eliot Spitzer, into ten Wall Street firms 
and two individual analysts. These firms and individuals were shown to have engaged in 
serious misrepresentations in their research reports and investment recommendations 
made to the investing public. The investment bank that firstly featured in this 
investigation was Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc50. It was noted that the initial investigation 
was not commenced with an explicit concern with analysts in general, or with those at 
Merrill Lynch in particular in mind. Instead, the investigation commenced with a general 
suspicion about the veracity of the advisories of investment bankers at Merrill Lynch 
(Ignatius, 2002). This investigation led Eliot Spitzer to launch an expedition into the 
internal records of Merrill. Spitzer came across an e-mail that suggested that analysts at 
Merrill had downgraded an Internet company, GoTo.com, which did not give Merrill 
investment banking business. Spitzer then decided to examine all those internal emails 
of Merrill, and undertook a breakthrough investigation into the sell-side research of this 
firm (Ignatius, 2002).
A series of settlements was proposed by Spitzer, and agreed by Merrill. The agreement 
that had the most knock-on effect on Merrill was the requirement “to separate 
completely the evaluation and determination of compensation for equity research 
analysts from [its] investment banking business” (OAG, 2002c). Spitzer also intended to 
use the settlement with Merrill as a possible catalyst to pursue broader structural reform 
in the securities industry in collaboration with the SEC and the other regulatory 
authorities (OAG, 2002b). The SEC had been addressing analyst conflicts of interest by 
calling upon the NASD and the NYSE to craft new rules, which happened at a similar 
time as Spitzer investigated Merrill. However, Spitzer argued that the new regulations 
proposed by the SEC, the NASD, and the NYSE failed to induce structural changes, 
even though they made progress regarding disclosure obligations (OAG, 2002b). Spitzer 
urged the US Congress to consider national reform modeled on the agreement his office
50 According to the Office o f  the N ew  York State Attorney General (OAG), one analyst at Merrill Lynch 
made highly disparaging remarks about the management o f  an Internet company, and called the stock o f  
this company “a piece o f  junk”. However, he gave the company, which was a major investment banking 
client, the highest stock rating (OAG, 2002a).
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had reached with Merrill Lynch (OAG, 2002d). It was further suggested by Spitzer that 
the SEC must impose new nationwide rules to regulate analysts, and to prevent the sort 
of abuses his office had discovered in the Merrill case (OAG, 2002e).
In October 2002, the SEC, the NYAG, the NYSE, the NASD, and the North American 
Securities Administrators Association announced a joint effort to bring to a speedy and 
coordinated conclusion the various investigations concerning research analysts. This 
eventually led to “a historic settlement-in-principle” with Wall Street brokerage firms to 
resolve the issue of analyst conflicts of interest. This settlement, which was the so-called 
Global Analyst Research Settlement (SEC, 2003a), proposed certain structural reforms 
on brokerage firms51. These included: firms have to separate research and investment 
banking, investment bankers cannot evaluate analysts, the compensation of analysts 
cannot be based directly or indirectly upon investment banking revenues or input from 
investment banking personnel, and instead, it will be based in significant part on the 
quality and accuracy of their research. The joint announcement of the settlement 
reflected the ever-increasing salience of the issue of analyst conflicts of interest in the 
market place and the immediate necessity to formulate a solution for addressing the 
problem. As the catalyst for these proposed structural reforms pertaining to sell-side 
analysts, Spitzer commented on the settlement:
“The settlement [...] implements far-reaching reforms that will 
radically change behavior on Wall Street. It is the fulfillment of a 
promise [... that] was to restore integrity to the marketplace, and just 
as important, to restore investor confidence in Wall Street.” (OAG 
28/04/2003)
According to the remark made by Spitzer above, the programme and policy agenda for 
re-establishing integrity of the financial services industry and restoring investor 
confidence in the US securities markets was partially re-interpreted as a call for reforms 
on the way in which sell-side research was organised (cf. Mennicken, 2008; Miller, 
1991; Robson, 1991). The settlement constituted a solution, which was regulatory in 
nature, to the problem associated with the analyst business model. The settlement also 
came to be perceived as a proposed solution to the problem that the US capital markets
51 See http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm.
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encountered in the early 21st century, one that was characterised by a lack of trust and 
integrity.
Considering the salience of the issue of analyst conflicts of interest and being influenced 
by the investigation into this issue in the US, the FSA in Britain had also kept a closer 
eye on sell-side research since 2002 (FSA, 2002b). The FSA initially published a 
discussion paper considering whether changes should be made to the approach to 
regulating investment research in the UK in July 2002 (FSA, 2002b). It put forward 
three options for discussion: no change to the current requirements, new rules, and a 
completely new approach of which some research reports would be clearly labelled as 
advice, promotion, or marketing material (see FSA, 2002a). After a series of 
consultations and clarifications (FSA, 2003a), the FSA issued new proposals for 
brokerage firms to consider how analyst conflicts of interest could and should be 
managed in October 2003 (FSA, 2003b). These proposals were finally published in 
March 2004 after further consultation (FSA, 2004a). According to the new proposals 
which were largely principles-based, all regulated brokerage firms which issue 
investment research were required to publish a policy explaining how they manage 
conflicts of interests in their business (FSA, 2003d). Such a policy had to meet a key 
standard that analysts should not be involved in any activity that could conflict with 
their ability to produce objective research (FSA, 2003d). Although the regulatory 
approach adopted by the FSA was not exactly the same as that adopted in the US, the 
new regulation imposed by the FSA, like the Global Analyst Research Settlement (SEC, 
2003a), constituted a potential solution to the problem associated with the analyst 
business model -  an issue that was argued as having undermined investor confidence 
with the integrity of the UK financial markets (FSA, 2003c, 2003d, 2004b).
However, the regulatory solution for addressing analyst conflicts of interest and 
reforming the way in which sell-side research was organised not only caused new 
problems, but also created threat and uncertainty to sell-side analysts52. One potential 
issue arising from the Global Analyst Research Settlement (SEC, 2003a) was the 
question who would subsidise sell-side research, given that such research was
52 This was expressed by a Responsible Investment Director o f  an investment and fund management firm 
during an interview that the author o f  this thesis conducted in London on 31/10/2008.
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henceforth required to be separated from investment banking (Coffee, 2006: 267). The 
contribution made by analysts to the profitability of the broker-dealer firm in terms of 
brokerage commissions was traditionally very modest. As Coffee (2006: 267) argued, 
the broker-dealer firm would reduce its investment in securities research by cutting back 
both on analyst compensation and employment, if the cost of the research department 
could not be justified by its return. In practice, after the adoption of the Global 
Settlement, there were significant reductions both in the size of sell-side research 
departments and in the number of companies covered by analysts (Davis, 2004). The 
supply of sell-side research seemed to have been squeezed. However, the demand for it, 
especially that performed by the “star analysts”, did not weaken (Coffee, 2006). Instead, 
“more relevant, more original and better-targeted”, and “innovative” sell-side research 
was, and is still highly sought after by a large number of institutional investors and fund 
managers (e.g. EAI, 2004; Hunt & Williams, 2003). Hunt and Williams (2003) even 
pointed out that:
“[... Developing more relevant and objective research at lower cost is
[...] a financial imperative [for sell-side research].”
While arguing that traditional sell-side research provided “little value”, investment 
research that considers environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria
C 'l
came to be viewed as more relevant and innovative , and hence more valuable (EAI, 
2004). A number of institutional investors and fund managers created informal networks, 
with the aim of encouraging and motivating sell-side analysts to perform innovative and 
valuable investment research. One of the most notable industry-led networks was the 
Enhanced Analytics Initiative (EAI). Members of the EAI agreed to allocate 5% of their 
broker commissions to broker-deal firms on the basis of how well analysts integrate 
analysis of material extra-financial issues into mainstream investment research. When 
this initiative was initially established, its members had already shown their awareness of 
the broader economic and regulatory environment that had been influencing the way in 
which sell-side research was organised at that time. According to the EAI:
53 For instance, the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) and the UNEP-FI Asset 
Management Working Group, which have been voicing for incorporating ESG issues into mainstream 
investment analyses, viewed this kind o f  investment research as innovative, and had requested brokers to 
deliver it (EAI, 2004).
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“[... T]his timely initiative [i.e. the EAI] coincides with the growing 
move by brokers to adapt their business model following regulatory 
changes, legal events and clearer demands from customers.” (EAI,
2004)
Dr. Raj Thamotheram, former Chair of the Steering Committee of the EAI and senior 
advisor to Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS), further highlighted the demand 
from members of the EAI for investment research on extra-financial issues. He 
suggested:
“Good analysts much prefer doing interesting and intellectually 
challenging work than the repetitive, mechanistic commentary on last 
quarters figures [...] at a time when the analyst business model is 
being squeezed by regulatory attention and moves to unbundling -  
succinctly captured by the McKinsey report titled “more relevant 
research at lower cost” -  EAI represents a clear statement by a 
growing pool of international clients who are clear about what they 
are happy to pay for!” (Thamotheram, 2005)
The 5% brokerage commissions which were set aside by members of the EAI in order to 
reward the best investment research on extra-financial issues would be relatively small, 
when compared to the part of the investment banking fees that analysts used to receive as 
part of their financial rewards before the enactment of regulations, such as the Global 
Analyst Research Settlement (SEC, 2003a). However, the 5% brokerage commissions 
were supposed to be used as a “pragmatic incentive to enable brokers to produce more 
rounded, more useful research” (Peter Moon, quoted in EAI, 2004). They could also, 
although to a modest extent only, become part of the funding available for financing and 
subsidising sell-side research54. The increasing demand from institutional investors and 
fund managers for more relevant, innovative, and useful sell-side investment research, 
and particularly the establishment of the EAI, came “at a very timely occasion”55 when 
the analyst business model was subject to regulatory scrutiny and its reform viewed 
increasingly as necessary. Performing research on EFIs or ESG issues, where corporate
54 A s previously discussed, the original level o f  funding available to sell-side research would be scarce. 
This was because the compensation o f  analyst was required to be disconnected directly or indirectly from 
investment banking revenues under the new regulations.
55 See “What is EAI?” on the EAI website: www.enhancedanalvtics.com.
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governance is an important element, and incorporating them into mainstream investment 
analyses, provided a step forward, if not yet a definite solution, for the on-going reform 
of the analyst business model. Undertaking ESG research offered a new opportunity for 
broker-dealer firms, which were faced with problems, threat, and uncertainty after the 
series of regulatory reforms on sell-side research, to consider adapting and transforming 
the analyst business model, and to re-conceptualise the way in which sell-side research 
could and should be performed.
In sum, sell-side financial analysts were subject to increasing regulatory scrutiny from 
the early 21 st century. This was largely the result of the increasing salience of the issue of 
analyst conflicts of interest that was considered as contributing to the loss of trust and 
integrity in both the US and the UK financial markets at that time. Regulators in both 
countries formulated and enacted new regulations in an attempt to provide a regulatory 
solution to the problems associated with the analyst business model in particular, and for 
addressing the perceived lack of trust and integrity in financial markets generally. The 
series of regulatory reforms pertaining to sell-side research was considered as causing 
new problems, and creating threat and uncertainty for analysts. Nevertheless, these 
reforms happened to coincide with a moment when the demand for “innovative”, “more 
relevant”, and “more valuable” investment research by a large number of institutional 
investors and fund managers was consistently high, and when informal networks (e.g. the 
EAI) started to be established among some asset owners and managers to encourage and 
support sell-side analysis of extra-financial issues. Performing extra-financial investment 
research, which was considered as “more valuable”, constituted a possible step forward 
for brokerage firms to further adapt the analyst business model, and to potentially 
transform the way in which sell-side research was organised and conducted.
4. Corporate governance
The issue of what has become known as corporate governance56 was inherent in the
56 Corporate governance can be conceptualised as possessing both programmatic (normative) and 
technological (operational) dimensions (cf. Miller, 2008a, 2008b; Power, 1997). The former relates to the 
concepts that shape and envision broader policy objectives related to corporate governance, while the
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operation of corporate forms of organisations (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005; Tricker, 2000). 
However, it was argued that the term “corporate governance” emerged only in the 1970s 
(Ocasio & Joseph, 2005), and its usage became more frequent from the late 1980s 
(Keasey et al., 2005a; Mallin, 2004; Tricker, 2000). It was during the 1990s and the first 
few years of the 2 1st century that corporate governance became an institutionalised field 
of activity (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). It can also be argued that during this period, 
corporate governance came to be viewed as a problem, and became to be subject to 
various forms of scrutiny, intervention, and reform.
“Corporate governance” was first made visible as an issue in the UK in the late 1980s. 
This was triggered by the combination of the harsh economic climate, concern about 
standards of financial reporting as heightened by corporate scandals such as Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and Maxwell, and the controversy over the 
compensation of company directors at that time (Cadbury, 1992; Mallin, 2004). The 
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the accountancy 
profession established the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
in May 1991 in an attempt to tackle the issue and put forward an agenda for reforming 
the British corporate system. The committee issued a report, known as the Cadbury 
Report (1992), in which the notion of “corporate governance” was inscribed into formal 
policy document for the first time. This report proposed a code of best practice of 
corporate governance that had significantly influenced the subsequent development of 
many corporate governance codes and guidelines in the UK and globally (e.g. Mallin, 
2004; Solomon & Solomon, 2004). This report not only viewed corporate governance as 
concerning the accountability of company management towards shareholders. Corporate 
governance was also considered as linked to wider issues and concerns of the economy, 
such as the confidence of investors in the UK financial market, Britain’s 
competitiveness position in the global economy, and the working of the market economy 
in general. For instance, when describing the background of the report, the Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance argued that:
latter refers to the more or less concrete tasks and routines that make up the world o f  practitioners, such as 
analysts. This section focuses on the programmatic aspect o f  corporate governance. It examines the 
articulation o f  ideas and discourses related to corporate governance and corporate governance reforms, as 
well as the process through which corporate governance came to be viewed as a problem.
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“The country’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its 
companies. Thus the effectiveness with which their boards discharge 
their responsibilities determines Britain’s competitive position. [...]
Bringing greater clarity to the respective responsibilities of directors, 
shareholders and auditors will also strengthen trust in the corporate 
system. Companies whose standards of corporate governance are high 
are the more likely to gain the confidence of investors and support for 
the development of their businesses.” (Cadbury, 1992)
Further reforms on corporate governance in Britain in the 1990s followed the Cadbury 
code. Additional policy documents were published, including the Greenbury Report1 
(Greenbury, 1995) and the Hampel Report58 (Hampel, 1998). The recommendations set 
out in the Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel reports were consolidated and incorporated 
into the Combined Code (FRC, 1998). The Combined Code outlined a mandatory 
disclosure framework which provided guidance to companies on the reporting of 
compliance or non-compliance with the code in their annual reports. In addition, in 
March 1998, the UK Department of Trade and Industry launched a long-term 
fundamental review of core company law. The review focused on several key aspects of 
corporate governance, including the duties and liabilities of directors and auditors, 
shareholder rights, and corporate reporting and disclosure. All together, these reforms 
reflected and reinforced the belief and perception that corporate governance as a 
problem in the British economy was needed to be tackled, and subject to a certain 
degree of regulatory intervention.
Meanwhile, in the US, corporate governance was also considered as a salient issue. As 
the former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt claimed:
“Corporate governance is no longer an academic discussion. It is not 
an arcane topic for high-minded legal debate. Nor is it a dusty, little- 
used flowchart in a vacant boardroom. [...] It is absolutely imperative
57 The Greenbury R eport was published in response to the concern about the size o f  the remuneration 
packages o f  company directors and the disclosure o f  this issue in the annual reports o f  companies.
58 In response to further significant corporate failures, such as the Barings Bank, the Committee on 
Corporate Governance was formed in 1995. This committee developed the Ham pel Report. This report 
focused on disclosure o f  the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies. It emphasised a 
“principle-based” and voluntary approach to corporate governance rather than an explicit “rules-based” 
approach in order to reduce the regulatory burden on corporations, and to prevent “box-ticking” by 
companies.
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that a corporate governance ethic emerge and envelop all market 
participants: issuers, auditors, rating agencies, directors, underwriters, 
and exchanges.” (Levitt, 1999)
Corporate governance was also put onto the agenda for intervention, scrutiny, and 
reform in the US. There, it was the private sector, especially institutional investors and 
corporations themselves, that took the lead and initiated reforms. For instance, the 
Business Roundtable, which is an influential association of chief executives in the US, 
had started to address issues related to corporate governance since the 1990s. It issued a 
Statement o f Corporate Governance (Business-Roundtable, 1997), which set out its 
recommendations on the functions, structure, and operations of the board, and on 
shareholder meetings. Also, while considering the potentially higher financial return that 
may result from more pro-active engagement with the corporate board and the 
management team, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), one 
of the largest public pension funds in the US, developed a set of principles of corporate 
governance. These principles were considered by the CalPERS as the minimum 
corporate governance standards that all markets throughout the world should strive to 
comply with (CalPERS, 1999). In addition, policy documents on corporate governance 
were issued by other organisations in the US in the late 1990s. These organizations 
included the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association -  College Retirement Equities 
Fund (TIAA-CREF), General Motors, National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD), among others (e.g. Solomon & Solomon, 2004). These organisations and 
institutions no doubt each had their own objectives and agendas. Nevertheless, since the 
late 1990s, they had been voicing similar views on the issue of corporate governance, 
and had come to share a common view that the governing of corporate conduct in the 
US needed to be strengthened and reformed (cf. Latour, 1987).
Corporate governance also became an object of concern at the transnational level. This 
occurred, in particular, after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) was called upon by 
the OECD Council to develop a set of corporate governance standards and guidelines, in 
collaboration with national governments, other international organisations, and the 
private sector. The OECD Principles o f Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999) was
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published in 1999. The Principles was supposed to serve as a “reference point” and an 
“international benchmark” for national governments, stock exchanges, investors, 
corporations, and other stakeholders to develop corporate governance standards and 
practices. The OECD viewed corporate governance as “one key element in improving 
economic efficiency”, and argued that “adherence to good corporate governance 
practices will help improve the confidence of [...] investors” (OECD, 1999). The 
Principles was endorsed by the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN). 
The ICGN is an informal network that offers a forum for investors, companies, financial 
intermediaries, academics, and other parties to debate corporate governance issues, and 
advance the governance reform agenda. The ICGN regarded the governance profile of a 
company as “an essential factor that investors take into consideration when deciding 
how to allocate their investment capital” (ICGN, 1999). A Statement on Global 
Corporate Governance Principles (ICGN, 1999) was issued by the ICGN in an attempt 
to offer guidance to corporations on the implementation of the OECD Principles o f  
Corporate Governance. The World Bank also set out its views on the issue of corporate 
governance, and published a report, titled Corporate Governance: A Framework fo r  
Implementation (World-Bank, 2000), in 2000. As commented by Sir Adrian Cadbury in 
the foreword to the report, the issue of corporate governance was put “firmly onto the 
world stage” by the World Bank with the publication of this report. The World Bank, 
“for the first time”, consolidated a framework of corporate governance that 
“encompasses the widely differing regimes, political, economic, and social, within 
which corporations carry on their activities around the world” (World-Bank, 2000: v).
Despite this increased scrutiny of corporate governance processes, the scandals and 
failures continued. The outbreak of a series of corporate scandals in different 
geographical jurisdictions of the world in the first few years of the 21st century, such as 
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Parmalat, further increased the visibility and 
salience of the issue of corporate governance. A diverse and heterogeneous group of 
agents and agencies in the US financial markets continued to view corporate governance 
as problematic. It was considered that fundamental reforms on corporate governance 
were necessary, and the agenda for reforming corporate governance needed further 
articulation and advancement. As the former SEC Chairman William Donaldson put it:
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“If significant steps are not taken to revisit and remodel corporate 
governance practices, corporate America will continue to attract the 
anger and animosity not only of disillusioned shareholders, but also of 
a much broader cross-section of American society.” (Donaldson,
2003a)
As a direct response to the continuing corporate failures, the US Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US-Congress, 2002). Former SEC Chairman William Donaldson 
regarded the Act as “[a] necessary and understandable response to an unprecedented 
string of corporate scandals which were rooted in intolerable governance, accounting 
and audit failures” (cited in Clarke, 2007:18). Self-regulatory organisations, such as the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD), were requested by the SEC to review their listing standards, with an emphasis 
on all the corporate governance listing standards (SEC, 2003b). Revised and new listing 
rules on corporate governance were approved by the SEC and issued by both the NYSE 
and the NASD in 2003. The Business Roundtable also acknowledged the “notable 
exceptions [i.e. the corporate scandals] to a system that has generally worked well [i.e. 
the perceived sound US corporate governance, financial reporting, and securities 
markets systems]”. It issued its Principles o f Corporate Governance (Business- 
Roundtable, 2002) in order “to guide the continual advancement of corporate 
governance practices, and so advance the ability of U.S. public corporations to compete, 
create jobs, and generate economic growth”.
The corporate failures in the early 21st century also led to further governance reforms in 
the UK. The publications of the Higgs Report59 (Higgs, 2003) and the Smith Report50 
(Smith, 2003) were considered as responding to those corporate scandals that broke out 
in the early 21st century (e.g. Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 11). As stated in the Higgs 
Report, the review formed “part of a systematic re-appraisal [...] of the adequacy of 
corporate governance arrangements in the wake of recent corporate failures” (Higgs, 
2003). The Smith Report (2003) also indicated that “[t]he Government’s request to the
59 This report examined the role, independence, and recruitment o f  non-executive directors.
60 This report offered guidance to corporate boards in companies to assist them “in making suitable 
arrangements for their audit committees, and to assist directors serving on audit committees in carrying 
out their role” (Smith, 2003).
FRC to develop guidance on audit committees has of course its root in the dramatic 
corporate failures in the United States in early 2002”. In 2003, a revised Combined Code 
(FRC, 2003) was issued to replace the one initially issued in 1998. This revised 
Combined Code incorporated the recommendations set out in the Higgs Report and the 
Smith Report.
Corporate governance reforms at national level paralleled the re-assessment of the 
corporate governance standards and guidelines that some international organisations 
initially developed. In 2002, in order to ensure that the Principles would continue to 
meet evolving challenges, the OECD Ministers called for a survey of the development 
and assessment of the OECD Principles o f Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004a). In a 
report which documented the survey, the OECD (2004a) pointed out that “[p]ublic 
concern with corporate governance issues has been driven in recent years primarily by a 
series of corporate scandals and failures in a number of countries [... and ijmmediate 
pressures on policy arise from corporate scandals and large failures [...]”. Upon 
completion of this survey, the OECD issued its new Principles o f Corporate 
Governance in 2004. Corporate governance continued to be considered by the OECD as 
linked to certain wider concerns and broader policy objectives. For instance, the 
implication of corporate governance to economic growth was highlighted in the OECD 
survey report mentioned earlier. The OECD stated that “the objective to promote growth 
is focusing attention on corporate governance” (OECD, 2004a). In the new Principles, 
the OECD suggested that good corporate governance can potentially contribute to 
“financial market stability, investment and economic growth” (OECD, 2004b). It was 
further emphasised by the OECD that “[cjorporate governance is one key element in 
improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor confidence 
[...] that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy” (OECD, 2004b).
In short, corporate governance was perceived as problematic by national and 
international governmental and non-governmental bodies, institutional investors, 
corporations, and professional associations in the US, the UK, and globally from the 
early 1990s. The idea that corporate governance needed to be scrutinised and 
transformed was widely articulated both nationally and transnationally. “Better
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governance”, and improving standards of corporate governance, became a key aspiration 
for regulators, institutional investors, corporations, and other actors in financial markets. 
These financial market participants all had their own distinct objectives and ambitions. 
Yet their interests and concerns came to be aligned so that they came to share a common 
goal of advancing the agenda for improving standards of corporate governance (cf. 
Latour, 1987). The widely articulated view that corporate governance was problematic 
and in need of reform was also acknowledged and endorsed by some sell-side financial 
analysts. This was clearly indicated in the corporate governance reports that these 
analysts had produced. For instance:
“Given the intensified focus on corporate governance, we think that 
investors who keep a close eye could attain an edge, which is why we 
have revisited this data [i.e. the Corporate Governance Quotient 
scores as issued by the Institutional Shareholder Services] today.”
(Sims & Hoch, 2003: 1)
“We believe the importance of corporate governance issues is 
growing. In the aftermath of a spate of accounting scandals, corporate 
governance is growing as an important investment consideration.”
(Dally, 2003: 1)
and
“With corporate governance issues continuing to emerge in the 
business world today (in the wake of scandals at companies such as 
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Tyco) [...], we have decided 
to take yet another look at the quality of these practices [i.e. corporate 
governance practices] at our companies.” (Sims, Hoch, & Tsai, 2004:
1)
According to these remarks made by analysts, the widely articulated view that corporate 
governance was problematic and in need of scrutiny informed and gave significance to 
the concrete routines and tasks that analysts performed in their corporate governance 
work (cf. Miller, 2008a; Miller & Rose, 1990; Power, 1997). In other words, the 
articulation of the idea that corporate governance was problematic and in need of reform 
made it possible for the corporate governance work pursued by analysts to emerge and 
develop.
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Furthermore, sell-side financial analysts came to be regarded as a subset of the 
significant counterparts and stakeholders of corporations (e.g. Cadbury, 2006; Engwall, 
2006; World-Bank, 2000). The potential role that these significant counterparts and 
stakeholders of corporations could play in corporate governance had been emphasised in 
the report issued by the World Bank, titled Corporate Governance: A Framework fo r  
Implementation (World-Bank, 2000). The framework outlined by the World Bank 
proposed that modem corporations were governed by both internal and external factors. 
Internal factors defined the relationship among key players (such as shareholders, board 
of directors, and management) in corporations. External factors referred to legal, 
regulatory, and market institutions that governed corporate behaviour. External factors 
were constituted by “reputational agents”, including accountants, lawyers, crediting 
firms, investment bankers, financial media, investment advisors, investment and 
corporate governance analysts, self-regulating bodies, and civic society. These external 
factors can potentially “reduce information asymmetry, improve monitoring of the firms, 
and shed light on opportunistic behaviour” (World-Bank, 2000: 5). Some of these 
counterparts and stakeholders of corporations, including analysts, auditors, lawyers, and 
credit rating firms, were also thought of as “gatekeepers” of financial markets (e.g. 
Coffee, 2006; Fuchita & Litan, 2006; Healy & Palepu, 2003). Regardless of how they 
were labelled, according to the framework outlined by the World Bank, the significant 
counterparts and stakeholders of corporations were accorded a potentially important role 
in governing corporate conduct. They were considered as being capable of imposing a 
sort of normative pressure on companies, scmtinising corporate behaviour, and 
contributing to the advancement of the agenda for improving corporate governance. The 
work pursued by gatekeepers on corporate governance can be seen as constituting a 
possible solution for addressing the problem of corporate governance.
Sir Adrian Cadbury, who, as noted above, had written a foreword for the World Bank 
report, expressed a similar view elsewhere:
“There are four main players on the governance stage that have the 
power and the responsibility to raise confidence in the corporate 
system. They are the regulators, the corporations themselves, those
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who invest in them whether as shareholders or as lenders, and those 
broader constituencies that have the ability to influence corporate 
behaviour. [...] Those broader constituencies are made up of those 
who contribute to the corporate debate and who influence the 
expectations of a whole range of investors. It includes the media in all 
its forms, financial advisers, analysts and commentators, financial 
institutions, and the body politic.” (Cadbury, 2006:37-38) [Emphasis 
added by Z. Tan]
These claims set out what gatekeepers and other significant counterparts and 
stakeholders of corporations could or should do in order to scrutinise corporate conduct 
and contribute to the governance reform agenda. Like the widely promulgated idea that 
corporate governance needed to be improved, these rationales also animated and gave 
significance to the concrete and routine work on corporate governance performed by 
gatekeepers, including that performed by analysts (cf. Miller, 2008a; Miller & Rose, 
1990; Power, 1997). In turn, the corporate governance work performed by these analysts 
can be thought of as providing a possible solution for addressing the problem of 
corporate governance, and as helping achieve the objective of reforming the corporate 
system. As Charles Elson, a law professor and director of the Centre for Corporate 
Governance at Alfred Lemer College of Business and Economics at the University of 
Delaware, commented on the corporate governance work undertaken by some sell-side 
financial analysts:
“The more attention that is paid [by sell-side financial analysts to 
corporate governance] the more reforms you'll continue to see.”
(Cited in Sweeney, 2004)
To sum up, corporate governance was perceived as problematic in the US, the UK, and 
globally during the 1990s and in the first few years of the 21st century. Pursuing 
fundamental reforms on corporate governance was considered as an important agenda 
by various actors in financial markets, including regulators, institutional investors, 
corporations, financial institutions, and professional associations. “Better governance”, 
and improving standards of corporate governance, were proposed as the objective that 
financial markets participants sought to achieve and realise. These aspirations, it is 
argued, conditioned the emergence and development of the corporate governance work 
undertaken by some sell-side financial analysts. Reciprocally, analysts, as the so-called
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“gatekeepers” in the corporate system, were viewed as having significant roles to play in 
governing corporate life, and contributing to the advancement of the agenda for 
reforming corporate governance. Together, these mutually reinforcing pressures helped 
place the issue of corporate governance firmly in the public sphere in the early 21st 
century.
5. Discussion
This chapter has examined how some sell-side financial analysts in the US and the UK 
started to bring corporate governance within the boundaries of their work territory in the 
early 21st century. It has drawn upon the notion of “eventalisation” and the concept of 
“arena” to offer a genealogy of this phenomenon. Three branches of this genealogy have 
been charted, corresponding to the three key arenas traced in this chapter, namely 
investment research, the regulatory framework for sell-side financial analysts, and 
corporate governance. These three aspects of institutional life are not understood as 
mutually exclusive, nor as the direct causes of the emergence of the doing of corporate 
governance by analysts. Instead, they provided the multiple and dispersed conditions of 
possibility under which the doing of corporate governance by some analysts in the US 
and the UK emerged in the early 21st century. A range of factors, not just immediate 
concern about corporate governance, contributed to the incorporation of corporate 
governance into the work territory of analysts. The emergence of the doing of corporate 
governance by these analysts cannot be understood without reference to the complex 
interplay of heterogeneous elements, including rationales, discourses, institutions, 
practices, and events61, involved in making the corporate governance work performed by 
analysts possible. In particular, a multiplicity of different actors and agencies, such as
61 As previously delineated, rationales and discourses related to, for instance, “long-termism”, “creating 
long-term value”, “re-establishing the integrity o f  the financial services industry”, “restoring investor 
confidence”, among others; institutions included the SEC, the FSA, the OECD, the World Bank, among 
others; practices included, for example, the allocation by those assets owners and managers that had 
joined the EAI o f  a minimum o f  5% o f  their broker commissions to sell-side firms based on how well 
analysts integrate analysis o f  extra-financial issues; processes included, for instance, the formulation and 
enactment o f  corporate governance rules, guidelines, and codes in the U S, the UK, and globally after the 
outbreak o f  the corporate scandals in the early 21st century; and events included, for example, the 
investigation led by the former N ew  York Attorney General (NYAG) Eliot Spitzer into ten Wall Street 
firms and two individual sell-side analysts to look into the issue o f  analyst conflicts o f  interest in 2002.
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state agencies, international governmental and non-governmental organisations, 
professional groups, corporations, institutional investors, and financial institutions, 
significantly contributed to the process through which the corporate governance work 
pursued by analysts appeared and developed.
In line with the other studies that draw upon the analytical concept of “arena”, each of 
the three arenas delineated in this chapter has its own objects of concern, modes of 
operation, and shifting patterns of relations between various agents and agencies (cf. 
Miller & Napier, 1993: 643). For this chapter, the first arena concerns the short-term 
focus of sell-side investment research that was attached to the wider issue of short- 
termism in financial markets; the second arena attends to the analyst business model and 
the regulatory framework for sell-side financial analysts; and the third arena focuses on 
the articulation of corporate governance as a problem, and the associated agenda for 
reforming corporate governance. What linked these three arenas together into a “loosely 
functioning ensemble” (Miller & Napier, 1993: 643), “constellation” (Burchell et al., 
1985), or “complex” (Miller, 1986)62, was their attention paid to the corporate 
governance work performed by sell-side financial analysts. In addition, the three arenas 
can also be seen as being linked with each other by the overlapping nature of the issues 
that they were concerned with. For instance, the problem of short-termism was seen as 
hindering the effort to strengthen corporate governance . Also, the issue of analyst 
conflicts of interest, which helped make the analyst business model appear as 
problematic, was considered as an issue under the agenda for broader corporate 
governance reform (e.g. IOSCO, 2003; OECD, 2004b). This chapter has examined the 
dynamics of each arena as if it were self-contained, yet the overall concern with the 
doing of corporate governance allows us to see how an alignment emerged over time 
among these initially distinct issues and concerns.
The findings of this chapter may have potential implications for institutional, 
sociological, and historical studies of corporate governance (e.g. Davis, 2005; Fellman, 
Kuustera’ & Vaara, 2008; Fiss, 2008). Sell-side financial analysts have been regarded as
62 The ensemble o f  heterogeneous elements is also conceptualised as an “assemblage” elsewhere (e.g. 
Collier & Ong, 2005; Miller, 1997; Miller & O'Leary, 1994).
63 See http://www.charteredaccountants.com.au/news releases 2007/mav 2007/A  119060038
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important “boundary-spanning and evaluating audiences for corporations” in the 
corporate system (Fiss, 2008). They have also constituted an institution of corporate 
governance that can potentially determine what companies can do and how control over 
corporations can be exercised (Davis, 2005). However, institutional and sociological 
studies of corporate governance have so far paid relatively little attention to the 
dynamics of institutions of corporate governance, i.e. how these institutions emerge, 
operate, change, and spread beyond their original purposes (e.g. Davis, 2005). This 
chapter has shed some new light on this issue by concentrating on the emergence of the 
corporate governance work undertaken by one important component of corporate 
governance, namely, sell-side financial analysts. In particular, this emergence was 
historically contingent upon and situated in a complex interplay of rationales, 
discourses, institutions, practices, processes, and events. The phenomenon that this 
thesis focuses on, namely, the doing of corporate governance by some analysts in the US 
and the UK across the past decade, had its historical trajectory, and emerged in relation 
to dispersed social, institutional, and historical contingencies.
Lastly, this chapter has specifically attended to the wider ideas, discourses, and 
aspirations that the techniques, tools, and instruments pertaining to corporate 
governance came to be attached to. For instance, the chapter has considered the 
articulation of “long-term investment”, “long term financial returns”, and “creating 
long-term value” as investment ideas and discourses among others in financial markets 
in the early 21st century. These ideas and discourses can be argued as forming part of the 
“programmes” that animated and gave significance to the “technologies” that made 
“long-termism” operable (cf. Miller & Rose, 1990; Power, 1997). Investment research 
that takes into account environmental, social, and corporate governance issues 
performed by sell-side financial analysts can be seen as one of these technologies. This 
conceptualisation of the linkage between technologies and the wider rationales and 
concerns that the technologies connect with also underlies the examination of the two 
aspects of the doing of corporate governance by analysts in the next two chapters. In 
chapter 3, the mechanisms and devices deployed by analysts in their evaluations of the 
corporate governance procedures of companies are viewed as potentially making 
operable a particular programme of corporate governance reform, one that places
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“transparency” in a central position. In chapter 4, the integration of corporate 
governance within the investment analyses performed by analysts, as an emerging form 
of economic calculation, is examined.
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C h a p t e r  3
EVALUATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: MECHANISMS AND 
DEVICES
1. Introduction
This chapter concentrates on the first aspect of the doing of corporate governance by 
analysts, namely, the evaluations undertaken by analysts of the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies. More specifically, it examines the ways in which 
analysts benchmarked the corporate governance procedures of companies against formal 
regulations, and how comparisons of the governance procedures adopted by different 
companies were undertaken and facilitated by analysts. This chapter also considers how 
the perceptions of companies’ corporate governance procedures held by financial market 
participants such as institutional investors can be altered and transformed by the 
corporate governance evaluations that analysts performed.
Rather than considering the whole spectrum of corporate governance, structural issues 
concerning the corporate board are specifically looked at in order to generate insights 
into the ways in which corporate governance evaluations were undertaken by analysts. 
The structural issues concerning the corporate board that this chapter focuses on are 
informed by some widely disseminated and articulated corporate governance rules, 
principles, and guidelines, such as the New York Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Rules (2003), the UK Combined Code o f Corporate Governance (2003), and the OECD 
Principles o f Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004b). These issues include: whether 
there is a strong balance of independent directors on the board and in board committees, 
whether the chairman and the CEO are separated, whether the chairman is independent, 
whether the full board is elected annually, whether the former CEO is still on the board, 
and whether board vacancies that are filled by directors are elected by shareholders, 
among other issues.
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To inform the empirical analysis of the chapter, the notion of “critic” from economic 
sociology (e.g. Bennza & Garud, 2007; Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Hirsch, 1972; 
Zuckerman, 1999) is drawn upon as the key theoretical reference point. As some 
economic sociologists have initially conceptualised, critics evaluate the quality of 
products based on the aesthetic systems in a cultural field (e.g. Baumann, 2001; Becker, 
1982; Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Hirsch, 1972; Shrum, 1991). This concept has recently 
been adapted and employed by other economic sociologists to study the financial 
analysis work performed by sell-side financial analysts that is evaluative in nature (e.g. 
Beunza & Garud, 2007; Zuckerman, 1999). However, most extant literature on critics 
has tended to focus on the impact of critical reviews on the objects being evaluated (e.g. 
Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Hirsch, 1972; Shrum, 1991; Zuckerman, 1999), or on the 
institutional environment that shapes the critical review process (e.g. Glynn & 
Lounsbury, 2005; Janssen, 1997; Rees, 1989). Little is known about how critical reviews 
are performed in general, and about what mechanisms, tools, and devices are deployed 
by critics in particular (except e.g. Baumann, 2001; Beunza & Garud, 2007)64. This 
chapter specifically attends to the mechanisms and devices created and deployed by 
analysts in measuring, classifying, and representing the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies. The notion of “inscription” from the social studies of 
science and technology literature (e.g. Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Robson, 
1992) is drawn upon in this chapter to make sense of how the mechanisms and devices 
deployed by analysts can alter and transform the way in which the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies were originally perceived.
In the corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts, the regulatory 
requirements contained in formal regulations of corporate governance can be viewed as 
the guiding principle for analysts assessing the quality of the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies. To understand how regulations of corporate
64 Baumann (2001) identifies eight techniques that film critics drew upon in film reviews in the US 
between 1925 and 1985. These techniques include positive and negative commentary, naming the director, 
comparison o f  directors, comparison o f  films, film is interpreted, merit in failure, art versus entertainment, 
and too easy to enjoy (ibis. 4 1 5 -4 1 6 ) . Beunza and Garud (2007) suggest that analysts, as frame-makers, 
develop calculative frames -  categorisations, analogies, and key dimensions o f  metric -  when valuing 
corporations under extreme uncertainty. These frames constitute the interpretive devices that provide 
analysts with a framework for calculations and for formulating investment recommendations.
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governance were operationalised, unpacked, and re-interpreted by analysts in their 
corporate governance evaluations, the concept of “carrier” from neo-institutional theory 
(e.g. Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002; Scott, 2003) is helpful. Prior research has 
suggested that the legal profession shapes and transforms the regulatory elements when 
laws and regulations are being operationalised (e.g. Edelman et al., 1992). This chapter 
expands this line of enquiry by examining a case in which analysts, who have relatively 
little experience in dealing with regulatory issues concerning corporate governance, 
unpacked and sought to make sense of new regulations and new regulatory arguments 
related to the governance aspect of companies. Meanwhile, the other element that can be 
seen as being carried by analysts in their corporate governance evaluations was the 
information about the corporate governance procedures of companies. The concept of 
“carrier” is again helpful to make sense of the manner in which the form, focus, and 
content of corporate governance information was edited and transformed by analysts.
The empirical analysis of this chapter is based upon the corporate governance reports 
produced by some analysts in the US and the UK. The chapter finds that analysts 
performed evaluations of corporate governance by directly and explicitly benchmarking 
the corporate governance procedures of companies against “best practices”65 contained 
in corporate governance regulations; and by making comparison, which comprised a 
mixture of narrative comparison, tabular comparison, and rankings. This chapter views 
these as the mechanisms and devices deployed by analysts in their corporate governance 
evaluations. The benchmarking performed by analysts can be thought of as the checking 
o f checking, where the governance systems of companies were monitored, audited, and 
scrutinised by a third party, in this case analysts. As critics, and in their capacity of 
“institutional regulators” (cf. Boskoff, 1964; Hirsch, 1972; Shrum, 1991), analysts can 
potentially monitor compliance with “best practices” of corporate governance by 
companies. In the comparative evaluations, analysts represented the corporate 
governance procedures of companies in new forms (e.g. in tabular forms), and created 
new visibilities of the governance of corporations. This chapter suggests that analysts
65 A s already mentioned in the introduction o f  this thesis, the term “best practice” does not only refer to 
the so-called “best practice o f  corporate governance” set out in principles or codes o f  corporate 
governance (i.e. soft regulations/laws). It also refers to the regulatory requirements related to corporate 
governance that are prescribed in company law and stock market listing rules (i.e. hard laws).
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contributed to one particular agenda for corporate governance reform, one that places 
“transparency” in a central position (cf. Hood & Heald, 2006). The mechanisms and 
devices that analysts deployed in their corporate governance evaluations can be viewed, 
in some sense, as transparency making devices, which created a kind of visibility 
(Grossman, Luque, & Muniesa, 2008a: 98). The governance procedures of companies 
were represented and transformed by the mechanisms and devices into a form that they 
could be further examined and assessed by participants in financial markets (e.g. 
institutional investors) ex-post the corporate governance evaluations performed by 
analysts.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief 
overview of the corporate governance assessments undertaken by a notable subset of 
parties external to companies, namely, corporate governance rating organisations, that 
commenced in the early 21st century. It suggests that the corporate governance 
evaluations performed by analysts, which also began from the early 21st century or so, 
differed from those undertaken by the rating organisations. The chapter then 
concentrates on the evaluative work on corporate governance undertaken by analysts. In 
particular, the mechanisms and devices deployed by analysts are examined in detail in 
sections 3 and 4. The final section summarises the chapter and provides some further 
comments.
2. Corporate governance assessments
As discussed in chapter 2, corporate governance was perceived as problematic in the 
US, the UK, and globally during the 1990s and in the first few years of the 21st century. 
Pursuing fundamental reforms on corporate governance was considered as an important 
agenda by various actors in financial markets, including regulators, institutional 
investors, corporations, financial institutions, and professional associations. Formal 
regulations of corporate governance were continuously revised, formulated, and enacted 
as an attempt to strengthen the governing of corporate behaviour, and to impose a sort of 
coercive pressure on companies (cf. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). From the
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early 21st century onward, activities of evaluating, monitoring, and checking the 
corporate governance procedures adopted by companies also emerged and gradually 
flourished. Activities of this kind have been argued as being able to impose normative 
pressure on objects being evaluated, and constituting new modes of governance66 (cf. 
Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Wedlin, 2006). Activities of evaluating and 
monitoring the corporate governance procedures of companies have been undertaken by 
agents and agencies that are supposedly external to and independent of the companies 
being evaluated and monitored. As outlined by Epstein and Roy (2006), these agents and 
agencies include corporate governance rating agencies (e.g. The GovemanceMetrics 
International), shareholders’rights advocate organisations (e.g. Institutional Shareholder 
Services67, The Corporate Library), credit rating agencies (e.g. Standard & Poor’s68, 
Moody’s), and shareholder and investor advisory groups (e.g. Deminor Rating, David 
Global Advisors). These agents and agencies construct and issue corporate governance 
ratings or scores as the final products of their activities of evaluating and monitoring the 
corporate governance procedures of companies. These agents and agencies can all be 
termed corporate governance rating organisations.
Corporate governance rating or scoring as a way of evaluating and assessing the 
corporate governance procedures of companies was considered, to a large extent, as 
being inspired by demands of institutional investors for quick and simple way of 
measuring the quality of the governance of companies (Solomon, 2007). Using the 
scores generated by these rating organisations, the corporate governance procedures 
adopted by different companies can be compared across markets and national 
boundaries as well as over time. However, not all aspects of the corporate governance 
practices adopted by companies can be captured by the governance scores. Only some 
key aspects of corporate governance were identified and considered by rating 
organisations in the rating processes. Broadly speaking, these included: board structure 
and processes, executive compensation, level of disclosure, and shareholder rights and
66 According to Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006), new modes o f  governance include contractual 
arrangements, standards, rankings and monitoring frameworks which tend to be less coercive in nature as 
compared to the more traditional coercive regulations imposed by the state. However, the state has now  
increasingly made use o f  these new modes o f  governance (e.g. Hood, Scott, James, Jones, & Travers, 
1999).
67 The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) was acquired by RiskMetrics Group in January 2007.
68 Standard & Poor’s stopped issuing corporate governance scores from September 2005. Management 
and corporate governance issues, however, have long been factored into its credit rating process.
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takeover defenses (Epstein & Roy, 2006:175). While constructing the overall Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ) score for companies, the Institutional Shareholder Services 
also issued Corporate Governance Quotient Sub-Scores for four dimensions of corporate 
governance, namely, board issues, takeover defences, audit, and 
compensation/ownership. Also, in addition to generating the overall corporate 
governance score, Standard & Poor’s issued sub-scores for four corporate governance 
components. These were: ownership structure and external influences; shareholder rights 
and stakeholder relations; transparency, disclosure and audit; and board structure and 
effectiveness. The selection of these key aspects of corporate governance and of the 
detailed criteria in each aspect were mostly informed by various existing corporate 
governance rules, principles, and codes. These included international corporate 
governance principles and guidelines issued by, for instance, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN), and the World Bank; national codes of corporate 
governance, such as the UK Cadbury Report (1992); national stock market listing 
requirements; and other guidelines issued by recognised pension funds and insurance 
companies, such as the California Public Employees Retirement System (Brown, 2004; 
Epstein & Roy, 2006; Solomon, 2007), among others. These standards and codes of 
corporate governance constituted the guiding principles adopted by rating organisations 
to select and formulate criteria for their ratings.
Nevertheless, the process through which regulations of corporate governance were 
elaborated upon, and the way in which regulatory requirements were translated into 
rating criteria, was not revealed or disclosed by rating organisations in a systematic 
manner. Different ways of unpacking and interpreting regulations of corporate 
governance in the rating process may potentially lead to inconsistent ratings issued by 
different rating organisations to the same company. This issue was widely criticised by 
users of the ratings, including institutional investors and corporations themselves (e.g. 
Epstein & Roy, 2006). Also, as previously mentioned, institutional investors may make 
use of the scores to compare the corporate governance procedures adopted by different 
companies, given that corporate governance rating was perceived to be a quick and 
simple way of measuring the quality of the governance of companies (cf. Solomon, 
2007). However, each rating report issued by rating organisations generally tended to
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focus on one single company69. In order to effectively compare the corporate 
governance procedures adopted by different companies, institutional investors need to 
get access to more than one rating report, collect relevant information from each report, 
and put the information together so as to make comparison possible.
The corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts can be seen as adding to 
the activities of assessing, monitoring, and checking the corporate governance 
procedures of companies in financial markets. Although analysts made use o f the input 
provided by corporate governance rating organisations, as this chapter will consider 
later, the corporate governance evaluations undertaken by analysts differed from those 
performed by rating organisations in at least two respects. First, analysts produced 
reports that documented the corporate governance evaluations they performed. The way 
in which analysts unpacked the regulatory requirements contained in formal regulations 
of corporate governance, and the circumstances under which analysts proposed 
alternative or additional “best practices” of corporate governance, can be identified from 
these reports. Second, these corporate governance reports also revealed that information 
about the corporate governance procedures of companies was represented by analysts in 
a form that comparison of the governance procedures of companies in the same industry 
or across the market can be readily facilitated. These and other features of the corporate 
governance evaluations undertaken by analysts are examined in detail in the following 
two sections.
3. Direct benchmarking of the corporate governance procedures of companies 
against “best practices”
Corporate governance practices and principles are specified by a variety of regulatory 
bodies and codes, including stock market listing rules, international and national 
governance codes, company laws, and financial regulations. These can be viewed as 
imposing a sort of coercive pressure on companies (cf. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 2001). Principles and standards of corporate governance have typically been
69 For a sample rating report issued by the GovemanceMetrics International, see 
http://www.gmiratings.com/Images/SampleReport.PDF.
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adhered to and endorsed, at least publicly, by constituents of the investment public, 
including analysts who frequently made references to them in the evaluations of the 
governance procedures adopted by corporations. In particular, analysts benchmarked the 
corporate governance procedures adopted by companies directly and explicitly against 
the requirements set out in formal corporate governance regulations, and monitored 
compliance by companies with these regulatory requirements. This was clearly indicated 
by analysts when they set out the objective of their governance evaluations in the 
corporate governance reports they produced. For instance:
“Throughout this report, we cite relevant new rules and data 
illustrating how well the companies in our coverage universe now 
comply with the new rules [in this case, the NYSE Corporate 
Governance Rules].” (Devine, Walsh, & Hunt, 2003: 5)
and
“We analyse three different aspects related to the board of directors.
First is board composition, and how each of the companies stack up 
against new requirements [as set out in the NYSE Corporate 
Governance Rules] that the majority of the board be independent.”
(Dally, 2003: 2)
The NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (2003) was often explicitly referred to by 
analysts based in the US. It was stated in Rule 1 of the NYSE Corporate Governance 
Rules that “listed companies must have a majority of independent directors” (NYSE,
2003). Consistent with the concept of aesthetic systems in the “critic” lens, this 
requirement can be viewed as part of an ideal of what a good board should possess. 
Analysts benchmarked the board practices adopted by companies directly and explicitly 
against the criterion that “listed companies must have a majority of independent 
directors”. For example, in the evaluation of the board practice adopted by Walt Disney, 
Krutick, Han, and Zraick (2004: 2) put it:
“Disney’s independent directors now number 8 of the 11 board 
positions, representing 73% of the board, higher than the NYSE 
requirement of a majority of independent outsiders while also using 
stricter definitions.”
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Analysts also explicitly drew upon the idea of director independence, as contained in 
the NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (2003), in order to evaluate the extent to which 
certain corporate board members were independent. For instance, when evaluating the 
independence of the board members in Caremark Rx, Veiel, and Perry (2002: 18) 
pointed out:
“Under newly implemented NYSE rules, “for a director to be deemed 
‘independent’, the board must affirmatively determine the director has 
no material relationship with the listed company (either directly or as 
a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a 
relationship with the company).” We note that two Board members 
may be deemed insiders when applying this rule. Mr. Piccolo still 
draws a consulting fee from the company of approximately $540,000 
per year. Moreover, because Mr. Brown’s firm provided legal services 
to Caremark, he may be considered an insider under the new rules as 
well.”
In Britain, the Combined Code o f Corporate Governance (2003) is the most widely 
endorsed piece of corporate governance regulation for financial markets. When 
assessing the composition of audit committees in UK life insurance companies, the 
Combined Code was explicitly drawn upon as the benchmark. As Walker (2008: 6) 
stated:
“[...] when looking at the composition of audit committees [in life 
insurance companies in Britain] it is clear that [... these] committees 
tend on average to have only one recognised audit committee expert 
with relevant financial experience as stipulated under the Combined 
Code.”
Compliance with the Combined Code (2003) is, in fact, a regulatory requirement for 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, just as compliance with the NYSE 
Corporate Governance Rules (2003) is a requirement for companies listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Despite the different jurisdictions, listed companies are expected 
to frequently self-evaluate the corporate governance procedures they adopt against these 
rules and principles. The corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts 
essentially constituted a further layer of checking on the quality of the corporate
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governance systems of companies. This can be regarded as the checking ofchecking70 or 
double checking where the corporate governance procedures of companies were 
monitored, audited, and scrutinised by a third party, in this case analysts. As previously 
discussed, critical reviews as activities of monitoring, evaluating, and auditing can 
impose a sort of normative pressure on objects being reviewed, and can have governing 
effects (cf. Scott, 2001,2003; Wedlin, 2006). Here, by double checking the governance 
of companies against “best practices” set out in formal regulations, analysts can be 
viewed-as acting as critics of the corporate governance procedures adopted by 
companies. As critics, and in their capacity of “institutional regulators” (e.g. Boskoff, 
1964; Hirsch, 1972; Shrum, 1991), analysts can be viewed as possessing the capacity of 
monitoring compliance with existing “best practices” of corporate governance by 
companies. Formal regulations of corporate governance may impose a sort of coercive 
pressure on companies (cf. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). The benchmarking 
of the corporate governance procedures of companies against “best practices” performed 
by analysts can be thought of as imposing a sort of normative pressure on corporate 
boards. This normative pressure can potentially lead companies to adopt corporate 
governance procedures that are at least in line with minimum regulatory requirements.
At times, when conducting their corporate governance evaluations, analysts did not 
explicitly identify a specific piece of formal regulation. Nevertheless, the criterion and 
standard employed by analysts to inform the evaluations were consistent with those 
“best practices” contained in formal regulations of corporate governance71. For instance, 
as Krutick et al. (2004) described:
“We look favorably on a manageable size (between 6-15), composed 
largely of non-insiders, with a split between the chairman and CEO 
roles. Compensation and nominating committees should be comprised 
of independent board members, and regularly scheduled board
70 The notion o f  checking o f  checking here is somehow similar to the notion o f  “control o f  control” for 
audit (Power, 1994,1997), to the extent that both terms address the activities o f  monitoring, assessing, and 
scrutinising organisational practices and performances undertaken by a third party. “Control o f  control” 
assures the quality o f  the control systems, instead o f  the quality o f  first order operations (Power, 1994). 
The objects that analysts were checking, however, were the corporate governance procedures adopted by 
companies.
71 There may be a possibility that analysts did refer to a specific piece o f  corporate governance regulation 
as the benchmark in the evaluations, but they did not explicitly point out which regulation they drew upon 
in the corporate governance report.
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meetings should occur in the absence of the CEO. Term limits or 
required retirement ages for board members are also considered to be 
good policies.” (Krutick et al., 2004: 2)
Although Krutick et al. (2004) did not explicitly refer to any specific corporate 
governance code or regulation, the recommendations they set out above were consistent 
with those “best practices” contained in the NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (2003). 
This suggests that these “best practices” may have been widely articulated, endorsed, 
and accepted by constituents of the investment community, including analysts. “Best 
practices” of corporate governance contained in formal regulations did not only
79correspond to the regulative pillars of institutions (Scott, 2001,2003). They can also 
be thought of as culturally cognitive elements (Scott, 2001, 2003), i.e. common 
conceptions and beliefs, that had been accepted and shared by stock market 
participants, including analysts. These “best practices” constituted part of the 
“institutionalised myths” related to corporate governance that had informed the 
understanding of corporate governance issues by market participants, and enabled 
actions towards governing corporate conduct to be taken (cf. Glynn & Lounsbury, 
2005; Lounsbury, 2008; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Nevertheless, “best practices” of corporate governance as common conceptions and 
beliefs may essentially set the boundary, and to a certain extent constrain the 
understanding of corporate governance issues by participants in financial markets. 
These “best practices” contained in regulations of corporate governance may become 
part of the so-called “editing rules” (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). These “editing rules” can 
potentially shape and frame the way in which ideas of corporate governance were 
unpacked, elaborated upon, and interpreted by analysts in their corporate governance 
evaluations.
However, exceptions did exist. These occurred when there were gaps in the regulations, 
where subjects were not covered by the regulations, where “best practices” were not 
clearly specified, or where there was simply room for interpretation. For instance, when
72 Scott (2001; 2003) identifies three pillars o f  institutions: regulative pillars, normative pillars, and 
cultural-cognitive pillars. The regulative pillars commonly take the form o f  regulations, laws and legal 
rules issued by the state, professional associations, business groups and other legal authorities. The 
regulative pillars o f  institutions can potentially impose coercive pressure on organisations.
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drawing upon the UK Combined Code o f Corporate Governance (2003) to assess the 
expertise of audit committee members in UK banks and insurance companies, Walker 
(2008: 3) pointed out that:
“Although the Combined Code states that audit committees should 
have at least three audit members of which one should have relevant 
financial experience, it does not provide a definition of what 
constitutes relevant financial experience.”
To enable the evaluation to be performed, Walker (2008: 3) set out his own standard for 
assessing the expertise of audit committee members:
“When assessing the expertise of audit committee members we 
looked for non-executives who were currently or had previously been 
a Finance Director of a FTSE 350 company or had been a senior 
executive or partner at one of the top four auditors.”
However, Walker (2008: 4) went beyond the requirements set out in the Combined 
Code, and argued:
“It is not necessary for every member of an audit committee to have 
recent and relevant financial experience because there is some value 
in having members of the committee from diverse backgrounds who 
are not afraid to engage in critical analysis, (in our view lawyers 
would be good at this) or ask questions which others have taken for 
granted, or perhaps are too afraid to ask. However such directors 
should make up the minority and not the majority of audit 
committees.”
As can be seen, analysts formulated and developed their own view of “best practices” of 
corporate governance in their governance evaluations. They injected their own ideas and 
opinions regarding certain corporate governance issues, or inflected those already in 
place when gaps in formal regulations of corporate governance were considered to exist. 
These alternative opinions could potentially re-shape and re-frame the perception by 
financial market participants of what a good audit committee should look like. For 
instance, as Walker proposed above, “[...] there is some value in having members of the 
committee from diverse backgrounds who are not afraid to engage in critical analysis 
[...] or ask questions which others have taken for granted, or perhaps are too afraid to
ask” (2008: 4).
Here was the other example. While the optimal size of the board was not specified in the 
NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (2003), Dally (2003) set out his own “best 
practices” with regard to this aspect of corporate governance:
“While there is no right or wrong size, we believe boards with greater 
than one dozen members may begin to reach a size where they 
become ineffective. We believe this is especially true for smaller 
organizations.” (Dally, 2003: 9)
Dally (2003) evaluated the board size of US life/annuity insurance companies by 
drawing upon their self-developed “best practices” regarding corporate board size as the 
benchmark. He found that US life/annuity insurance companies on average had 12 board 
members in 2003. Accordingly, he regarded AFLAC, which had 17 board members, and 
Reinsurance Group of America, which had 8 board members, as outliers (Dally, 2003:
9).
At times analysts criticised the existing “best practices”, as contained in the initial 
formal regulations of corporate governance, and set out alternative opinions. For 
instance, Devine et al. (2003: 15) noticed that company John Hancock Financial 
established a compensation committee. However, it was viewed as ineffective, in that it 
allowed the executive and management of the company to be awarded compensation 
packages that were considered to be excessive. This led Devine and his colleagues to 
point out:
“While we believe the establishment of the formal board committees 
required by the NYSE is a positive step, in our opinion, it would also 
be naive to believe that such committees in and of themselves will 
result in good governance and proper alignment of shareholder and 
management interests.” (Devine et al., 2003: 15)
In this case, the conception regarding board structure by Devine et al. (2003) somehow 
departed from and went beyond “best practices” contained in formal regulations of 
corporate governance, such as those prescribed in the NYSE Corporate Governance
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Rules (2003)73. Instead, it paralleled the suggestion made by, for instance, Bradley 
(2004) that board effectiveness is more than a matter of structure, and that the “human 
side” of the board is equally important74. Due to the perceived gaps in formal regulations 
of corporate governance, Devine and his colleagues did not neutrally operationalise the 
existing regulatory requirements. Instead, Devine and his colleagues proposed 
alternative ideas, and based their evaluations of the corporate governance procedures 
adopted by John Hancock Financial on the alternative ideas.
In short, when evaluating the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies, 
which themselves were based on the formal rules and codes of corporate governance, 
analysts were not acting simply as neutral vehicles, “carrying” institutional ideas from 
one place to another. Analysts were re-interpreting and transforming the original “best 
practices” of corporate governance, rather than neutrally applying them or being wholly 
constrained by them. In some instances, analysts actively proposed alternative or 
additional ideas and opinions in relation to certain corporate governance issues, and used 
them as norms against which the governance procedures of companies were evaluated. 
Although the way in which analysts came up with the alternative ideas was not revealed 
in the corporate governance reports they produced, analysts challenged some of the 
dominant institutional ideas related to certain corporate governance issues contained in 
formal regulations, and injected additional elements. As has been noted, for instance, in 
the case of Walker (2008:4) proposing that “[i]t is not necessary for every member of an 
audit committee to have recent and relevant financial experience”, these alternative or 
additional elements could potentially re-shape and re-frame the original “best practices” 
of corporate governance.
4. Comparative evaluations of corporate governance procedures
73 For instance, for the issue o f  compensation committee, Rule 5 o f  the NYSE Corporate Governance 
Rules (2003) simply states that “listed companies must have a compensation committee composed entirely 
o f  independent directors”, and that the “compensation committee must have a written charter that 
addresses the comm ittee’s purpose and responsibilities [... and] an annual performance evaluation o f  the 
compensation committee.”
74 According to Bradley (2004:112), the “human side” o f  a board concerns the extent to which individual 
board members are engaged, well informed, and represent diverse skill sets and perspectives.
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Making comparisons is one of the key mechanisms deployed by critics (e.g. Baumann, 
2001; Beunza & Garud, 2007). Consistent with the view of analysts as critics, this 
mechanism was also deployed by analysts, and it featured often in their corporate 
governance reports. Analysts sought to examine how companies “stacked up” on a 
specific governance issue (Sims & Hoch, 2003: 1), they sought to investigate which 
companies “saw the biggest improvements/declines” in their CGQ scores (Sims & 
Hoch, 2003: 2), and they aimed to identify “leaders and laggards” (Dally, 2003: 2). 
Three approaches to making comparison were adopted by analysts: narrative 
comparison, tabular comparison, and rankings. These different ways of comparing 
performed by analysts made use of various forms of inscriptions, including narratives, 
lists, and ranking tables (cf. Latour, 1987; Robson, 1992). They rendered the corporate 
governance procedures of companies visible, measurable, comparable, and amenable to 
further assessment and checking.
4.1 Narrative comparison o f corporate governance procedures
The term narrative comparison is used here to describe one important aspect of the 
corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts. One-to-one comparison was 
one type of narrative comparison, in which analysts evaluated the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by one company in relation to the governance procedures of the 
other company. For instance, when Devine et al. (2003) were reviewing the number of 
board meetings excluding the CEO at Manulife Financial in 2002, they compared the 
practice adopted by Manulife Financial with that of Sun Life Financial:
“This level [i.e. the number of board meetings excluding the CEO at 
Manulife Financial in 2002 which was 11] was behind only Sun Life, 
the other Canadian insurer in our study, which held 14 meetings in 
2002.” (Devine et al., 2003: 37)
As Devine et al. (2003: 12) mentioned in their report, board meetings excluding the 
CEO were not common among Northern American life insurance companies, although 
these meetings were considered as being able to enhance the independence of the
75 The Corporate Governance Quotients (CGQ) scores are provided by the Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS).
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corporate board. The comparison above depicted Sun Life as the role model for this 
aspect of corporate governance, and accordingly Sun Life came to set the standard for 
the other companies in the same industry. While the optimal number of this kind of 
meeting was not specified in formal regulations of corporate governance, the practice 
adopted by Sun Life came to be seen as an exemplar of “best practice”. In this manner, 
one-to-one comparisons allowed assessments of corporate governance which went 
beyond formal regulatory requirements. By comparing the practice adopted by Manulife 
Financial against that of Sun Life, analysts were able to suggest that the number of 
board meetings excluding the CEO at Manulife Financial in 2002 was sufficient, and 
fairly close, to “best practice”.
One-to-n comparisons were also performed by analysts. In this case, the corporate 
governance procedures adopted by one company were compared to those of more than 
one company in the same industry. For instance, the board of O’Reilly was regarded by 
Sims and Hoch (2003:5) as the “most troubling” and the “loser” based on the corporate 
governance rating provided by the Institutional Shareholders Services in 2003. To 
demonstrate this, Sims and Hoch (2003) pointed out:
“There is no standing nominating committee [in O’Reilly]. All of our
other companies have a nominating committee, and all but one (Home
Depot) have committees comprised solely of independent outsiders.”
(Sims & Hoch, 2003: 5)
This comparative evaluation reviewed the corporate governance practice with regard to 
the existence and composition of the nominating committee adopted by O’Reilly in 
relation to the practices adopted by the other companies in the US hardline retail
If*industry . The comparison led to a conclusion drawn by Sims and Hoch (2003) that 
O’Reilly was a laggard in terms of board practice among its peers. This was largely 
because O’Reilly was the only company in the hardline retail industry that did not have 
a nominating committee in 2003. The comparative evaluation performed by analysts
76 Hardline retailers are considered as including retailers o f  home centre stock, consumer electronics stock, 
and furniture. The hardline retailers that Sims and Hoch (2003) covered include: Advance Auto Parts, 
Inc., AutoZone, Best Buy Company, Inc., Circuit City Group, Home Depot, Inc., Lowe’s Companies, Inc., 
O ’R eilly Automotive, Inc., Office Depot Inc, PETCO Animal Supplies, Inc., Radio Shack Corp., Staples 
Inc., and Toys R U s Inc.
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here made the governance practice adopted by O’Reilly comparatively knowable. More 
specifically, the board practice of O’Reilly was made knowable in relation to those 
practices adopted by the other companies in the same industry. With such comparison, 
the corporate board of O’Reilly was not only evaluated in a stand-alone manner. Instead, 
it was evaluated in a relative manner, and was constructed as a comparable object. This 
comparison, therefore, created an additional lens through which the performance of the 
corporate board at O’Reilly could be assessed and checked by participants in financial 
markets.
The comparisons made by analysts were strongly informed by and tied to the 
requirements as contained in formal regulations of corporate governance. For example, 
it was considered “best practice” that the corporate board should have a nominating 
committee which is solely comprised of independent members77. This “best practice” 
informed and was operationalised in the comparison made by Sims and Hoch (2003) 
between the board practice adopted by O’Reilly and those of the other companies 
mentioned above. In 2003, O’Reilly did not have a nominating committee while the 
other companies in the US hardline retail industry did, the board of O’Reilly was 
regarded as the most troublesome in this industry (Sims & Hoch, 2003: 5). When it 
created a nominating committee in 2004, and notwithstanding its failure to adhere to the 
requirement that the nominating committee should be comprised solely of independent 
members, O’Reilly was praised by analysts who regarded this change as “a major step 
forward for the company” (Sims et al., 2004: 8). This was largely because the board 
practice adopted by O’Reilly had caught up, to a certain extent, with those of its peers, 
and had at least started to move towards “best practice”.
In another case, the evaluation undertaken by Walker (2008) of the board practice 
adopted by Aviva relative to that of the other life insurance companies in Britain, was 
informed by the UK Combined Code o f Corporate Governance (2003). As Walker 
(2008: 8) put it:
“[...] boards in this sector [i.e. UK life insurance sector] appear to
77 For instance, this is stated in Rule 4 o f  the NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (NYSE, 2003).
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have a higher number of directors with experience of the financial and 
insurance sectors [...]. However, the issue of the competence level of 
the audit committee remains paramount and in this respect Aviva 
stands out as a company with a well balanced board, having non­
executives who are not members of the audit committee (80%) and an 
audit committee that has two members with relevant financial 
experience, which goes beyond the requirements of the Combined 
Code.”
As can be seen, these evaluations undertaken by analysts of the relative merits of the 
corporate governance practices adopted by companies remained strongly tied to “best 
practices” of corporate governance as contained in the formal codes. In the comparison, 
the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies were indirectly and 
implicitly benchmarked against these formal regulatory requirements. These formal 
regulatory requirements related to corporate governance implicitly penetrated the 
comparison, guiding and informing the comparative evaluations performed by analysts.
4.2 Tabular comparison o f corporate governance procedures
In addition to benchmarking, and one-to-one and one-to-n comparisons, the corporate 
governance procedures of companies were also compiled, summarised, and represented 
in various forms of tables by analysts. These tables made possible and facilitated new 
forms of comparison, which we term tabular comparison.
For instance, Table 1 below from Krutick & Osur (2004: 4) depicted the board 
procedures of companies in the US entertainment industry. The information contained in 
this table can potentially be found in the annual reports of individual companies. 
However, it looked different, in that the information in Table 1 had been edited and 
transformed by analysts. For Table 1, analysts selected and summarised the information 
about the corporate governance practices associated with ten structural issues 
concerning the corporate board adopted by US entertainment companies, and 
represented the information in tabular form. These issues included: number of board 
members, whether the Chairman is also the CEO, whether the former CEO still sits on 
the board, whether the nominating and compensations committees are completely
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consisted of independent members, whether the board hold meetings without the 
presence of the CEO, whether the board sets out the term limit or the mandatory 
retirement age for board members, the components of board compensation, whether 
directors are required to own stocks, and whether reporting guidelines on these issues 
exist. In the last two rows of the table, in particular, analysts explicitly set out what they 
viewed as favourable and unfavourable policies with regard to each aspect of the board 
practice examined. Also, companies were grouped in the table based on the nature of 
their businesses, namely, cruising, recreational boating, toys, theme parks, and video 
games. What analysts had done here was not dissimilar to some work performed by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD 
collected data from OECD countries concerning public management reforms, and edited 
and summarised the data in reports (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). The editing and 
representing of corporate governance information by analysts exemplified the view that 
when information is being “carried”, the form and the format of it are subject to revision 
and transformation (e.g. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002). 
Here, more specifically, the information about the corporate governance procedures 
adopted by companies was summarised, edited, and represented in tabular form.
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Table 1, like other inscriptions (cf. Latour, 1987; Robson, 1992), should not be seen as a 
neutral listing of information (cf Rose & Miller, 1992). The collecting of the 
information about the board practices adopted by companies in the US entertainment 
industry and its representation in tabular form, made the governance procedures adopted 
by corporations in the same industry comparatively knowable and observable. More 
importantly, a new visibility of the corporate governance procedures adopted by 
companies in this industry was created through the deployment of the table by analysts.
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Comparison of the board practices adopted by the different companies in the US 
entertainment industry can be readily facilitated and performed. For instance, this table 
highlighted that the compensation committee of GameStop “include[d] 
insiders/affiliated outsiders” in 2004. By looking through the table, one can easily spot 
that GameStop was not alone, as the compensation committee of Blockbuster also 
“include [d] insiders”. The compensation committees at all other companies, however, 
consisted of “all independent” members. Blockbuster and GameStop were shown to be 
exceptional in the table, and they can be treated as the outliers among all the companies 
in the US entertainment industry. While the tabular representation may not provide 
additional information, what it did was to provide a new type of visibility of the 
governance of corporations. The corporate governance practices adopted by companies 
in the US entertainment industry were transformed and inscribed into a form that they 
became visible, comparable, and assessable. Financial market participants, such as 
institutional investors, were provided with additional input to undertake their own 
comparative assessment of the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies. 
In other words, in addition to facilitating the comparison performed by analysts 
themselves, Table 1 can also make it possible for some financial market participants to 
further assess and check the corporate governance procedures of companies in a 
comparative manner ex-post the evaluations performed by analysts.
Furthermore, one special feature of Table 1 was that the perception by analysts of the 
“favourable policies” regarding the ten structural issues concerning the corporate board 
examined were clearly specified and incorporated into the table. According to Rule 1 of 
the NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (2003), “listed companies must have a majority 
of independent directors”. However, the percentage that can be regarded as “a majority” 
or the optimal board size was not specified in this particular piece of corporate 
governance regulation. For Table 1, analysts developed and explicitly set out their own 
notion of “best practices” regarding these aspects of governance procedures, i.e. the 
“favourable policies” -  “board size 6 - 1 5  with 3A independent” directors. These 
additional elements to the original “best practices” contained in the NYSE Corporate 
Governance Rules (2003) can function as the revised norm and ideal that analysts 
employed in judging the quality of corporate boards. As suggested earlier, the additional
- 9 7 -
elements proposed by analysts can potentially re-shape and re-frame the original “best 
practices” of corporate governance perceived by participants in financial markets. 
Furthermore, as the information about the governance practices of individual companies 
and the “favourable policies” were both included in Table 1, both analysts and other 
participants in financial markets can compare the board practices adopted by companies 
against the “best practices” formulated by analysts.
In short, Table 1 might have been constructed by analysts primarily for the pragmatic 
and immediate purpose of listing information about the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies, and presenting it to some financial market 
participants, such as institutional investors. However, the table rendered the corporate 
governance procedures adopted by companies comparatively knowable and visible in a 
particular way, and hence facilitated further comparison and evaluation by participants 
in financial markets. As an inscription, this table not only constituted a new way of 
recording and representing information about a domain, it also changed the way in 
which such a domain could be assessed and examined. Here, the board practices adopted 
by companies in the US entertainment industry were transformed and constructed in 
such a way that financial market participants could be in the know about the relative 
merits of the different corporate boards, and potentially act upon them (cf. Robson, 
1992; Rose & Miller, 1992).
The information included in Table 1 came from the records kept by analysts and the 
annual reports of companies. Table 2, from Sims & Hoch (2003: 9) and shown below, is 
different in that it is partially based on information provided by other parties. For Table 
2, input from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a corporate governance rating 
organisation, was drawn upon by analysts. This table summarised information about 17 
structural issues concerning the corporate board: board composition, nominating 
committee composition, compensation committee composition, the establishment and 
meetings of governance committee, board election policy, board size, CEO’s role on 
other company boards, whether the former CEO serves on the board, shareholders’ use 
of cumulative voting rights, the existence of a lead director, the existence and disclosure 
of governance guidelines, participation in “ISS Accredited” education program, board
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meeting attendance, shareholders’ approval of changes to board size, board vacancies, 
related party transactions, and board policies.
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Sims et al. (2004: 10) regarded Table 2 as providing “a comprehensive review of the 
specific issues assessed in determining a company’s Board quality”. As this table listed 
information about the board practices adopted by all the companies in the US hardline 
retail industry, comparison of the board practices adopted by different companies can be 
easily facilitated. Particularly, the classification of each structural issue concerning the 
corporate board into several categories and the grouping of companies in accordance 
with their performances on each issue by analysts created a new visibility of the 
governance of companies in the US hardline retail industry. This new visibility can 
potentially enable and facilitate an additional dimension for comparison. For example, 
under “Board Composition”, there were five categories: “less than 50%” of outsiders, 
“greater than 50%”, “greater than 67%”, “greater than 75%”, and “greater than 90%”. 
Company RSH was positioned under the category of “greater than 90%”, which 
suggested that more than 90% of the board of directors at RSH were “outsiders”. As 
RSH was the only company in this category, it can be seen almost by default as an 
exemplar of best practice regarding board composition among companies in the US 
hardline retail industry. In contrast, company ORLY was the only company that 
appeared under the category of “less than 50%”, suggesting that ORLY represented a 
case of “worst practice”, as it were. It was also revealed that the board of ORLY did not 
closely comply with the regulatory requirement stated in the NYSE Corporate 
Governance Rules (2003) that “listed companies must have a majority of independent 
directors”. Furthermore, according to Table 2, companies HD, LOW, CC, TOT, AZO, 
and AAP were all placed under the category of “Greater than 75%”. This implied that 
corporate board compositions of these companies possessed similar features, namely, 
their boards had “greater than 75%” but less than 90% outsiders. In other words, 
regarding board composition, as Table 2 revealed, companies HD, LOW, CC, TOT, 
AZO, and AAP all performed better than ORLY, even though the percentages of 
outsiders in these companies had not reached the highest level that RSH had achieved.
As with Table 1, no additional information about the corporate governance procedures 
adopted by companies appeared in Table 2. However, and again like Table 1, by 
transforming the way in which information was presented, the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies were made comparatively knowable and observable,
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and perhaps more importantly, visible in terms of categories. The corporate governance 
evaluations performed by analysts, again, gave a new visibility to the governance of 
corporations. The corporate governance procedures adopted by companies in the US 
hardline retail industry were again transformed into assessable and checkable objects 
that could be evaluated and examined by other financial market participants (e.g. 
institutional investors). Also, the information about the corporate governance procedures 
adopted by companies in the US hardline retail industry included in Table 2 was 
partially supplied by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). However, it was 
analysts who put into place the tabular device, and who made use of the classification 
system to transform the way in which the information was represented. As “carriers” 
who transmitted ideas and information, analysts were far from being neutral vehicles 
which simply transmit information. Instead, analysts edited and transformed the way in 
which the governance of companies could be viewed and assessed through their 
corporate governance evaluations (cf. Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002; Scott, 2003).
As revealed from Table 2, a classification system was deployed by analysts in their 
evaluations of the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies. The 
classification system deployed by analysts in Table 2 grouped companies, represented 
the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies in a comparative manner, 
provided a new visibility of the governance of corporations, and facilitated further 
comparisons. However, there are other classification systems that quantitatively measure 
objects and hierarchically arrange things being assessed. Ranking is an example of such 
classification systems, and it was deployed by analysts, both explicitly and implicitly, in 
their corporate governance evaluations.
4.3 Comparison o f corporate governance procedures through rankings
Rankings are a prevalent feature of modem society. A number of scholars have 
examined the implications of such ranking systems, such as business school rankings 
(e.g. Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson, & Wedlin, 2001; Wedlin, 2006), MBA rankings (e.g. 
Free, Salterio, & Shearer, 2009), and law school rankings (e.g. Espeland & Sauder,
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2007; Sauder & Lancaster, 2006). Rankings are part and parcel of the increasingly 
flourishing activities of monitoring, evaluating, scrutinising, and auditing in various 
aspects of social, economic, and political life (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Wedlin, 
2006), and are a central part of the “audit society” (Power, 1997). They have also 
become a new mode of governance, which can impose strong normative pressures on 
the objects being ranked, even while not forming part of legislation or regulation (cf. 
Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Wedlin, 2006).
In the corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts, two types of rankings 
and associated league tables were deployed. These were rankings that made use of the 
input provided by other interest groups, and rankings compiled by analysts alone. Table 
3 below from Sims and Hoch (2003: 8) and the ranking embedded in it, represents an 
example of the first type. Instead of providing a comprehensive review of the board 
practices adopted by companies, Table 3 sought to provide a snapshot of the overall 
quality of the board practices of companies in the US hardline retail industry. This was 
made possible by drawing upon the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) Board
7RIssues Sub-Scores issued by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) . The ISS 
quantified and measured the quality of the board practices adopted by companies in the 
US hardline retail industry. This quantification transformed qualitative corporate 
governance information into quantitative information. The difference between the 
corporate governance procedures adopted by companies was transformed into a 
magnitude, and a common metric, namely, the corporate governance score, was 
generated (cf. Espeland & Stevens, 1998).
78 Before the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) was acquired by RiskMetrics Group in January 
2007, it issued two overall Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) scores (namely, index ranking and 
industry ranking) to companies. Companies also received four sub-scores for four dimensions o f  corporate 
governance, namely, board issues, takeover defences, audit, and compensation/ownership. For the sub­
scores, the highest score available was 5, and the lowest score available was 1. For board issues, the 
following 17 elements were taken into account by the ISS: board composition, nominating committee, 
compensation committee, governance committee, board structure, board size, changes in board size, 
cumulative voting, boards serve on -  CEO, boards serve on -  other than CEO, former CEOs, 
chairman/CEO separation, board guidelines, response to shareholder proposals, board attendance, board 
vacancies, related party transactions. For more information, see 
http://www.isscgq.com/RatingCriteria.htm.
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T a b le  3
Company Name Ticker Board Issues
AutoZone AZO 5
5
5
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
High
Advance Auto Parts AAP 
Toys R Us TOY
Radio Shack RSH
Staples SPLS
Home Depot HD
Lowe’s Companies LOW
Office Depot ODP
Rest Buy BBY
Circuit City CC
O'Reilly Automotive ORLY Low
Source: Sims and Hoch (2003: 8)
However, it was not the ISS that put together the CGQ Board Issues Sub-Scores into a 
single table. What made Table 3 special was the getting together o f these scores by 
analysts, as well as the hierarchical positioning o f the companies in the table based on 
the scores. This table can be read as a ranking/league table regarding the quality o f the 
board practices adopted by companies in the US hardline retail industry. Here, 
companies AZO, APP, TOY, and RSH can be considered as leaders, as indicated by them 
being accorded the highest possible CGQ Board Issues Sub-Score o f “5”, and by the top 
positions these companies captured in the table. In contrast, companies ODP, BBY, CC, 
and ORLY can be considered as laggards, as indicated by their low CGQ Board Issues 
Sub-Score o f “ 1” or “2”, and by being placed in bottom position in the table. The 
discrepancy in the measured quality o f board practices between good players and bad 
players was visually revealed by having AZO, APP, TOY, and RSH placed at the top in 
the table, and ODP, BBY, CC, and ORLY at the bottom. The magnitude o f the shortfall, 
which was represented by the difference in the CGQ Board Issue Sub-Scores received 
by companies, was also made explicit and visible by analysts who incorporated the 
scores in Table 3.
While the CGQ Board Issue Sub-Scores provided the necessary input for analysts to 
construct the ranking and the associated league table, it was analysts who gathered these 
scores, elaborated upon them, used them in an alternative manner, and represented them
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in a different format. More specifically, analysts collected the CGQ Board Issue Sub- 
Scores received by companies in the US hardline retail industry, arranged companies 
hierarchically based on the scores, represented the scores in tabular form, and rendered 
companies as rankable objects. The ranking constructed by analysts here can be thought 
of as a “second-order measurement” of the quality of corporate boards which was
70developed based on the originally available CGQ Board Issue Sub-Scores (cf. Power, 
2004: 771-774). Like Tables 1 and 2, Table 3 also created a new visibility of the 
governance of corporations in the US hardline retail industry. The ranking table rendered 
the corporate governance practices of companies hierarchically and quantitatively 
visible. It transformed the manner in which the corporate governance procedures 
adopted by companies could be viewed and assessed. The attention of financial markets 
participants, such as institutional investors, can potentially be directed by the ranking 
and the associated table from the individual CGQ Board Issue Sub-Scores received by 
individual companies to the differences in these scores between companies. Anew mode 
of comparison of the board practices adopted by companies in the US hardline retail 
industry was made available by focusing on the positions of companies in the ranking 
table, and the differences in the scores received by companies.
The rankings constructed by analysts not only facilitated new modes of comparison of 
board practices, the ranking also “punishes and rewards” (cf. Foucault, 1977: 181). In 
the case of companies such as AZO, APP, TOY, and RSH, they were “rewarded” by 
being placed at the top of the ranking. Analysts Sims and Hoch (2003: 8) indeed 
commented positively on the corporate governance practices adopted by these 
companies in their evaluations:
“For our universe, AutoZone, Advance Auto Parts, Toys R Us, and
RadioShack all have extremely high-quality Boards that rank in the
top quintile of all companies” (Sims & Hoch, 2003: 8)
79 Power (2004: 771) suggests that first-order measurement “relates to the institutions o f  classification that 
make counting possible”, while second-order measurement can be understood as “the further aggregation 
o f  numbers and the further creation o f  ratios and indices” which can be seen as “measure o f  measure”. 
Although the ranking constructed by analysts on the quality o f  corporate boards did not strictly aggregate 
number or create ratios, it was based on the CGQ Board Issue Sub-Scores which can be seen as first-order 
measures. The ranking here can be viewed as “measure o f  measure”.
-105 -
After nine months, when Sims and his colleagues evaluated the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies in the US hardline retail industry again, these four 
companies once more obtained the highest possible CGQ Board Issues Sub-Scores from 
the ISS for their board practices. Their board practices were praised by Sims and his 
colleagues who, for the second time, regarded the corporate boards of these four 
companies as “extremely high-quality” (Sims et al., 2004: 10).
In the construction of the rankings and associated league tables, “best practices” of 
corporate governance contained in formal regulations of corporate governance were 
often made reference to, unpacked, and elaborated upon by analysts. Table 4, adapted 
from Devine et al. (2003:11) and shown below, can be used to demonstrate this. Table 4 
also represented the kind of rankings and the associated league tables that analysts 
constructed without the input provided by other interest group of corporate governance. 
Instead, it was constructed by analysts based on the information contained in the annual 
reports of corporations and the data maintained by analysts themselves.
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Table 4
Figur* 4. Outsider Representation on Boards as of December 2003 
Symbol Board Composition
Insiders Affiliated Unrelated BOD Size % Unrelated
FBL 4 14 3 21 14®i
AFL 3 4 11 18 61
NFS 2 2 8 12 67?4
JHF 2 1 10 13 77®e
AMH 1 - 9 10 90*4
MET 3 - 13 16 81 Vo
JP 2 - 9 11 82°o
TMK 2 - 9 11 82®«
SUF 3 - 14 17 82®o
PFG 2 - 12 14 86®c.
AFC 1 - 7 8 SS'lo
PL 1 - 8 9 89°'o
UNM 1 - 9 io 90*/.
LNC 1 - 11 12 92a.o
MFC 1 - 13 14 93®/«
PRU 1 - 13 14 93®'«
Awragm 1.7 0.5 10.4 12.6 S3?*
Ayg. ex.High/lcnv 1.6 0.2 10.1 12.3 S6°*
Source. Comp airy report * and Smith Banuy
Source: Figure 4. Outsider Representation on Boards as o f  December 2003, Devine et al. (2003: 11)
According to Table 4, board compositions of US life insurance companies, and 
particularly, the independent members in corporate boards, were evaluated. The numbers 
of “insiders”, “affiliated directors”, and “unrelated”80 directors, and the percentage of 
unrelated directors in each corporate board were listed in the table. Roughly speaking, 
companies with smaller percentages of “unrelated” directors in their boards appeared at 
the top in the table, while those with greater percentages appeared at the bottom. 
Therefore, this table can be considered as a ranking table which hierarchically ordered 
companies based on the level of board independence. To construct this table, the 
definition of “independence” specified in the NYSE Corporate Governance New Rules 
(2003) was first operationalised and drawn upon by analysts to inform their judgement
80 See Rule 2 o f  the NYSE Corporate Governance New Rules (2003) for the detailed definition o f  
“independent director” (or “unrelated director”).
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of who was insider, affiliated director, and unrelated director . The NYSE Corporate 
Governance New Rules (2003) indeed contains detailed specifications on circumstances 
in which a director is not considered as “independent”. However, the meaning contained 
in laws and regulations, and the interpretation of them are often obscured rather than 
being transmitted in a straightforward manner (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Scott, 
2003). As a consequence, these specifications can be perceived and interpreted by 
analysts in diverse ways. For instance, as can be seen from Table 4, Devine and his 
colleagues (2003) considered company NFS as having two insiders, two affiliated 
directors, and eight unrelated directors. This led to a corporate board with 67% unrelated 
directors, and this was lower than the industry average of 83%. NFS was also ranked the 
third for having the lowest percentage of unrelated directors among all companies 
assessed. However, in the other corporate governance evaluation, Dally (2003) 
considered those two affiliated directors in NFS as unrelated. This gave rise to a board 
with 83% unrelated directors, and this percentage exceeded the industry average of 
80%82.
The notion of “independence”, as noted above, can be subject to diverse interpretations. 
Nevertheless, analysts elaborated upon the “best practices” associated with the issue of 
board independence originally contained in formal regulations of corporate governance, 
developed their own conceptions of “independence” where necessary, and adhered to 
them in their corporate governance evaluations. Without these prior steps, Devine and 
his colleagues (2003) may not have been able to measure the independence of corporate 
boards, represent the corporate governance practices regarding board composition 
adopted by companies in tabular form, or hierarchically order companies. The
81 The NYSE Corporate Governance N ew Rules (2003) was the main regulation that Devine et al. (2003) 
drew upon in the evaluations o f  the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies. They 
explicitly stated in their report that, they “cite relevant new rules and data illustrating how well the 
companies [ ...]  now comply with the new rules” (Devine et al., 2003: 5). They also summarised the 
N Y SE ’s amended rules in the appendix o f  their report (Devine et al., 2003: 65-69).
82 As Devine et al. (2003: 39) put it, “[ 0 ] f  its [i.e. N F S’] 13 members, two are insiders and two are 
considered affiliated because they serve on the board o f  its parent company, Nationwide Property & 
Casualty Company. Classifying the two affiliated members as “related,” the outside representation is 67%, 
but classifying them as unrelated puts the outside representation at 83%”. Devine et al. (2003) decided not 
to treat those two affiliated members as “unrelated”, while D ally (2003) treated them as “unrelated” or 
“independent” directors. These different treatments reflected the different understandings by analysts o f  
the notion o f  “independence” as specified in the NYSE Corporate Governance New Rules (2003).
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alternative “best practices” regarding certain issues of corporate governance developed 
by analysts may, to some extent, be embedded in the rankings and the associated league 
tables that analysts constructed. They can potentially re-shape and re-frame the original 
“best practices” perceived by participants in financial markets, such as institutional 
investors, who may make use of the rankings and the associated league tables 
constructed by analysts. In the present case, it was the notion of “board independence” 
developed and adopted by analysts in their corporate governance evaluations that can 
potentially be passed onto other financial market participants through the ranking in 
Table 4. The revised and re-formulated notion of “board independence” may potentially 
challenge and transform the original perception of the issue of board independence by 
constituents of the investing public.
Financial markets participants, such as institutional investors, can potentially find out 
the numbers of “insiders”, “affiliated directors”, and “unrelated” directors for companies 
in the US life insurance industry in their own way, and may also compute the 
percentages of unrelated directors. However, this work had been performed by analysts 
who also put together the data and represented the data in a ranking table. As can be 
observed from Table 4, the corporate boards were more or less hierarchically ordered 
based on the degree of their “independence”. The magnitude of the difference in the 
level of board independence between companies was also quantitatively revealed. The 
industry averages regarding the numbers of “insiders”, “affiliated directors”, “unrelated” 
directors, and the percentage of unrelated directors were also computed and incorporated 
into the table by analysts. Table 4 created a new visibility of board independence for 
companies in the US life insurance industry. By means of ranking, corporate boards 
were rendered comparatively and hierarchically visible, measurable, and calculable. 
Comparisons of the numbers and percentages of independent board members between 
different companies in the same industry were facilitated. Corporate boards were 
transformed into a form that they can readily be further examined, evaluated, and acted 
upon. In other words, the inscribing of the level of board independence for US life 
insurance companies in a ranking table made it possible for some participants in 
financial markets to further assess the practices adopted by companies in this industry 
ex-post the corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts (cf. Power, 1997;
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Robson, 1992; Rose & Miller, 1992). More specifically, institutional investors could 
clearly spot the position that a particular company captured in the ranking, and compare 
the board practice adopted by this particular company with that of another company, or 
those of its peers, or the industry averages. In other words, Table 4 may, once again, 
provide institutional investors with additional input to assess and check the corporate 
governance procedures adopted by companies in a comparative manner.
5. Discussion
This chapter has examined the ways in which evaluations of corporate governance were 
performed by analysts. Special attention has been paid to the mechanisms and devices 
deployed by analysts in their corporate governance evaluations. Based on the corporate 
governance reports produced by some analysts in the US and the UK, this chapter has 
documented that analysts performed corporate governance evaluations by directly and 
explicitly benchmarking the corporate governance procedures of companies against 
“best practices” contained in formal regulations of corporate governance; and by making 
comparison, which comprised a mixture of narrative comparison, tabular comparison, 
and rankings. The notion of “critic” from economic sociology has been drawn upon as 
the key theoretical reference point to inform the empirical analysis. It is supplemented 
by the concept of “carrier” from neo-institutional theory, and the notion of “inscription” 
from the social studies of science and technology literature.
The direct and explicit benchmarking undertaken by analysts in their corporate 
governance evaluations, it is argued, constituted a further layer of checking on the 
corporate governance procedures adopted by companies against formal regulatory 
requirements. This benchmarking has been depicted in this chapter as checking o f  
checking, or double checking, where the corporate governance procedures of 
corporations were monitored, audited, and scrutinised by a third party, in this case 
analysts. As critics, and in their capacity of “institutional regulators”, analysts can be 
thought of as possessing the capacity to monitor compliance with existing “best 
practices” of corporate governance by companies. The comparative evaluations were
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undertaken through various forms of inscriptions, such as narratives, lists, and ranking 
tables. Corporate governance procedures were transformed by these inscriptions into a 
form that was visible, comparable, measurable, and calculable. The new visibilities of 
the governance of corporations created by these inscriptions can potentially offer 
financial market participants, such as institutional investors, additional input to further 
assess the corporate governance practice of a company in relation to those of other 
companies. While the existing literature on critics has not paid sufficient attention to 
how critical reviews are performed by critics, this chapter has generated some insights 
into this issue by focusing on the mechanisms and devices deployed by a particular set 
of critics.
In corporate governance evaluations, analysts often engaged with existing formal 
regulations of corporate governance. On the one hand, analysts benchmarked the 
corporate governance procedures adopted by companies against formal regulatory 
requirements in a direct and explicit manner. On the other hand, these “best practices” 
also implicitly informed the comparative evaluations performed by analysts of the 
corporate governance procedures adopted by companies. However, when subjects were 
not covered by regulations, or “best practices” were not clearly specified, or there was 
simply room for interpretation, analysts did not neutrally endorse the regulatory 
requirements, or at least they were not wholly constrained by them. Instead, analysts 
proposed alternative or additional “best practices”, and adhered to and made use of the 
revised “best practices” in their corporate governance evaluations. In short, corporate 
governance regulations were constantly drawn upon, unpacked, and re-interpreted by 
analysts. These findings shed light on the manner in which analysts, who have relatively 
little experience in dealing with regulatory issues, “carried” the regulative pillars of 
institutional ideas related to corporate governance (cf. Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 
2002; Scott, 2003), operationalised the regulatory requirements prescribed in formal 
regulations, in the process transforming them, even if only to a modest extent.
The deployment by analysts of various forms of inscriptions, such as narratives, lists, 
and ranking tables in corporate governance evaluations, as previously argued, made the 
governance of corporations knowable, visible, measurable, and calculable. Analysts
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provided little additional information about the corporate governance procedures 
adopted by companies when undertaking governance evaluations. However, new 
visibilities of the governance of corporations were created. As analysts created new 
visibilities of the governance of corporations in financial markets, they contributed to 
the operationalisation of a particular “programme” (cf. Miller & Rose, 1990) of 
corporate governance reform, one that placed “transparency” in a central position (cf. 
Hood & Heald, 2006; OECD, 2004b). Similarly, the mechanisms and devices analysts 
created and deployed in seeking to make corporate governance practices visible and 
“transparent”, provided a set of “technologies” that made this particular programme of 
corporate governance reform operational. The mechanisms and devices that analysts 
deployed in corporate governance evaluations can be viewed, in some sense, as 
transparency making devices, which created a kind of visibility (Grossman et al., 2008a: 
98). While statutory regulatory bodies have been seeking to impose corporate 
governance standards in a top-down manner (e.g. Dallas & Scott, 2006; World-Bank, 
2000), analysts can potentially operate in the other direction, or at least give visibility to 
governance deficits where they exist.
In addition to creating new visibilities, the inscribing of the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies into narrative and tabular forms can allow them to be 
readily examined, assessed, and compared. These examinations, assessments, and 
comparisons of the governance of corporations can be undertaken by participants in 
financial markets (e.g. institutional investors) subsequent to the corporate governance 
evaluations performed by analysts. The making of assessable, measurable, and 
comparable corporate governance by analysts is comparable to the process of “making 
things auditable”, as described by Power in his “audit society” thesis (e.g. 1994; 1996; 
1997). Power (1996: 310) defines the notion of “making things auditable” as “the 
construction of the visible signs of ‘reasonable practice’ for consumption by markets, 
regulators, courts of law, the state and others [...]”. Similarly, the making of corporate 
governance assessable, measureable, and comparable by analysts can be viewed as the 
construction of the visible signs of the governance of corporations for use by financial 
markets participants, including institutional investors and fund managers. These markets 
participants may largely be distant from the day-to-day operation of companies, and
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direct control of the governance of corporations may seem difficult or even impossible. 
By making the corporate governance procedures of companies in principle assessable, 
measurable, and comparable, the inscriptions deployed by analysts can potentially 
facilitate “action at a distance” (e.g. Latour, 1987; Miller, 1991; Miller & Rose, 1990; 
Robson, 1992) over the governance of corporations. Analysts, therefore, can be thought 
of as contributing to the governing of corporate governance through their corporate 
governance evaluations, and particularly with their deployment of the various forms of 
inscriptions.
The empirical analysis of this chapter is based upon the corporate governance reports 
produced by some analysts in the US and the UK. The chapter has built upon the line of 
recent research on analysts that has strongly emphasised the importance of examining 
the work product generated by analysts, namely, their written reports (e.g. Beunza & 
Garud, 2007; Fogarty & Rogers, 2005). This chapter has extended this line of enquiry by 
explicitly examining the various forms of inscriptions that make up the written reports 
produced by analysts, namely, narratives, lists, and ranking tables. The chapter has also 
considered the potential capacity of these material devices to enable and facilitate 
further actions possibly taken by some financial market participants towards the 
corporate boards being examined. Critical review has been conceptualised by Beunza 
and Garud (2007: 34) as a material activity. This chapter endorses this argument, and 
suggests that the corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts, which have 
been viewed as a specific type of critical review, are also material in nature. Narratives, 
lists, and ranking tables constitute the material infrastructure that underlies the corporate 
governance evaluations performed by analysts (cf. Beunza & Garud, 2007).
The next chapter examines another aspect of the doing of corporate governance by 
analysts, namely, the integration of corporate governance within the investment analyses 
performed by analysts. It investigates the technologies deployed by analysts in the 
linking of corporate governance to the financials. However, attention is also paid to the 
programmatic dimension of the integration. This refers to the ideas, discourses, ideals, 
and aspirations that were widely articulated in financial markets, and that shaped and 
animated the concrete tasks performed by analysts. It is to these issues that the thesis
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now turns, so as to consider the ensemble of the technological and the programmatic 
dimensions of the corporate governance work performed by analysts.
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C h a p t e r  4
INTEGRATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WITHIN INVESTMENT 
ANALYSES: THE PROGRAMMATIC AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL
1. Introduction
In addition to undertaking evaluations of the corporate governance procedures adopted 
by companies, analysts have also attempted to link corporate governance to the 
financials (e.g. profitability, stock price performance, and equity valuation) in 
investment analyses. This is the second aspect of the doing of corporate governance by 
analysts that this thesis examines, and is the main focus of the present chapter.
Corporate governance scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat, that broke out 
in the early 21st century have significantly shaken the global business landscape. Since 
then, corporate governance has explicitly been perceived as “an area of risk” (Dallas & 
Patel, 2004; Dallas, 2004). Incorporating governance issues in the investment decision 
making process has come to be seen as an ideal to be sought by constituents of the 
investing public (e.g. The UN Global Compact, 2004,2005,2009; The UNEP FI, 2004). 
However, a common and consistent understanding of how to incorporate corporate 
governance in asset management, securities brokerage services, and the associated buy- 
side and sell-side research functions is seen not to exist yet (The UN Global Compact, 
2004: 1). The integration of corporate governance in the investment decision making 
process, which can be regarded as an emerging form of economic calculation, has been 
explored by various participants in financial market, including fund managers, brokers, 
and buy-side and sell-side financial analysts. This chapter examines the integration of 
corporate governance within investment analyses explored by sell-side financial 
analysts. Specifically, it addresses two related issues: what constituted this particular 
form of economic calculation, and how such integration was performed by analysts.
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The empirical analysis of this chapter is informed by the conceptualisation that 
economic calculation is constituted by both “programmatic” and “technological” 
dimensions, and by the ensemble formed between the two (e.g. Mennicken et al., 2008; 
Miller, 2008a, 2008b; Miller & Rose, 1990; Miller & Rose, 2008; Power, 1997; Rose & 
Miller, 1992). As introduced in chapter 1, the programmatic dimension generally relates 
to the ideas and concepts that shape the mission of certain calculative practices, and that 
attach economic calculation to broader objectives and aspirations in the economy and 
society. The technological refers to the more or less concrete tasks and routines that 
practitioners perform. This conceptualisation of economic calculation differs from that 
of some economic sociologists who have mainly concentrated on the technological 
aspect and largely downplayed the programmatic dimension83. These economic 
sociologists have argued that economic calculation is constituted by an ensemble of 
human and non-human agencies, where non-human agencies consist of instruments, 
tools, and devices that are material, humble, and mundane in nature. For instance, as 
Callon and Muniesa (2005: 1245) have suggested, economic calculation “is distributed 
among human actors and material devices”, where “material devices” include tools, 
equipment, technical devices, algorithms, among others. Recently, the notion of “market 
devices” has been formulated to refer to the material instruments, models, and tools that 
represent and intervene the construction of markets (Muniesa et al., 2007). Also, in the 
emerging field of social studies of finance, scholars have emphasised the “technicality” 
and “materiality” of financial markets. They have studied technical systems and the 
concrete and material practices of trading, risk management, and on the like, that make 
up actions and transactions in financial markets (e.g. Beunza et al., 2006; Hardie & 
MacKenzie, 2007).
However, this so-called “technological turn” in economic sociology, with its emphasis 
on “material markets” (MacKenzie, 2009), has been criticised for its neglect of the 
“programmatic” dimension of economic calculation, and hence to the linkages and 
interdependences between “programmes” and “technologies”. As Miller (2008a: 53 &
83 Many o f  these economic sociologists are initially scholars in social studies o f  science and technology. 
They have emphasised the technological and material aspect o f  laboratory experiments (cf. Gendron, 
Cooper, & Townley, 2007: 125).
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57) has argued, the emphasis on the material reality of calculation “has not been
0/1
matched by a similar concern with the ‘programmes ’ or ‘ ideas ’ that articulate, animate 
and give significance to particular ways of calculating”, and therefore “resulted in a 
neglect of the overall ensemble of calculations, inscriptions, tactics, strategies and 
aspirations Miller and his colleagues (Mennicken et al., 2008; Miller, 2008a, 
2008b) have further suggested that when studying calculative practice, the programmatic 
and the technological need to be conjointly analysed, and the linkage and interplay 
between the two dimensions attended to.
This chapter views the integration of corporate governance within the investment 
analyses performed by analysts as an emerging form of economic calculation. It 
investigates the mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by analysts as part of such 
integration. The chapter also attends to the programmatic dimension of this particular 
form of economic calculation. Ideas, discourses, and aspirations that the mechanisms, 
tools, and devices deployed by analysts came to be connected with are seen as an 
important part of the integration performed by analysts. This chapter aims to shed new 
light on economic sociology by supplementing the “technological turn” with the 
consideration of programmes, ideas, and discourses, and the ensembles formed between 
the programmatic and the technological.
This chapter demonstrates how the integration of corporate governance within the 
investment analyses performed by analysts was attached to certain idealised and 
normative elements that had been widely articulated in financial markets. These 
included the ideas and discourses related to the potential link between corporate 
governance and the financials that had emerged since the 1980s; the idea of taking into 
account environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues in asset
84 The notion o f  “ideas”, as well as related terms “things” and “marks”, have been developed by Hacking 
(1992) who regards these as elements o f  laboratory experiments. For Hacking (1992), scientific 
experiments and laboratory practices are material. However, as he further illuminates, the material “is 
flanked on the one side by ideas (theories, questions, hypotheses, intellectual models o f  apparatus) and on 
the other by marks and manipulations o f  marks (inscriptions, data, calculations, data reduction, 
interpretation)” (Hacking, 1992:32). This implies that, for Hacking (1992), the view o f  Latour (1987) that 
inscription is the core characteristic o f  laboratory experiments is limited (cf. Gendron et al., 2007:125). In 
addition to inscriptions, “ideas”, namely, the intellectual elements o f  an experiment, also form an 
important part o f  scientific activity.
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management, securities brokerage services, and buy-side and sell-side research 
functions, that started to surface from the early 21st century; and the perception that 
analysts could and should play a “leading” and “active” role in incorporating corporate 
governance into the investment decision making process. All together, these 
programmatic elements, it is argued, shaped and gave significance to the more or less 
concrete tasks performed by analysts in linking corporate governance to the financials. 
These ideas, discourses, and perceptions are identified largely based on publicly 
available documents issued by various organisations and institutions, selected financial 
newspapers and magazines, textbooks of corporate governance, and academic and 
practioner publications on corporate governance.
The idealised and normative elements, however, were made operable by the 
mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by analysts in the integration. These so-called 
“technological infrastructures of calculation” (Mennicken et al., 2008) are mostly
Of
identified from the corporate governance reports produced by analysts . Quantification 
of corporate governance issues, corporate governance scores, portfolio analyses, event 
analyses, regression analyses, “govemance-to-profitability” analyses, “govemance-to- 
valuation” analyses, and the various graphs deployed by analysts, operationalised the 
idea that corporate governance and the financials are potentially linked, and helped fulfil 
the objective of bringing corporate governance within the investment decision making 
process. The mechanisms, tools, and devices, like those discussed in chapter 3, can be 
thought of as transparency making devices (cf. Grossman et al., 2008a: 98). Here, these 
devices made visible the link between corporate governance and the financials, and 
made visible the category of corporate governance as a risk factor in the investment 
decision making process.
85 This chapter mainly draws upon those reports produced by analysts that consider the link between  
corporate governance and the financials, and that document the integration o f  governance issues within 
investment analyses. So far, very few reports o f  this kind are available. Three reports drawn upon in this 
chapter were authored by analysts at Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank started its corporate governance 
related research back in 2000, and published a number o f  reports on this topic. In 2003, Deutsche Bank 
established a dedicated corporate governance research team. Despite o f  its termination in late 2008, this 
team was the first among all brokerage firms that mainly concentrated on corporate governance research. 
Since 2003, the research output had been published in the “Beyond the Numbers” series. This chapter also 
draws upon the reports that consider the link between corporate governance and the financials produced 
by analysts in other sell-side firms.
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
articulation of the ideas and discourses related to the potential link between corporate 
governance and the financials in three related arenas from the 1980s, and the emergence 
of the idea of and agenda for incorporating governance issues into the investment 
decision making process in the early 21st century. An examination of the mechanisms, 
tools, and devices deployed by analysts in the integration of corporate governance
RAwithin investment analyses then follows . The final section summarises the chapter and 
provides some further comments.
2. The programmatic dimension of the integration of corporate governance 
within the investment analyses performed by analysts
During the last two decades of the 20th century, ideas and discourses related to the 
potential link between corporate governance and the financials were articulated in at 
least three different but related aspects of institutional life: academic research, 
institutional investment, and public policy making.
The first academic study of the relationship between corporate governance issues and 
the financials can be traced back to 1955 when Stanley Vance related type of board 
structure to corporate performance (Vance, 1955, 1978). Subsequent studies of this 
relationship followed in the 1960s and the 1970s, and they were mostly conducted by 
Vance (e.g. 1964; 1968; 1977; 1978)87. It was not until the 1980s that academic studies 
of the link between corporate governance and the financials started to gain momentum88.
86 Although this chapter describes the programmatic dimension o f  the integration o f  corporate governance 
within the investment analyses performed by analysts first, and the technological side next, it does not 
suggest a sequence in the relationship between programmes and technologies. These two aspects, it is 
argued, were equally important elements o f  the integration performed by analysts, and they went hand in 
hand.
87 But, see Pfeffer (1972).
88 Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) performed meta-analyses o f  54 empirical studies o f  board 
composition and 31 empirical studies o f  board leadership structure, and their relationships with firm 
financial performance. A  subset o f  these studies was found “by a combination o f  computer-aided, key 
word searches and manual searches o f  relevant journals” (ibis. 276). The authors “examined the reference 
lists o f  the potentially applicable articles and identified further articles the topics or titles o f  which 
suggested suitability” (ibis. 276). The anonymous reviewers o f  their paper also provided “sources for
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A large number of studies of the relationship between corporate governance and the 
financials focused on board composition and board leadership structure, and explored 
the relationships between these aspects of corporate governance and the financials. As 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998: 269) noted:
“There is a distinguished tradition of conceptualization and research 
arguing that boards of directors’ composition and leadership structure 
(CEO/chairperson roles held jointly or separately) can influence a 
variety of organisational outcomes. This attention continues to be 
apparent in the academic literature.”
These studies contributed to the academic debate over mechanisms of corporate control 
between agency theory and stewardship theory given the separation of ownership and 
control in modem corporations89. Studies informed by agency theory90 suggested that 
outside director representation and firm performance were positively correlated (e.g. 
Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Ezzamel & Watson, 1993; Schellenger, Wood, & Tashakori, 
1989). In contrast, research informed by stewardship theory91 argued that inside 
directors were associated with higher firm performance (e.g. Kesner, 1987). 
Nevertheless, as Dalton et al. (1998) noted, there was research that did not find 
statistically significant correlations between board composition and firm performance 
(e.g. Chaganti, Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Kesner, Victor, & 
Lamont, 1986; Zahra & Stanton, 1988). As can be seen, mixed results were obtained 
from academic studies of the relationship between some aspects of corporate
additional relevant articles” (ibis. 276). Out o f  the 54 studies o f  the relationship between board 
composition and firm financial performance they reviewed, 50 studies were published in the 1980s and 
the 1990s. Out o f  the 30 studies o f  the relationship between board leadership structure and firm financial 
performance they analysed, 29 studies were published after 1980.
9 It is beyond the scope o f  this chapter to discuss either agency theory or stewardship theory in detail. 
These two schools o f  thought are briefly mentioned here for the purpose o f  illustrating that academic 
research that sought to discover the link between corporate governance and the financials was largely 
informed by these theoretical lenses. For an overview o f  agency theory, see Jensen and M eckling (1976). 
For stewardship theory, see Donaldson and Davis (1991).
90 In general, agency theory suggests that managers who have firm-specific knowledge and managerial 
expertise are perceived to gain an advantage over the owners, who are largely removed from the operation 
o f  the firm (e.g. Mizruchi, 1988). According to agency theory, a corporate board that mostly comprises 
outside directors is considered to be effective in providing superior performance benefits to the firm 
because o f  their independence from firm management.
91 Stewardship theory argues that managers are trustworthy and inherently work hard to attain a high level 
o f  profit for the firm and good shareholder returns (Donaldson & Davis, 1994). This implies that inside 
directors are potentially beneficial to the firm, since the amount and quality o f  inside information 
possessed by these directors may lead to more effective evaluation o f  top managers (e.g. Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990).
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governance, such as board composition, and corporate performance. Nevertheless, the 
burgeoning of such studies in the last two decades of the 20th century shows that the 
potential link between corporate governance and the financials was widely perceived by 
academics as a significant issue at that time.
The potential link between corporate governance and the financials had also been 
identified by institutional investors, particularly in conjunction with their activism 
towards corporations that appeared from the mid-1980s and rapidly flourished in the 
1990s . The increasing prevalence of shareholder activism by investment institutions 
coincided with the rapid growth in institutional investor share holdings both in the US 
and the UK during the last two decades of the 20th century (Gillan & Starks, 1998; 
Smith, 1996; Solomon, 2007). “Shareholder activism” was referred to by the European 
Corporate Governance Institute93 as “[...] the way in which shareholders can assert their 
power as owners of the company to influence its behaviour”94. Smith (1996:227), more 
specifically, regarded shareholder activism as “[...] monitoring and attempting to bring 
about changes in the organisational control structure of firms [...] not perceived to be 
pursuing shareholder-wealth-maximising goals”. The formation of the Council of 
Institutional Investors (CII) in the US in January 1985 marked the beginning of 
shareholder activism by institutional investors (Gillan & Starks, 1998). The Council was 
formed in an attempt on the part of large public pension funds to lobby for shareholder 
rights and hold investee companies accountable. In the first few years after the 
formation of the CII, according to Gillan and Starks (1998), public pension funds in the 
US exerted their activism to address issues such as the repeal of anti-takeover 
amendments, changes in voting rules, and increased board independence. Shareholder
92 Shareholder activism was not new even in the mid-1980s. Before the mid-1980s, especially in the US, 
individual activists and religious groups had challenged corporations on specific social or moral issues 
(Hendry, Sanderson, Barker, & Roberts, 2007). Shareholder activism by institutional investors, 
particularly by self-managed public pension funds, started to emerge, first in the US, from the mid-1980s 
(Gillan & Starks, 1998; Hendry et al., 2007). From the early 21st century, especially in the UK, the “new  
shareholder activism” by mainstream institutional investors (e.g. wholesale and retail asset management 
companies, pension funds, and the investment arms o f  life assurance companies) started to surface 
(Hendry et al., 2007). This paper concerns shareholder activism by institutional investors.
93 According to its website, the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) is a forum for debate 
and dialogue between academics, legislators, and practitioners. It focuses on major corporate governance 
issues and promotes best practice. Its primary role is to undertake, commission, and disseminate research 
on corporate governance. For more information about the ECGI, see 
http ://www.ec gi.org/organi sation/overvi e w.htm.
94 See http://www.ecgi.org/activism/index.php.
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activism came to serve as a mechanism of corporate governance that potentially 
contributed to the governing of corporate conduct, and to the control over corporate 
managers.
One primary assumption underlying shareholder activism was considered to be the 
promotion of “sound” corporate governance practices as a means to improve corporate 
performance and shareholder returns95 (e.g. Eisenhofer & Levin, 2005). It was believed 
that by actively engaging in overseeing the management of corporations, institutional 
investors would be able to press for good corporate governance practices, which it was 
hoped would in turn translate into improved firm performance and enhanced investment 
returns. In other words, active shareholders considered that corporate governance and 
the financials are potentially linked, and that improved corporate governance practices 
could lead to enhanced financial performance. This was made more explicit by Dale 
Hanson, former chief executive of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS), and a pioneer of shareholder activism:
“CalPERS has no motives other than to improve corporate 
performance so that investment value is increased [...]. We seek a 
return to corporations being accountable to their shareholders. If 
accountability exists, we are confident that corporate performance 
will follow.” (Hanson, 1993)
The following comment by Alastair Ross Goobey, former chief executive of Hermes 
Pensions Management in the UK, further stressed that shareholder activism can add to 
shareholder return, and reinforced the idea that corporate governance and the financials 
are potentially linked:
“We see corporate governance not as a moral crusade, but as part of 
our fiduciary duty to our clients in identifying the business risks, 
financial and non-financial, to enhance our investment process 
accordingly [...] Hermes believes that an active shareholder 
involvement can help release the higher intrinsic value of the
95 The pursuit o f  shareholder value was considered as the main driver o f  shareholder activism. Besides this 
economic motivation, Hendry et al. (2007) noted the political and moral motivations related to ideas o f  
responsible ownership that also triggered institutional shareholder activism. For the “new shareholder 
activism” exerted by mainstream institutional investors, “the institutions’ own profit maximisation and the 
need to position themselves against competitor institutions in the context o f  political and regulatory 
changes” also motivated these investors to be active (ibis. 223).
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company [... Hermes’ activism] grew out of our involvement in 
corporate governance issues, which if you are not careful could turn 
into a box-ticking exercise. The question is, what do you do when you 
come across governance that you don’t like? You need some way of... 
facilitating change.” (Quoted in Sparkes, 2002)
Some institutional investors engaged in intensive shareholder activism by investing in 
companies known for their weak governance practices, with the view of forcing them to 
improve their corporate governance, and thereby achieve enhanced returns. Lens Ltd., 
which was established by Robert Monks and Nell Minow in the US in 1989, represented 
one example of these investment institutions. As noted by Solomon and Solomon (2004: 
63-64), Lens targeted and invested in companies such as Sears and Eastman Kodak that 
had weak governance structures, negotiated with them, and effected changes within the 
companies. This engagement with initially poorly governed companies was reported as 
having resulted in substantial increases in the valuation of their shares (see Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004). In 1998, Lens joined forces with Hermes, a major UK institutional 
investor, and founded Hermes Lens Asset Management Company in partnership with the 
British Telecom pension scheme. The same principle, namely, taking stakes in 
underperforming companies and engaging in shareholder activism to press for change, 
was adopted by this investment institution. Again, excess investment returns were 
reported to have been generated (see Solomon & Solomon, 2004). The success of these 
cases of intensive shareholder activism gave support to the view taken by active 
institutional investors that corporate governance and the financials are potentially linked.
The perception that shareholder activism can potentially contribute to the financials in a 
positive manner was explicitly endorsed by some academics, such as Solomon and 
Solomon (2004: 113):
“An essential issue in the whole debate about shareholder activism 
and the role of institutional investors in corporate governance is 
whether or not such intervention results in higher financial 
performance in investee companies. [...] There is certainly a 
perception among the institutional investment community that 
activism brings financial rewards, as more efficient monitoring of 
company management aligns shareholder and manager interests and 
therefore helps to maximize shareholder wealth.”
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Academics started to study the impact of shareholder activism as a mechanism of 
corporate governance on corporate performance from the 1990s. For instance, Nesbitt 
(1994) found that shareholder activism had a significantly positive impact on the 
financial performance of companies targeted by the CalPERS. In contrast, Faccio and 
Lasfer (2000) argued that pension funds in the UK did not add value to the companies in 
which they hold large stakes. Like the results from other studies of the relationship 
between some aspects of corporate governance and the financials, evidence from 
academic research on the impact of shareholder activism on corporate performance and 
investment returns was largely mixed (Solomon & Solomon, 2004:113). Nevertheless, 
exploring the link between corporate governance and the financials continued to be an 
agenda for academic research. The idea that corporate governance and the financials are 
potentially linked was articulated by both academics and institutional investors 
throughout the 1990s.
Ideas and discourses related to the potential link between corporate governance and the 
financials were also promulgated in the public policy making arena. Corporate 
governance reforms initiated by the American Law Institute (1982) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (1980) in the US in the early 1980s were informed by the 
idea that corporate governance and the financials are potentially linked. As Baysinger 
and Bulter (1985: 103) explicitly pointed out:
“[... T]he [corporate governance] reform movement is based on the 
idea that shareholder welfare is enhanced by boards of directors which 
are capable of monitoring management, rendering independent 
judgments on managerial performance, and meting out rewards on the 
basis of these evaluations. All else equal, firms with more independent 
boards should perform better; changes in board composition toward 
the reformers’ prescriptions should improve performance.”
The formulation of codes, principles, and standards of corporate governance in the 
1990s was also significantly informed by the belief that corporate governance and the 
financials are potentially linked. For instance, when setting out the responsibilities of the 
board, the OECD Principles o f Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999: V) stated that:
“Together with guiding corporate strategy, the board is chiefly
- 124-
responsible for monitoring managerial performance and achieving an 
adequate return for shareholders, while preventing conflicts of interest 
and balancing competing demands on the corporation.”
It appeared that an underlying assumption behind the statement above was that a 
responsible corporate board can effectively monitor the actions of managers, which can 
in turn potentially bring about enhanced investment return to shareholders. In other 
words, the belief that a responsible board can positively contribute to firm performance 
seemed to underlie the Principles issued by the OECD. Also, Solomon and Solomon 
(2004: 51 & 131) considered that the Hampel Report (1998), which was issued by the 
Committee on Corporate Governance in the UK96, was informed by the idea that active 
institutional shareholders can positively contribute toward the financials of corporations:
“Pension fund trustees were targeted by the report [i.e. the Hampel 
Report] as a group who needed to take their corporate governance 
responsibilities more seriously. [...] It is clearly an implicit 
assumption of the Hampel Committee and other proponents of 
shareholder activism that institutional investors’ intervention in 
investee companies produces higher financial returns.”
In the first few years of the 21st century, a new wave of corporate governance reforms 
took place, arguably in response to the outbreak of a series of corporate scandals on both 
sides of the Atlantic (such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Parmalat). The 
idea that corporate governance and the financials are potentially linked continued to 
underlie policy documents issued at that time. For instance, the Higgs Report (2003), 
which examined the role, independence, and recruitment of non-executive directors, 
stated that:
“Good corporate governance [...] is an integral part of ensuring 
successful corporate performance, but of course only a part. It remains 
the case that successful entrepreneurs and strong managers, held 
properly to account and supported by effective boards, drive wealth 
creation. [...] The nominations [of board members] and appointments 
process is crucial to strong corporate performance as well as effective
96 As already mentioned in chapter 2, to react to significant corporate failures, such as the Barings Bank, 
the Committee on Corporate Governance was formed in 1995. This committee produced the H am pel 
Report, which focused on disclosure and emphasised a princip les-based  and voluntary approach to 
corporate governance, instead o f  an explicit rules-based  one.
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accoun tab ility .”
After the outbreak of the corporate scandals in the early 21st century, the OECD called 
for a survey to assess the Principles o f Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999) originally 
issued in 1999 before it considered updating and revising the Principles. In the report 
that documented the survey, the OECD reviewed and summarised the body of 
“empirical work showing the importance of corporate governance in determining 
company performance and economic growth” (2004a: 4). This suggested that the idea 
that corporate governance and the financials are potentially linked was not alien to the 
notion of corporate governance adopted by the OECD, even if this idea might not 
explicitly inform the process of assessing and revising the Principles.
Not only regulatory bodies, but also investors tended to get even more concerned about 
corporate governance after the outbreak of the corporate scandals in the early 21st 
century (e.g. Tricker, 2009; Young, 2003). The link between corporate governance and 
the financials appeared to be more strongly perceived by institutional investors. A survey 
of investors undertaken by McKinsey & Company (2002) showed that investors 
believed that corporate governance can make a difference to the bottom line of a 
company, i.e. corporate financial performance. The survey reported that the majority of 
investors surveyed would be willing to pay a premium to invest in a company with good 
corporate governance. More specifically, according to the survey, investors would be 
prepared to pay 12% more for the shares of a well-governed UK company, and 14% 
more for the shares of a well-governed US company, compared to the shares of 
companies with similar financial performances but poorer governance procedures. As 
Mallin (2004: 74) commented on the results of the survey:
“It is [...] the investor’s perception and belief that corporate 
governance is important and that belief leads to the willingness to pay 
a premium for good corporate governance.”
The increasing importance of corporate governance, as perceived by institutional 
investors and other financial market participants in the early 21st century, paralleled the 
emergence and rapid growth of corporate governance rating services. The 
GovemanceMetrics International (GMI), Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the
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Corporate Library, and the Corporate Governance Service Department at Standard & 
Poor’s came to be the key players in the corporate governance rating industry. As 
commercial organisations, these rating firms claimed to provide independent corporate 
governance ratings to institutional investors as well as corporations. Whilst the accuracy 
and reliability of these ratings, and the independence of the rating firms, had been 
subject to scrutiny since their emergence (Brown, 2004; Snyder, 2008), the availability 
of the ratings expanded the scope of academic research on the relationship between 
corporate governance and the financials. With these ratings, academic scholars started to 
explore the relationship between the overall quality of the corporate governance 
procedures of a firm, presumably captured and represented by the single governance 
metric and corporate performance. For instance, Brown and Caylor (2004) documented 
that corporations with the higher industry-adjusted Corporate Governance Quotient 
(CGQ) scores issued by the ISS 97 were associated with better 3-year, 5-year, and 10- 
year shareholder returns, higher profits, lower stock price volatilities, and higher 
dividend payouts and yields. However, Daines, Gow, and Larcker (2009) reported that 
there was no significant correlation between the CGQ scores issued by the ISS and some 
basic performance metrics, such as restatements of financial results, shareholder 
lawsuits, return on assets, stock valuation, and risk-adjusted stock price performance. 
Epps and Cereola (2008) also found no statistical evidence suggesting that the operating 
performance of firms was related to their ISS corporate governance rating. Similar to 
prior academic research, this new line of enquiry produced rather mixed results. 
However, the emergence and rapid growth of corporate governance ratings triggered a 
wave of academic investigations of the link between these ratings and firm performance. 
The agenda for exploring the relationship between corporate governance and the 
financials in the academic community was consolidated with the availability of 
corporate governance ratings. The idea that corporate governance and the financials are 
potentially linked was once again being articulated and reflected upon.
97 ISS issues two Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) scores for each company: industry-adjusted 
CGQ scores, which reflects the standing o f  a company within its own industry group; and the second  
score compares the corporate governance practices o f  a company against a relevant index, e.g. the S&P 
500. ISS also produces four sub-scores concentrating on specific areas: board composition, director 
compensation, quality o f  audit, and takeover defences. These sub-scores are expressed as quintiles, where 
‘5 ’ indicates that a company is in the top quintile relative to a relevant index or an industry group.
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From the late 1990s and the early 21st century onward, the notion of corporate
QQ
governance itself started to be expanded and redefined . One important aspect of this 
wider accountability and extended corporate governance was considered to be related to 
socially responsible investment (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Sparkes, 2002). According 
to the Social Investment Forum", socially responsible investment:
“[...] recognizes that corporate responsibility and societal concerns 
are valid parts of investment decisions. SRI considers both the 
investor's financial needs and an investment’s impact on society. SRI 
investors encourage corporations to improve their practices on 
environmental, social, and governance issues.”100
Socially responsible investment (SRI) used to be a fringe activity carried out by a small 
number of unit trusts and mutual funds in the US and the UK. However, from the late 
1990s it became one of the mainstream considerations by institutional investors, such as 
pension funds and insurance companies, on both sides of the Atlantic (Sparkes, 2002). 
Together with corporate governance, environmental and social issues came to be 
perceived by an increasing number of institutional investors as important and significant 
factors in their investment decision making processes. The term “ESG”101, which stands 
for environmental, social, and corporate governance issues, started to be utilised to 
capture the simultaneous attention paid by investment institutions to all three criteria 
(Solomon, 2007:272). Similar to the perceived link between corporate governance and 
financial performance, ideas, beliefs, and discourses related to the potential link between 
“ESG” and the financials also started to surface. For instance, in its Global Principles o f
98 This expanding notion o f  corporate governance can be explained by stakeholder theory. Stakeholder 
theory suggests an approach to corporate governance that considers not only the needs o f  shareholders, 
but also the needs and requirements o f  all corporate stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, 
customers, creditors, the environment, local communities, etc. (Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 188).
99 The Social Investment Forum is “the U.S. national nonprofit membership association for professionals, 
firms and organizations dedicated to advancing the practice and growth o f  socially responsible investing 
(SRI)”. For more information, see http://www.socialinvest.ore/.
100 See http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/sriguide/srifacts.cfm.
101 The other term, “extra-financial issues” (EFIs) was also created and deployed by financial market 
participants to capture those factors that are thought o f  as having fundamental impact on the long-term  
performance o f  corporations. For a detailed explanation on issues constituting EFIs, see for instance: 
http://www.enhancedanalvtics.com/portal/ep/contentView.do7channelId~
1073756003&contentOID=1073963300&contentId=10739633Q0&programId=l 073757413&contentTvpe 
=MISC INFO. Generally speaking, “EFIs” embraces more elements (such as intellectual capital, wider 
elements in the supply chain, e.g. suppliers, products and services) than “ESG” which basically includes 
environmental, social and corporate governance issues.
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Accountable Corporate Governance, the CalPERS stated that it
“[...] believes that environmental, social, and corporate governance 
issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios (to varying 
degrees across companies, sectors, regions, and asset classes through 
time.)” (CalPERS, 2009: 17)
The potential link between ESG issues and the financials was not only perceived by an
increasing number of institutional investors and asset owners102. Other financial market
participants also considered that ESG issues can have material impact upon the
1
financials of corporations. For instance, according to Mercer , a consulting firm:
“[...] ESG or extra-financial criteria (for example, human capital, 
environmental, social and corporate governance factors) can have a 
positive affect on long-term corporate performance. [... ESG or extra- 
financial criteria] are now accepted as having a potentially material 
impact on financial performance104.
Fund managers also believed that ESG issues and the financials are potentially linked. 
For instance, the twenty financial institutions105 which took part in the Financial Sector 
Initiative Who Cares Wins overseen by The United Nations Global Compact106 argued 
that they
“[...] are convinced that in a more globalised, interconnected and 
competitive world the way that environmental, social and corporate 
governance issues are managed is part of companies’ overall 
management quality needed to compete successfully. Companies that 
perform better with regard to these issues can increase shareholder
102 Some o f  these institutional investors and assets owners have owned a wide range o f  asset classes 
distributed among economic sectors that they effectively own a slice o f  the broad economy. The success o f  
these so-called “universal owners” (cf. Monks & Minow, 1995) depends on the performance o f  the 
economy at large. These universal owners are forced to concern about long-term economic prosperity, and 
hence are forced to consider ESG issues which have been perceived as having financial impacts in the 
long term (cf. Mercer Investment Consulting, 2006; Solomon, 2007).
103 Mercer provides investment consulting services. In 2004, it formed a specialist global Responsible 
Investment (RI) business unit, focusing on RI and ESG issues.
104 See http://www.mercer.com/referencecontent.htm?idContent=l332515.
105 These largely comprised fund management firms, insurance companies, and investment banks.
106 The documents issued by the U N  Global Compact are quite intensively drawn upon in this chapter. 
These are the few official documents that explicitly articulate the idea o f  and the agenda for integrating 
ESG issues into the investment decision making process. It is based on these reports that part o f  the 
programmatic dimension o f  the integration o f  corporate governance within the investment analyses 
performed by analysts is identified.
- 129-
value by, for example, properly managing risks, anticipating 
regulatory action or accessing new markets, while at the same time 
contributing to the sustainable development of the societies in which 
they operate. Moreover, these issues can have a strong impact on 
reputation and brands, an increasingly important part of company 
value.” (The UN Global Compact, 2004: i)
Accordingly, these financial institutions perceived the consideration of ESG issues in 
asset management, securities brokerage services, and the associated buy-side and sell- 
side research functions as highly significant. In particular, the incorporation of ESG 
issues into the investment decision making process was thought of as being able to help 
realise and achieve certain broader aspirations and objectives in the economy. It was 
suggested that:
“[...] a better consideration of environmental, social and governance 
factors will ultimately contribute to stronger and more resilient 
investment markets, as well as contribute to the sustainable 
development of societies.” (The UN Global Compact, 2004: i)
Voices pronouncing on the importance of integrating ESG issues within the investment 
decision making process also came from other financial market participants. For 
instance, Kay Carberry, Assistant General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
and director of the TUC Superannuation Society in the UK, suggested that:
“There is a growing recognition amongst pension funds and fund 
managers that the management of extra financial or intangible issues 
by companies is essential for their long-term performance. This 
realisation is not before time. [...] Without comprehensive analysis of 
these issues, investors will continue to base investment decisions on a 
partial view.” (Quoted in EAI, 2005b)
Taking ESG criteria into account and integrating them in the investment decision 
making process became an ideal to be sought and an agenda to be pursued. Nevertheless, 
a common and consistent understanding of how to incorporate corporate governance 
issues in asset management, securities brokerage services, and the associated buy-side 
and sell-side research functions was not considered as having been developed (The UN 
Global Compact, 2004: 1). This implied that how corporate governance could and 
should be integrated within investment analyses was yet to be explored by actors in the
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investment chain, including fund managers, brokers, and buy-side and sell-side financial 
analysts. The respective roles of these financial market participants in the ESG field, 
however, was not considered as being clearly specified, either (The UN Global 
Compact, 2004: i).
As an initial step towards overcoming these potential obstacles, the twenty financial 
institutions which took part in the Financial Sector Initiative Who Cares Wins 
contributed to the publication of a report, titled “Who Cares Wins: Connecting Financial 
Markets to a Changing World'. This report
“[...] aims to enhance clarity concerning the respective roles of 
different market actors, including companies, regulators, stock 
exchanges, investors, asset managers, brokers, analysts, accountants, 
financial advisers and consultants [in the ESG field]. It therefore 
includes recommendations for different actors, striving to support 
improved mutual understanding, collaboration and constructive 
dialogue on these issues [i.e. ESG issues].” (The UN Global Compact,
2004: i)
This report was the first official document in international financial markets that 
specified the potential roles played by the different financial market participants in the 
ESG field. Sell-side financial analysts were regarded in this report as “the specialists 
best placed to show how ESG issues impact company and investment value” (The UN 
Global Compact, 2004: 37). They were suggested as having a “leading role” to play in 
the integration of ESG factors within mainstream investment analyses. In particular, 
analysts were explicitly requested
“[...] to take an active role in testing and refining the investment 
rationale for ESG integration in research and investment decisions.”
(The UN Global Compact, 2004: 10)
The request for the integration of ESG criteria within the investment analyses 
undertaken by sell-side financial analysts also came from the twelve financial
107institutions that constituted the Asset Management Working Group (AMWG) under
107 These largely consisted o f  fund management firms and the asset management departments o f  
investment banks.
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the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI). These 
institutions strongly requested brokerage firm analysts
“[...] to identify specific [environmental, social and corporate 
governance] criteria likely to be material for company 
competitiveness and reputation [... and] to the extent possible to 
quantify their potential impact on stock price.” (The UNEP FI, 2004:
4)
Furthermore, analysts were also encouraged by these financial institutions to “[...] 
further develop the necessary investment know-how, models and tools in a creative and 
thoughtful way [...]” in order to “[...] better deal with qualitative information and 
uncertain impacts related to ESG issues [...]” (The UN Global Compact, 2004: ii & 28). 
Meanwhile, the United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI)108, which 
were formulated to provide a framework to assist institutional investors to deal with 
ESG issues, highly recommended institutional investors to “[.. .a]sk investment service 
providers (such as financial analysts, consultants, brokers, research firms, or rating 
companies) to integrate ESG factors into evolving research and analysis”109.
To sum up, in the last two decades of the 20th century ideas and discourses related to the 
potential link between corporate governance and the financials were articulated in three 
aspects of institutional life: academic research, institutional investment, and public 
policy making. From the early 21st century, the idea that corporate governance, as part of 
the “ESG”, should be integrated in asset management, securities brokerage services, and 
investment research started to surface. Taking corporate governance into account in the 
investment decision making process was also considered as being able to “contribute to 
stronger and more resilient investment markets” (The UN Global Compact, 2004: i). 
Furthermore, sell-side financial analysts were perceived to play a crucial role in the 
integration of corporate governance within investment analyses. These ideas, discourses, 
and perceptions constituted the programmatic dimension of the integration of corporate 
governance within the investment analyses undertaken by analysts. These programmatic
108 The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment were developed by 20 investment 
institutions from 12 countries. They were initially launched by the U N  Secretary-General at the N ew  York 
Stock Exchange in April 2006.
109 See http://www.unpri.org/principles/. in particular, Principle 1.
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elements not only shaped, animated, and gave significance to, but were also made 
operable by the concrete tasks and routines performed by analysts to link corporate 
governance to the financials.
3. The technological dimension of the integration of corporate governance
within the investment analyses performed by analysts
3.1 The agenda o f  analysts fo r  exploring the integration
Consistent with the widespread perception that a common approach to incorporating 
ESG issues in the investment decision making process was not yet formulated (The UN 
Global Compact, 2004: 1), analysts considered their work in the ESG field as 
exploratory in nature. They put forward an agenda for exploring the way in which 
corporate governance issues could be integrated within investment analyses. As some 
analysts indicated:
“In our research we identify some of the potential implications of 
corporate governance to the investment process. [...] We identify the 
facts and behavioural differences impacting a company’s governance 
standards and explore ways to integrate them into the investment 
process in a systematic way.”(Grandmont, Grant, & Silva, 2004: 6) 
[Emphasis added by Z. Tan]
A similar description was offered by other analysts:
“[... W]e offer a detailed framework and extensive data to incorporate 
Corporate Governance systematically throughout stock selection.”
(Hudson & Morgan-Knott, 2008: 1)
The agenda put forward by analysts for exploring the integration of governance issues 
within investment analyses and what they sought to achieve under this agenda were 
closely aligned with the expectations that other financial market participants, as
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documented in various official reports110 (e.g. The UN Global Compact, 2004, 2005, 
2009; The UNEP FI, 2004), placed on analysts and their role in the ESG field. 
Meanwhile, the work performed by analysts in this field seemed to be strongly informed 
and influenced by the ideas related to the potential link between corporate governance 
and the financials that were widely articulated in financial markets. This was clearly 
reflected in the corporate governance reports produced by analysts, where discourses 
related to this potential link were further considered and articulated by analysts 
themselves. For instance, as Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008: 3) put it:
“[... We] believe that the quality of corporate governance can affect 
the volatility of the price of risk, at the level of market, sector, and 
company, and therefore, can affect the performance of investment 
portfolios.”
Other analysts, such as Grandmont, Grant and Silva (2004:14), expressed a similar view 
on the potential link between corporate governance and the financials:
“We hypothesize that corporate governance standards affect the way a 
company is run and, consequently, its profitability. It is logical to 
predict that companies and boards that are focused on maximizing 
shareholder value tend to be better run and have better returns.”
Meanwhile, corporate governance was perceived by analysts as a risk factor in the 
investment decision making process. As Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008: 17) 
emphasised:
“[... C]orporate governance is potentially a significant source of risk 
at the level of country, sector, and company.”
This perception was also held by the other analysts, such as Grant (2005: 1), who 
pointed out that:
“It is now increasingly accepted that corporate governance and extra- 
financial risk metrics encompassing environmental and social factors
110 These expectations and perceptions o f  other financial market participants related to what analysts could 
and should do in the ESG field as indicated in official documents have been highlighted in section 2 o f  
this chapter.
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are components of a company’s equity risk premium.”
As Grant (2005: 1) continued to suggest:
“Incorporating these risk metrics [related to ESG factors where 
corporate governance is a part] into the investment decision-making 
process is a necessary -  and ultimately -  profitable step for portfolio 
managers.”
In short, the ideas related to the potential link between corporate governance and the 
financials and the perception that corporate governance as a risk factor should be 
considered in the investment decision making process rationalised the investigation by 
analysts into how governance issues can be integrated within investment analyses. 
However, the potential link between corporate governance and the financials was not 
accepted unquestioningly by analysts. Instead, some analysts expressed their mis-trust in 
this link. For instance, Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008: 4) argued that they
“[...] do not believe the governance rating would necessarily explain 
potential performance in isolation.”
Also, they admitted that:
“[...I]t is unlikely to be very easy to make a direct association 
between governance and share price performance.” (Hudson & 
Morgan-Knott, 2008: 15)
As a consequence, to pursue the agenda for exploring the integration of corporate 
governance within investment analyses, analysts first attempted to ascertain the 
relationships between corporate governance and various financial metrics, although 
these relationships had been intensively studied before by others, including 
academics111. With some of these relationships being established and ascertained,
111 As discussed above, analysts expressed their mis-trust in the potential link between governance issues 
and the financials in their corporate governance reports. They set out to “explore the relationships” 
between corporate governance and the financials before they “start[ed] to evaluate companies and equity 
portfolios”. Furthermore, the relationships between corporate governance and various metrics o f  the 
financials had been studied by academic scholars before. While analysts acknowledged the existence o f  
these studies, they undertook their own investigations into these relationships. A s can be seen in section 
3.3, analysts explored these relationships by deploying a set o f  mechanisms and devices, some o f  which
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analysts then explored the way in which corporate governance criteria can be considered 
in relation to the financials in the investment decision making process. Grandmont and 
his colleagues explicitly set out these steps in their corporate governance report:
“We quantify and measure corporate governance standards and 
explore the relationships between corporate governance and risk (e.g. 
volatility) and their implications for profitability, stock price 
performance and equity valuation. With these links we can start to 
evaluate companies and equity portfolios by comparing their inherent 
corporate governance risks.” (Grandmont et al., 2004: 6)
3.2 Quantification o f  corporate governance
To ascertain the link between corporate governance and the financials, analysts first 
attempted to get corporate governance issues quantified and measured. Some analysts 
(e.g. Hudson & Morgan-Knott, 2008; Walker, 2008) made use of the quantification 
provided by other interest groups of corporate governance in financial markets, such as 
corporate governance rating organisations. For instance, the corporate governance 
ratings provided by the GovemanceMetrics International (GMI) were drawn upon by 
Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008)112. The rating methodology adopted by the GMI was 
reviewed and described by Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008: 6) as follows:
“The GMI research template is divided into six categories of analysis:
Board Accountability; Financial Disclosure & Internal Controls; 
Shareholder Rights; Executive Compensation; Market for Control & 
Ownership Base; Corporate Behaviour & CSR Issues. These 
categories are further divided into sub-sections where, in addition to 
reviewing company documents, GMI also places a great deal of 
importance on reviews of regulatory actions, legal proceedings, and 
other sources to gauge whether company behaviour is consistent with 
its stated policies. Once the database profiles are complete, a 
proprietary algorithm is then applied to generate the rating. Ratings 
run on a scale of 1.0 (lowest) to 10.0 (highest), and are relative. The 
median is 6.5.”113
had not been deployed by academics. It can be argued that analysts examined the link between corporate 
governance and the financials in a different way as compared to others, such as academics.
112 Walker (2008) also drew upon the ratings provided by the GMI in his study.
113 The GMI calculates for each company two overall governance scores (global and regional) together 
with sub-scores in the six areas. According to the GMI, global ratings are designed to demonstrate how  
each company's governance profile compares to all others in the GMI universe. Regional ratings are now
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The GMI collected a reasonable amount of qualitative information about various 
dimensions of corporate governance for a wide range of companies, and derived 
corporate governance scores for these companies. The approach adopted by the GMI and 
the ratings it generated were appreciated by analysts who relied on the input from the 
GMI in their integration of corporate governance within investment analyses. As Hudson 
and Morgan-Knott (2008: 17) put it:
“Although [...] we do not expect to be able to identify the perfect set 
of [corporate governance] metrics [...], we believe GMI’s research 
categories are likely to capture a reasonable amount of relevant 
information.”
Nevertheless, some other analysts, such as those at Deutsche Bank, developed their own 
quantification and measurement of the corporate governance procedures of companies. 
To quantify and measure corporate governance issues, analysts at Deutsche Bank 
initially identified corporate governance factors that “[...] represent international best 
practices as well as being indicators of equity risk [...]” (Grant, 2005: 5). A total of 50 
corporate governance factors were identified, and these were treated as 50 data points. 
Each factor or data point was then being weighed depending on whether it was 
considered by analysts as a primary, secondary, or tertiary issue of corporate governance 
best practice (see Figure 13 from Grant, Grandmont, & Silva, 2004: 38 and the extract 
from Grant, Grandmont, and Silva, 2004: 37 below). Subsequently, “[...] an overall 
assessment score for each company” was generated, and “[... t]hese scores [were] 
presented on an absolute scale that ranges from 0% to 100%”114 (Grant, 2005: 6). For 
instance, Burberry received a score of 38%, while BHP Billiton Pic was given a score of 
82% (Grant, Grandmont, & Silva, 2004: 17 & 31). This indicated that the corporate
called “home ratings”, which reflect how well a company’s governance policies and practices compare to 
those o f  other companies in its home country or region. For more details on the rating methodology 
adopted by the GMI, see
http://www.gmiratings.com/(epxambeozfoe4fafl)we4wl55Vabout.aspx#methodologv.
114 However, analysts did not explicitly specify in their reports how absolute scores, based on the 50 data 
points and on the weights given to the primary, secondary, and tertiary issues o f  corporate governance best 
practices, were derived. This lack o f  detail on how the scores were constructed, however, does not 
significantly affect the empirical analysis o f  the current chapter. For the purpose o f  this chapter, what is 
interesting is the approach o f  quantifying corporate governance issues adopted by analysts. Knowing how 
the scores were derived in detail can be the object o f  further research.
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governance system o f BHP Billiton Pic tended to be superior to that o f Burberry. In 
addition to measuring absolute standards o f corporate governance, the change in the 
corporate governance procedures adopted by companies over time was also measured. 
Such change was captured by the momentum score. It was generated, as briefly 
specified by analysts, through “[...] compare[ing] each company’s underlying current 
governance data to its own available historical data” 115 (Grandmont et al., 2004: 9).
figure 13: Governance factors segregate by Pillar and degree of significance
PliM tot Independent*
Chairman Information
cso Secondary
independent Chairman Primary
Number of board m em bers T ertia ry
Number of Independent directors Primary
CSO othsr dir set orsblpsrpos moos Secondary
No director attend* more than 4 board m eetings Secondary
Directors attend m ore m en 4 boatds Secondary
Number of board meetings in lest FY Secondary
Number of directors with 9 .  years tenure T ertia ry
There ts a nam ed senior independent d u e t tot T ertia ry
% independence. Audit, Mom,. ftem un.Com t. Primary
Shareholder Treatment
Each ordinary share has equal voting rights Primary
Other share type T ertiary
Author ised/tssued shares Secondary
All directors face election every year Primary
There is no controlling tnarehotdet Secondary
No parsons have right to designate d t  actors Secondary
Alt new LTIPsiESOs are put to vote Tertiary
All voting conducted equitably and by poll Tertiary
issued shares under option Primary
Director* required to build up sig, equity stake Secondary
Directors interests Primary
No director ha* a contract in excess cf t year Secondary
Siur9*, Sjfl'C Dmurtc’* Sana Mtmateautt eatzcaxr c
Information Dlsclosur •
Directors state compliance with Combined Coda Primary
Individual directors attendance is disclosed Secondary
Compensation .''policy changes fully explained Secondary
Fully Independent audit com mi at least 3 memb Primary
Total non-audit tees as % ol total fee Secondary
Number cf aud* committee meetings test FY Tertiary
Audit Com ha* right to engage outside advisors Tertiary
Audit Com includes at least 1 financial expert Secondary
Political contributions 'GBP! Inform ation
Process for beard  appraisal ts disclosed Secondary
Proees* tor succession planning is disclosed Secondary
transparent reciuittfig system tor new directors Secondary
C orpom * C o m p u ta tio n
CEO appointment year Inform ation
CEO's last FY salary Inform ation
CEO’s last FY bonus Inform ation
CEO's other em olum ents Inform ation
CEO's share option gains Inform ation
CEO's LTIP ga*rvs Inform ation
CEO's Pension gains Information
CEO Total com pensation Inform ation
All components of salary are tuliy disclosed S eco n d a ry
Comp. lUbiity on  termination of contract stated T srtia ry
All directors with I * year of service own woe* Secondary
Maximum potential award? ate disclosed T artta ry
Source: Grant, Grandmont & Silva (2004: 38)
115 A s for the absolute scores, analysts did not describe in detail how  they derived the momentum scores in 
their corporate governance reports.
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Explanation on Primary. Secondary, and Tertiary Issues of Corporate Governance
Best Practices
Primary issues: 3x weight A deliberate stance to disadvantage
minority investors or a factor identified as price/valuation sensitive
Secondary issues: 2x weight A failure to follow international best
practice standards
Tertiary issues: 1x weight
corporate governance policies
Information issues: no weight
investors but not scored
A failure to follow pro-active 
Of relevance to institutional
Source: Grant, Grandmont & Silva (2004: 37)
Quantification of corporate governance was an essential step towards the ascertaining 
and establishment of the link between corporate governance and the financials, and 
towards the integration of governance issues in the investment decision making process. 
Particularly, without quantifying corporate governance issues, statistical analyses on the 
relationship between corporate governance and the financials can not be performed. 
Quantification of corporate governance, therefore, constituted a pre-condition for the 
integration of corporate governance within the investment analyses performed by 
analysts. Through quantification, qualitative information about corporate governance 
was transformed into quantitative information, difference between the governance 
procedures adopted by companies was transformed into magnitude, and a common 
metric, namely, the corporate governance score was generated (cf. Espeland & Stevens, 
1998)116.
116 Quantification o f  corporate governance was not dissimilar to the process o f  “commensuration” 
conceptualised by Espeland and Stevens (1998). According to these scholars, commensuration is “the 
transformation o f  different qualities into a common metric” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998: 314).
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3.3 Ascertaining and making visible the link between corporate governance and 
the financials
A set of tools and devices were deployed by analysts to ascertain the link between 
corporate governance and the financials. These tools and devices, which can largely be 
thought of as inscriptions (e.g. Latour, 1987; Robson, 1992), created new visibilities of 
the link, and transformed the link from hypothetical and potential to visible, material, 
and factual.
First, analysts undertook portfolio analyses. This kind of analyses drew the attention o f 
the twelve financial institutions that participated in the Asset Management Working 
Group (AMWG) of the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI). These financial institutions, which evaluated the study of the materiality of 
ESG issues to equity pricing undertaken by analysts, considered portfolio analyses as
“[...] us[ing] financial metrics to compare best from worst performers 
for a given set of environmental social and corporate governance 
criteria against existing stock portfolios. The comparison helped 
analysts evaluate the financial impact of chosen criteria for a given 
industry sector. This is an important step beyond identifying potential 
criteria for analysis and determining best and worst performers.” (The 
UNEP FI, 2004: 7)
Analysts at Deutsche Bank, for instance, constructed two portfolios from the US 
S&P500 stocks based only on corporate governance criteria117 (Grandmont et al., 2004; 
Grant, 2005; Grant et al., 2004). The first portfolio consisted of stocks with above 
average118 absolute corporate governance scores and positive momentum scores over a 
two-year period, while the second portfolio included stocks with below average absolute 
corporate governance scores and negative momentum scores over the same period119. 
The respective price performances of the two portfolios between 07/02/2001 and
1,7 According to the reports in which the analysis was documented, these two portfolios were “equally 
weighted to avoid giving extra prominence to larger companies” (Grandmont et al., 2004: 10).
118 This “average” was the average corporate governance absolute score developed by analysts at 
Deutsche Bank for companies in the US S&P500 index.
119 According to the research performed by analysts at Deutsche Bank, a positive momentum score 
indicates that a company improved its governance practice over a time period, while a negative 
momentum score suggests that the quality o f  the governance practice o f  a company deteriorated.
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30/06/2003 were plotted in a graph (see Figure 6 from Grandmont, Grant, & Silva, 
2004: 10 below). This graph revealed that the portfolio which consisted o f stocks with 
above average absolute corporate governance scores and positive momentum scores had 
a higher average market price than the other portfolio over the two-year period. Based 
on this, analysts at Deutsche Bank concluded that “ [c]ompanies with above average 
assessment & positive momentum outperformed those with below average assessment & 
negative momentum [...] with a [price] performance differential spread between the 
portfolios o f 18.9%” (Grandmont et al., 2004: 10). This also led to a more general 
argument put forward by these analysts that “investments in companies with the highest 
quality o f governance structures and behavior have significantly outperformed those 
with the weakest governance” (Grandmont et al., 2004: 10). By constructing two 
portfolios based only on corporate governance criteria, tracking their price 
performances, and revealing the price performance differentials through a graph, the link 
between corporate governance and share price performance was established as a fact, 
and was made visible. The portfolio analyses and the associated graphs developed by 
analysts operationalised the widely articulated ideas related to the potential link between 
corporate governance and the financials.
Figure 6 S&P 500 -  Above average a s se s sm e n t  & positive m o m e n tu m  vs 
below  average  & negative m o m e n tu m  (indexed, tw o  years)_________________
Source: Grandmont, Grant, & Silva (2004)
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Portfolios were not only constructed based on the overall corporate governance scores. 
They were also constructed according to individual corporate governance criteria. For 
instance, analysts at Deutsche Bank argued that the Chairman of a company has to be 
independent and that “[...] separation of roles [between the Chairman and the CEO]
15ftwithout a fully-independent Chairman is insufficient protection for investors” (Grant, 
2005: 6). Grant (2005) hypothesised that companies with independent Chairmen may 
outperform those without. He constructed two portfolios with one consisting of 
companies with independent Chairmen, and the other one consisting of companies 
without independent Chairmen, and compared their price performances between 2000 
and 2003. The respective price performances of the two portfolios over this three-year 
period were plotted in a graph (see Figure 4 from Grant, 2005:7 below). In this case, the 
link between a particular corporate governance criterion, namely, the existence / non­
existence of an independent Chairman, and stock price performance was established. A 
fact was constructed, namely that “[...] companies with an independent Chairman 
outperformed companies without an independent Chairman over the period between 
December 2000 and December 2003” (Grant, 2005:6). In particular, this fact regarding 
the relationship between the corporate governance criterion in question and stock price 
performance was constructed through portfolio analyses and the associated graph 
created by analysts. It was through the portfolio analyses and the associated graph that 
the link between the existence / non-existence of an independent Chairman and stock 
price performance was rendered from hypothetical and invisible, to factual and visible.
120 Grant (2005: 6) set out several reasons for their suggestion on the separation o f  the roles between the 
Chairman and the CEO. These included: the roles are quite distinct; the roles require different aptitudes 
and temperaments, which are not easily found in a single person; the time horizons over which the 
Chairman and CEO’s success is measured may be different; and formal separation o f  the roles divorces 
the task o f  management oversight from management itself.
- 142-
Figure 4: C o m p an ies  w ith  an in d e p e n d e n t C hairm an  o u tp e rfo rm e d  co m p a n ie s  w ith o u t  
an in d e p e n d e n t C h airm an
11*
1 uxnpviiw  Independent cnamvan “  Compjme* wwioui ar Independent Cnarmar
Sour* Dauuctm Bant aatvnataa Company OMa ana Btoombmrg
Source: Grant (2005: 7)
Event analyses performed by analysts also made use o f the portfolios that were 
constructed based on the corporate governance rating scores. For instance, analysts at 
Deutsche Bank drew upon event analyses to examine whether companies in the US 
S&P500 and the UK FTSE350 announcing positive corporate governance reforms 
around the annual general meeting (AGM) date would outperform companies disclosing 
deteriorating standards o f corporate governance. According to Grant (2005: 16), two 
equally weighted portfolios were built for companies “with the most identifiable 
momentum -  top and bottom 5% o f each index” 121. By plotting the price performances 
o f these portfolios in graphs (see Figures 22 and 23 from Grant, 2005: 17 below), Grant 
(2005: 17) noted that the portfolio o f companies disclosing deteriorating governance 
standards underperformed the portfolio of companies which announced highly positive
121 This means that one portfolio consisted o f  stocks o f  companies whose momentum scores were higher 
than those received by 95% o f  companies in the respective stock index, and the other portfolio consisted 
o f  stocks o f  companies whose momentum scores were lower than those received by 95% o f  companies in 
the respective stock index.
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governance reforms over the 90-day analysis period around the AGM date. Once again, 
by constructing two portfolios based only on corporate governance criteria, tracking 
their price performances, and visualising the price performance differentials through 
graphs, the link between corporate governance and the financials was established and 
made visible. The fact that changes in the corporate governance practices adopted by 
companies had impact on the financials was constructed.
Figure 23: FTSE 350 top 5% governance momentum vs. 
bottom 5%
figure 22: S&P 500 top 5% governance momentum vs. 
bottom 5%
ofuy »mm Mu ttwDn tan: .wuyt
I ■—  I ■■■- 1
- 5: ! :  i j ; i i ! .'! i I ) i i i  i
Sdiai Dtjtxht S«w .‘oftKMH Som tia  liemttib tni ficm Sana. Omtscto Sri carport* Getmwxa fwmch ma ftcswi
Source: Grant (2005: 17)
In order to establish the link between corporate governance and the financials in a 
statistical manner, regression analyses were performed. Regression analyses had long 
been deployed by academic researchers to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and the financials. Analysts endorsed this approach, and briefly described 
how this kind of analyses was supposed to work as follows:
“In academia, the approach has often been to gather qualitative 
information relating to the presence or absence of specified features of 
a specific set of governance provisions or features, and then convert 
the list into a score that potentially reflects the overall quality of 
governance. Financial models [according to their reports, analysts 
essentially meant regression models] are then used to look for 
relationships with metrics such as share price performance, valuation, 
or accounting performance (for instance, ROE).” (Hudson & Morgan-
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Knott, 2008: 15)
With the corporate governance scores either being provided by corporate governance 
rating organisations or being internally generated by analysts themselves, in a statistical 
manner, analysts explored the link between standards of corporate governance achieved 
by companies which were presumably captured by the corporate governance scores and 
various dimensions of the financials. For instance, analysts at Deutsche Bank argued that 
“[...] corporate governance standards affect the way a company is run and, 
consequently, its profitability” (Grandmont et al., 2004:14). They hence focused on the 
relationship between corporate governance and profitability for companies in the UK 
FTSE350. Three measures of profitability were drawn upon, including Return on Equity 
(ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), and Earnings Before Interests, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortisation (EBITDA) Margin. The quality of the corporate governance procedures 
adopted by companies was measured by the absolute corporate governance scores that 
these analysts developed. In order to statistically look for a relationship between firm 
profitability and corporate governance, analysts ran regressions for the two variables, 
with profitability being the dependent variable and corporate governance being the 
independent variable. The regression model, simply speaking, appeared to be:
Profitability = a  + Corporate Governance + £
It was found that the corporate governance scores were positively correlated to all three 
measures of profitability. For instance, for the relationship between ROE and corporate 
governance, the regression result was ROE = 0.2518Corporate Governance + 0.1128 
(Grandmont et al., 2004: 14). This meant that one unit increase in the corporate 
governance score would lead to an increase in ROE by 0.2518%. The relationships 
between each profitability measure and corporate governance were also represented in a 
series of graphs. From the graph that represented the result of the regression between 
ROE and corporate governance (see Figure 16 from Grandmont, Grant, & Silva, 2004: 
14 below), one can see that the regression line is upward sloping. This suggested that the 
relationship between ROE, a measure of firm profitability, and corporate governance 
was positive. With the deployment of the regression analyses, the link between firm 
profitability and corporate governance was numerically and statistically established.
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This link was further visualised and made visible with the regression lines (either 
upward or downward sloping) being plotted in graphs. A new visibility o f the link 
between corporate governance and the financials was created through the deployment of 
the regression analyses as well as the graphs that represented the results o f the 
regressions.
Figure 16: FTSE 360: C orporate governance and  R eturn on  E quity
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Source: Grandmont, Grant, & Silva (2004: 14)
However, the link between corporate governance and the financials can not always be 
established as originally expected. For instance, although corporate governance and the 
price earnings ratios (P/E) were perceived to be positively correlated, Walker (2008: 1) 
noted that:
“[...] within the UK life insurance sector there appears to be a 
decreasing relationship between the governance rating [provided by 
the GMI] and price earning ratios (P/E), although there is no 
statistically significant data to back up this conclusion122.”
The results from the investigation o f the link between corporate governance and the 
financials tended to be sector-specific. The conclusion that can be drawn from the 
investigation also depended on the level o f the analysis, namely, individual firm level,
122 Walker (2008) only focused on seven life insurance companies in the UK.
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industry level, or market level The exploration of the association between corporate 
governance and the valuation of stocks for companies in the US S&P500 index 
undertaken by analysts at Deutsche Bank clearly demonstrated this. Three measures of 
valuation were drawn upon by these analysts: Price to Earnings, Price to Book Value, 
and Price to Cash Flow. The relationships between each of these measures and standards 
of corporate governance presumably captured by the corporate governance scores that 
analysts developed were studied. It was noted by these analysts that:
“[...] while for the Food & Staples Retailing sector the relationship 
shows that companies with higher governance standards trade at 
higher valuation multiples, the same cannot be said for the Capital 
Goods sector.” (Grandmont et al., 2004: 22)
When summarising the results from their regression analyses in a table (see Figure 34 
from Grandmont, Grant, & Silva, 2004: 23 below), Grandmont et al. (2004: 23) 
concluded that:
“[...] there is no US market-wide correlation between corporate 
governance and equity valuations.”
Figure 34: Governance impact on equity valuation, by S&P 600 sector
P/E P/BV P/CF
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment Positive Positive Positive
Food & Staples Retailing Positive Positive Positive
Materials Positive Positive Positive
Technology Hardware & Equipment Positive Positive Positive
Retailing Positive Positive Positive
Food Beverage & Tobacco Positive Positive Positive
Software & Services Positive Positive Negative
Telecommunication Services Positive neutral Negative
Utilities neutral neutral neutral
Consumer Durables & Apparel neutral neutral Negative
Commercial Services & Supplies Negative neutral neutral
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology Negative Positive Negative
Capital Goods Negative neutral Negative
Energy Negative neutral Negative
Media Negative neutral neutral
Health Care Equipment & Services Negative Negative Negative
Swror Beittsch? Sank Stew&tt Ins. tttknatta Mdcmpuyiafomttiot
Source: Grandmont, Grant, & Silva (2004: 23)
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As can be seen, not all perceived relationships between corporate governance and the 
specific dimensions of the financials can always be established or ascertained. 
Nevertheless, analysts still strongly considered that corporate governance standards 
“have an impact on corporate results and longer term equity performance” (Grandmont 
et al., 2004: 24). The relationships between corporate governance and the various 
measures of the financials that were established and made visible by the tools and 
devices deployed by analysts still reinforced the idea that corporate governance should 
be incorporated into the investment decision making process. Although the links 
established by analysts seemed to be made-up in some cases, these links justified, and 
constituted the bases for the integration of corporate governance issues within 
investment analyses. In addition, the lack of correlation between corporate governance 
and market valuation of stocks for companies in some industry sectors was considered 
by some analysts as being induced by the inability of investors to incorporate 
governance assessments into valuation models on a timely basis due to lack of efficient 
and effective tools (Grandmont et al., 2004: 24). It was partially for this reason that 
analysts claimed to develop certain frameworks that may help portfolio managers and 
investors to “incorporate governance systematically throughout stock selection” 
(Hudson & Morgan-Knott, 2008: 1).
3.4 Combining corporate governance with the financials
The combination of corporate governance and the financials in investment analyses was 
explored by analysts mainly on a case-by-case basis. For each case, analysts examined 
the corporate governance standard of a company in relation to its broader investment 
thesis. The general principle adopted by analysts was to seek an alignment between the 
corporate governance assessment of a company and its broader investment thesis related 
to profitability, equity valuation, and stock price performance.
Such an “alignment” occurred, according to analysts, when a company whose 
governance rating was above sector average (i.e. governance risk below sector average) 
enjoyed above sector-average profit, market valuation, and stock price performance, or
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vice versa. The notion of “alignment” was largely informed by the positive link between 
corporate governance and the financials that was either perceived by analyst and other 
financial market participants, or that was established and ascertained by analysts. In 
other words, in the case of an “alignment”, the corporate governance assessment of a 
company can be considered as being consistent with the investment thesis based on the 
financials. When the view on the financials of a company and its governance profile 
were not in line with each other, further investigation was needed, as suggested by 
analysts, in order to decide whether or not the stock was worthy of being chosen for 
investment. The principle of “alignment” was adopted irrespective of how the corporate 
governance assessment was undertaken, i.e. either by corporate governance rating 
organisations, or by analysts themselves. For instance, Hudson and Morgan-Knott 
(2008: 23), who drew upon the corporate governance ratings provided by the GMI, 
explicitly stated that:
“[... We] look for an alignment between the overall governance rating 
according to GMI, and the broader thesis driven by fundamentals, 
valuation, and/or share price performance, as appropriate.”
Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008) focused on companies in the beverage, household & 
personal products, life sciences, clothing and fabrics, and food retail sectors. While 
looking at the beverage sector, Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008) referred to the 
research provided by the other analyst, Jason DeRise, who had formulated the
193investment thesis for companies in this sector . DeRise (2008, quoted in Hudson & 
Morgan-Knott, 2008) wrote that “[w]e believe Britvic is cheap and defensive”. Given 
this investment thesis, Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008) examined the extent to which 
the governance standard of Britvic measured by the GMI rating scores aligned with the 
financials. Britvic was given high scores by the GMI for both the global rating and the 
regional rating. This led Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008: 23) to comment:
“Britvic is not only “cheap and defensive”, but also brings the 
additional comfort of a strong governance profile.”
123 Jason DeRise was an equity research analyst, while Julie Hudson and Shirley Morgan-Knott were so- 
called SRI or corporate governance analysts. They all worked in the equity research division o f  the same 
brokerage firm, i.e. on the so-called “sell-side”.
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For Britvic, the corporate governance assessment provided by the GMI aligned with its 
broader investment thesis. Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008) agreed that the relatively 
low level of governance risk suggested by the GMI rating scores was in line with the 
“buy” recommendation given to Britvic by DeRise.
Nevertheless, inconsistencies between the corporate governance assessment and the 
broader investment thesis appeared. For instance, Carlsberg was given very low scores 
by the GMI for both the global rating and the regional rating. However, DeRise (2008, 
quoted in Hudson & Morgan-Knott, 2008) recommended that investors should “buy” the 
shares of Carlsberg. Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008), therefore, sought to find out the 
reason for this “buy” recommendation based on the research provided by DeRise. As 
noted by Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008), DeRise, who was aware of the low GMI 
rating scores given to Carlsberg, provided a justification for the “buy” recommendation. 
This was agreed and accepted by Hudson and Morgan-Knott who re-produced the 
justification provided by DeRise in their own report:
“Though Carlsberg has a low governance rating, we continue to 
recommend the stock as Buy. [...] we believe Carlsberg's growth 
story from S&N cost synergies and ongoing restructuring of the “old” 
Carlsberg business is compelling and not factored into the current 
share price.” (DeRise 2008, quoted in Hudson & Morgan-Knott,
2008)
As a consequence of this “out of line” analysis, Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008: 23) 
suggested that “every situation needs to be considered on its own merits”. In other 
words, the integration of governance issues in the investment decision making process 
was best to be pursued on a case-by-case basis. Aligning the corporate governance 
assessment of a company and its broader investment thesis with each other was the 
fundamental principle for the incorporation of corporate governance into investment 
analyses. This principle, as emphasised by Hudson and Morgan-Knott (2008), needed to 
be operationalised with the consideration of the merits of individual circumstances.
A similar approach was adopted by other analysts in their exploration of integrating 
corporate governance within investment analyses. However, additional tools and devices
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were created and deployed by these analysts. For instance, Grant et al. (2004) at 
Deutsche Bank explored the way in which corporate governance information could be 
used in combination with financial information in the selection of stocks for investment. 
They proposed that:
“Our objective is to incorporate the corporate governance risk factor 
into the investment decision making process. Therefore, we add 
corporate governance information as a further layer to traditional 
fundamental analysis in order to select stocks for inclusion (or 
exclusion) from portfolios. We contend that adding corporate 
governance to traditional fundamental analysis allows us to more 
accurately estimate the potential risk-reward of a security. [...] This 
analysis allows us to identify companies whose govemance-valuation- 
profitability measures are, in our view, inappropriately priced by the 
markets, allowing us to generate long and short stock ideas.” (Grant et 
al., 2004: 57)
The “govemance-valuation-profitability” analyses were useful, according to Grant et al. 
(2004), for at least three purposes: “analysing individual companies for investment”, for 
which the analyses were performed to determine whether the stock of an individual 
company should be invested in; “relative stock comparison”, for which the analyses 
were used to identify the relative merits of two stocks and determine which one should 
be invested in; and “building portfolios”, for which the analyses were performed for the 
selection of a portfolio of stocks to invest. The combined analyses of corporate 
governance, valuation, and profitability were undertaken with the deployment of certain 
representational devices. These were the “govemance-to-profltability” graphs and the 
“govemance-to-valuation” graphs that represented the relationship between the 
corporate governance standard of a company and its profitability or valuation, relative to 
that of the other firms in the same industry. With the deployment by analysts of the 
“govemance-to-profitability” and “govemance-to-valuation” analyses and graphs, the 
category of corporate governance as a risk factor was explicitly and visibly brought 
within investment analyses.
When comparing the relative merits of two stocks from the General Retailers sector, 
namely, Signet Group Pic and Burberry Group Pic, a “govemance-to-profitability” 
analysis was performed and three “govemance-to-profitability” graphs were developed
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by analysts: “corporate governance vs. ROE”, “corporate governance vs. ROA”, and 
“corporate governance vs. EBITDA margin” (see Figures 58, 59, and 60 from Grant et 
al., 2004: 64 below). For the “corporate governance vs. ROA” graph (Figure 59), the 
horizontal axis measured the corporate governance scores that analysts developed and 
offered to companies, and the vertical axis measured Return on Assets (ROA). The 
horizontal line in the middle of the graph (left half in red and right half in blue) indicated 
the average ROA for companies in the General Retailers sector, which was roughly 10% 
in 2003. The vertical line in the middle (upper half in blue and lower half in red) that 
intersected with the horizontal line in the middle indicated the average corporate 
governance score for this sector, which was roughly 55%. Since the correlation between 
standard of corporate governance and ROA would be perceived to be positive, it was 
considered that a company whose corporate governance score was above the sector 
average would have an above sector average ROA, and it would capture a position in the 
top right rectangle of the graph. A company whose corporate governance score was 
below the sector average would be expected to have a below sector average ROA, and it 
would appear in the bottom left rectangle. In these two cases, the corporate governance 
assessment and the broader investment thesis can be thought of as aligning with each 
other. When a company appeared in the top left or the bottom right part of the graph, the 
corporate governance assessment of the company and its broader investment thesis can 
be viewed as being mis-aligned or inconsistent.
According to Figure 59 (from Grant et al., 2004: 64), Signet Group Pic was located in 
the top right rectangle. This suggested that the corporate governance standard of Signet 
was consistent with its profitability in 2003. Both of the corporate governance score 
received by Signet and its ROA exceeded the sector averages. However, Burberry Group 
Pic appeared in the top left part of the graph. This suggested that the corporate 
governance standard of Burberry and its investment thesis related to profitability did not 
align with each other in 2003. In this case, the quality of the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by Burberry was significantly below the sector average, although 
this company achieved an above sector average ROA. Together with the similar message 
suggested by Figures 58 and 60, Grant et al. (2004: 64) noted that:
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“[...] on a govemance-to-profitability measurement Signet Group Pic 
shows similar profitability measures to Burberry Group Pic while 
enjoying much better governance standards. In other words, when 
compared to Burberry Group Pic, Signet Group Pic offers similar 
levels of profitability for a lower corporate governance risk.”
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Based on the “govemance-to-profitability” analysis, between Signet and Burberry, 
Signet was suggested to be the investment target for “long investing” and Burberry for 
“short investing”124. This investment strategy was further reinforced by the result of a 
“govemance-to-valuation” analysis. For this analysis, three “govemance-to-valuation” 
graphs were created and deployed by analysts: “corporate governance vs. P/E”, 
“corporate governance vs. P/CF”, and “corporate governance vs. P/BV” (see Figures 61, 
62, and 63 from Grant et al., 2004: 65 below). For the “corporate governance vs. P/E” 
graph (Figure 61), the horizontal axis measured the corporate governance scores that 
analysts developed, and the vertical axis measured the Price-to-Eamings (P/E) ratio. The 
horizontal line in the middle of the graph (left half in red and right half in blue) indicated 
that the average P/E for companies in the General Retailers sector was roughly 18 in 
2003. The middle vertical line (upper half in red and lower half in blue) that intersected 
with the middle horizontal line indicated that the average corporate governance score for 
companies in this sector was roughly 55%. As the correlation between standard of 
corporate governance and the P/E ratio would be perceived to be positive, it was 
considered that a company whose corporate governance score was above the sector 
average would have an above sector average P/E ratio, and it would capture a position in 
the top right part of the graph. A company whose corporate governance score was below
124 In the case o f  “long investing”, according to Grant et al. (2004), the stock o f  a company with an above 
average governance assessment, improving momentum, and low valuation will be bought by investors. In 
contrast, in the case o f  “short investing”, an investor may wish to sell the stocks o f  high governance risk 
companies (i.e. below-average assessment with declining momentum) that trade at valuation premiums.
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the sector average would be expected to have a below sector average P/E ratio, and it 
would appear in the bottom left part of the graph. In these two cases, the corporate 
governance assessment and the broader investment thesis driven by equity valuation can 
be viewed as being consistent with each other. However, when a company appeared in 
the top left or the bottom right rectangle of the graph, the corporate governance 
assessment of the company can be thought of as being out of line with its broader 
investment thesis.
According to Figure 61, Signet Group Pic appeared in the bottom right rectangle. This 
suggested that the corporate governance standard of Signet and its market valuation 
were not consistent with each other in 2003. Although Signet received a corporate 
governance score that was higher than the sector average, its P/E ratio was below the 
sector average. In contrast, Burberry Group Pic appeared in the top left part of the graph. 
This indicated that the governance standard of Burberry and its investment thesis related 
to valuation did not align with each other in 2003, either. In this case, the governance 
standard of Burberry was significantly below the sector average, whilst its P/E ratio was 
significantly higher than the sector average. Together with the similar message 
suggested by Figure 63, Grant et al. (2004: 65) pointed out that:
“In the govemance-to-valuation graphs [...] we notice that Signet 
Group Pic trades at a significant valuation discount to the sector on a 
P/E and P/BV basis while enjoying a much lower governance risk 
factor than the average company in the sector. Conversely, Burberry 
Group Pic trades at valuation rates that are much richer than the sector 
average while having a higher corporate governance risk than the 
sector average.”
- 155 -
Figure 61: G en era l R eta ilers s e c to r  -  co r p o r a te
g o v e r n a n c e  v s . P/E
Soarcm: D m atscim  3m nk Smcarrt^a ine mmtirvmtmo mnd c o m p a n y  ,n*ermmtk>n
Source: Grant, Grandmont, & Silva (2004: 65)
F ig u re  62 : G e n e r a l  R e ta i le r s  s e c to r  -  c o r p o r a te  
g o v e rn a n c e  vs . P /C F
Scarce. DmatooAm 3m»* Smcar.'t.'me ' *c me*mmtmm a *d  com pany inform aron
Source: Grant, Grandmont, & Silva (2004: 65)
F ig u re  63 : G e n e ra l R e ta ile r s  s e c to r  -  c o r p o ra te  
g o v e rn a n c e  vs . P /B V
Source: Dmatec*e Sanr, Secant,me f.nc metirratoe and company infoomsUo*
Source: Grant, Grandmont, & Silva (2004: 65)
- 156-
Based on the insights generated from the analyses above, investors who “long” the 
shares of Signet Group Pic and “short” those of Burberry Group Pic would expect to 
make a profit. This investment strategy was informed simultaneously by the corporate 
governance assessment of companies and the broader investment thesis. In particular, 
the “govemance-to-profitability” and “govemance-to-valuation” analyses and graphs 
that were deployed by analysts brought corporate governance within the investment 
decision making process, put corporate governance information and financial 
information together, and made the integration of corporate governance within 
investment analyses possible and visible. The ideas related to the potential link between 
corporate governance and the financials and that governance issues should be 
incorporated into the investment decision making process were made operable by the 
“govemance-to-profitability” and “govemance-to-valuation” analyses and graphs. These 
tools and devices utilised by analysts helped realise the ideal of taking into consideration 
corporate governance and integrating this factor in the investment decision making 
process. Both the corporate governance standards and the financials of companies were 
translated by these tools and devices into a form that companies as potential investment 
objects could be focused on, discussed, compared, and subsequently acted upon. Both 
corporate governance and the broader investment thesis were simultaneously captured 
and represented in the “govemance-to-profitability” and “govemance-to-valuation” 
analyses and graphs. Institutional investors and asset managers could potentially make 
use of the information generated from these analyses and graphs as an input in the 
process of formulating their investment strategies. The “govemance-to-profitability” and 
“govemance-to-valuation” analyses and graphs enabled corporate governance risk to be
lie #
considered within centres o f investment decision making , where institutional investors 
and fund managers could be in the know about the investment potentials of companies, 
and where investment decisions could possibly be made.
To sum up, analysts put forward an agenda for integrating corporate governance within 
investment analyses. In order to proceed, various governance issues were first quantified 
and corporate governance scores were generated for companies. This quantification of
125 This term is inspired by the notion o f  “centres o f  calculation” (Latour, 1987).
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corporate governance provided a pre-condition for analysts to ascertain the link between 
corporate governance and the financials, which was the next step of the integration. For 
this second step, a bundle of tools and devices was deployed by analysts to establish the 
link between corporate governance and the financials. These included portfolio analyses, 
event analyses, and regression analyses. The link was also made visible with the 
deployment of certain representational devices by analysts, such as graphs. With such a 
link, the integration of governance issues within investment analyses was performed by 
analysts on a case-by-case basis. As the last but the most important step, analysts 
explored the way in which the corporate governance assessment of a company could be 
considered in relation to its broader investment thesis driven by share price, profitability, 
and valuation. Again, a bundle of tools and devices (e.g. “govemance-to-profitability” 
and “govemance-to-valuation” analyses and graphs) was developed by analysts to 
investigate the extent to which the corporate governance assessment of a company and 
its broader investment thesis aligned with each other.
Analysts were still at an early stage of exploring the integration of corporate governance 
within investment analyses. However, in a report issued by The United Nations Global 
Compact (2009), titled “Future Proof? Embedding Environmental, Social and 
Governance Issues in Investment Markets'”, analysts were praised for their achievement 
“[...] in developing the analytical frameworks and demonstrating the rationale for ESG 
integration in investment research [...]” in the last couple of years (The UN Global 
Compact, 2009: 8). The report also suggested that analysts
“[...] have demonstrated that quantifying financial impacts of ESG 
issues, in spite of their often uncertain and long-term character, is 
absolutely within the reach of the analysts’ profession.” (The UN 
Global Compact, 2009: 23)
4. Discussion
This chapter has examined the integration of corporate governance within investment 
analyses explored by analysts. The empirical analysis has been informed by the
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conceptualisation that economic calculation is constituted by both “programmatic” and 
“technological” dimensions, and by the ensemble formed between the two (e.g. 
Mennicken et al., 2008; Miller, 2008a, 2008b; Miller & Rose, 1990; Miller & Rose, 
2008; Power, 1997; Rose & Miller, 1992). As an emerging form of economic 
calculation, the integration of governance issues within investment analyses was, it has 
been suggested, constituted by an interplay of ideas, discourses, mechanisms, tools, and 
devices.
During the last two decades of the 20th century, ideas and discourses related to the 
potential link between corporate governance and the financials were widely promulgated 
in academic research, institutional investment, and public policymaking. From the early 
21st century or so, the idea that corporate governance and other extra-financial issues 
should be considered in asset management, securities brokerage services, and the 
associated buy-side and sell-side research functions started to surface. The consideration 
of governance issues in the investment decision making process also came to be seen as 
being attached to and connected with certain wider objectives and aspirations in the 
economy. For instance, combining corporate governance with the financials in the 
investment decision making process was thought of as potentially able to “contribute to 
stronger and more resilient investment markets” (The UN Global Compact, 2004: i). 
Furthermore, a number of financial market participants felt strongly that analysts could 
have a “leading” and “active” role to play in incorporating governance issues in the 
investment decision making process. These ideas, discourses, and perceptions 
constituted the programmatic aspect of the integration of corporate governance within 
the investment analyses pursued by analysts. They shaped, animated, and gave 
significance to the more or less concrete tasks performed by analysts to actually link 
corporate governance to the financials.
These ideas, discourses, and perceptions, however, were made operable by the 
mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by analysts. Quantification of corporate 
governance issues, corporate governance scores, portfolio analyses, event analyses, 
regression analyses, “govemance-to-profitability” analyses, “govemance-to-valuation” 
analyses, as well as the various graphs deployed by analysts operationalised the idea of
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incorporating corporate governance into the investment decision making process. These 
technologies can also be considered as being able to help realise the aspiration and fulfil 
the objective of making and developing “stronger and more resilient investment 
markets” (The UN Global Compact, 2004: i). The integration of corporate governance 
within the investment analyses pursued by analysts, as an emerging form of economic 
calculation, was not neutral or purely technical. Instead, it was attached to and linked 
with certain ideals, aspirations, and objectives in financial markets. The programmatic 
and the technological dimensions of the integration of corporate governance within the 
investment analyses performed by analysts went hand in hand here as elsewhere, with 
each dimension being the condition of operation for the other (cf. Mennicken et al., 
2008; Miller, 2008b: 25). While this chapter endorses the “technological turn” in 
economic sociology, the insights from the chapter have suggested that the ideas, 
rationales, and idealised schemata that the mechanisms, tools, and devices are connected 
with need equal attention in order to fully understand the pre-conditions and 
implications of a particular form of economic calculation.
Through the exploration of the integration of corporate governance within investment 
analyses, the link between corporate governance and the various dimensions of the 
financials was established and ascertained by analysts. This link, originally perceived as 
potential and hypothetical, was rendered material, visible, and factual, by the tools and 
devices that analysts deployed. In particular, the fact that corporate governance and the 
financials are linked was represented in various graphs, which can be viewed as 
inscriptions (Latour, 1987; Robson, 1992). The inscribing of the link between corporate 
governance and the financials into these graphs gave new visibilities to such a link, and 
visualised the link in new forms. Also, corporate governance issues, which appeared to 
be hidden in the traditional investment analyses, were brought together and considered 
in combination with the financials in the integration performed by analysts. In particular, 
a bundle of tools and devices developed by analysts, such as the “govemance-to- 
profitability” and “govemance-to-valuation” analyses and graphs, made visible the 
category of corporate governance as a risk factor in the investment decision making 
process. These tools and devices prompted a new kind of visibility for certain aspects of 
corporate governance, and opened a new window for a wide range of financial market
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participants to possibly look into.
In short, the tools and devices deployed by analysts in the integration of governance 
issues within investment analyses, like those mechanisms and devices deployed by 
analysts in their evaluations of corporate governance discussed in chapter 3, can be 
thought of as transparency making devices (Grossman et al., 2008a: 98). In the present 
context, “transparency” relates to the visibility of the link between corporate governance 
and the financials, and the visibility of the category of corporate governance as a risk 
factor in the investment decision making process. More specifically, the link between 
corporate governance and the financials was constructed as a fact, and represented in 
various graphical forms. Also, the transparency making devices made visible corporate 
governance risk in such a way that corporate governance could be easily picked up and 
readily brought within the investment decision making process.
-161 -
C h a p t e r  5
ANALYSTS AS AGENTS OF TRANSPARENCY: CONCLUSION
1. Introduction
Across the past decade or so, debates concerning corporate governance have focused 
increasingly on the roles that the broader constituents of the investing public and society 
may play (e.g. Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Cadbury, 2006; Engwall, 2006; World Bank, 
2000). These broader constituents have been defined as including private sector agents, 
self-regulating bodies, the media, investment and corporate governance analysts, 
financial advisors, financial institutions, governments, civil society, and other significant 
counterparts and stakeholders of corporations. It has been proposed that these broader 
constituents can contribute to expanding the mechanisms of corporate governance, and 
potentially supplement the prevailing mechanisms, such as the board of directors and 
related committees, external audit, internal control, as well as institutional investor 
engagement with investee companies. This thesis has focused primarily on one 
particular set of these broader constituents, namely, sell-side financial analysts. By 
studying the “doing” of corporate governance by analysts in the US and the UK across 
the last decade, the thesis has described and analysed some of the ways in which 
analysts worked on corporate governance issues and performed investment analyses 
beyond the financials. The thesis has also sought to consider the extent to which, and in 
what ways, the corporate governance work pursued by analysts can potentially 
contribute to the governing of corporate life.
This thesis has investigated the multiple and dispersed factors that gave rise to the doing 
of corporate governance by analysts in the early 21st century. It has also concentrated on 
two particular aspects of the corporate governance work pursued by analysts, namely, 
the evaluations of the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies, and the 
integration of governance issues within investment analyses. This thesis has argued that
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analysts can be viewed as agents o f  transparency in financial markets, in so far as they 
have deployed certain transparency making devices when working on corporate 
governance issues. By “doing” corporate governance, analysts have made corporate 
governance visible and transparent. More specifically, analysts have created new 
visibilities of the corporate governance procedures adopted by companies, transformed 
the link between corporate governance and the financials from hypothetical and 
potential to material, visible, and factual, and helped make the category of corporate 
governance a risk factor in the investment decision making process.
This chapter provides some concluding reflections on the doing of corporate governance 
by analysts, as examined in this thesis. The following section summarises the main 
research findings of this study. Next, the chapter further elaborates upon the key theme 
of the thesis, namely, analysts as agents o f transparency, and discusses the implications 
of the doing of corporate governance by analysts. This chapter also reflects upon the 
theoretical lenses and concepts that have informed the empirical analyses in chapters 2,
3 and 4, and offers observations on the empirical materials utilised in this research. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the current study for future 
research.
2. The doing of corporate governance by analysts
The term doing corporate governance has been used in this research to designate the 
phenomenon that some sell-side financial analysts in the US and the UK have started to 
work on corporate governance issues, and have brought corporate governance within the 
boundaries of their work territory since the early 21st century. This thesis has focused on 
the emergence of this phenomenon, the corporate governance evaluations performed by 
analysts, and the integration of corporate governance within the investment analyses 
undertaken by analysts. Empirical investigations into these interrelated dimensions of 
the doing of corporate governance by analysts have been undertaken in chapters 2,3 and
4 of the thesis.
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The first issue, addressed in chapter 2 of this thesis, was the emergence of the doing of 
corporate governance by analysts in the US and the UK in the early 21st century. The 
dispersed pre-conditions that made possible the appearance and development of the 
corporate governance work pursued by analysts were explored. The empirical analysis 
of this chapter involved an examination of a multiplicity of rationales, discourses, 
institutions, practices, processes, and events that conditioned and facilitated the 
emergence of the doing of corporate governance by analysts126. This chapter considered 
three different, but interrelated arenas in which the corporate governance work 
undertaken by analysts was perceived as indispensable by a diverse group of agents and 
agencies in the early 21st century. These three arenas were labelled as investment 
research, the regulatory framework for sell-side financial analysts, and corporate 
governance. As suggested in chapter 2, the corporate governance work performed by 
analysts came to be seen as the focus of varied attentions in the three arenas. For 
instance, investment research performed by analysts which takes into account corporate 
governance and other extra-financial issues was considered as a proposed solution to the 
problem associated with the short-term focus of sell-side investment research in 
particular, and to the wider problem of short-termism in financial markets in the early 
21st century in general. Also, when faced with the uncertainty triggered by the regulatory 
reforms concerning the traditional analyst business model, performing research on 
corporate governance and other extra-financial issues led brokerage firms to further 
adapt and transform the organisation of sell-side research. Furthermore, reforming 
corporate governance was widely articulated as an agenda in financial markets in the 
US, the UK, and globally during the 1990s and in the first few years of the 21st century. 
This agenda, together with the perception that analysts are “gatekeepers” in the 
corporate system, made it possible for analysts to embark upon work on corporate 
governance and to undertake investment analyses beyond the financials. In short, a
126 A s documented in chapter 2, rationales and discourses related to, for instance, “long-termism”, 
“creating long-term value”, “re-establishing the integrity o f  the financial services industry”, “restoring 
investor confidence”, among others; institutions included the SEC, the FSA, the OECD, the World Bank, 
among others; practices included, for example, the allocation by those assets owners and managers that 
had joined the EAI o f  a minimum o f  5% o f their broker commissions to sell-side firms based on how well 
analysts integrate analysis o f  extra-financial issues; processes included, for instance, the formulation and 
enactment o f  corporate governance rules, guidelines, and codes in the US, the UK, and globally after the 
outbreak o f  the corporate scandals in the early 21st century; and events included, for example, the 
investigation led by the former N ew  York Attorney General (NYAG) Eliot Spitzer into ten Wall Street 
firms and two individual sell-side analysts to address the issue o f  analyst conflicts o f  interest in 2002.
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range of factors, not just immediate concerns about corporate governance, gave rise to 
the corporate governance work pursued by analysts. A complex interplay o f rationales, 
discourses, institutions, practices, processes, and events, made possible the doing of 
corporate governance by some analysts in the US and the UK across the last decade.
Chapter 3 concentrated on one aspect of the doing of corporate governance by analysts, 
namely, the way in which evaluations of the corporate governance procedures adopted 
by companies were performed by analysts. While the corporate governance procedures 
of companies have also been assessed by other organisations external to companies, 
such as by corporate governance rating firms, this chapter revealed the specific features 
of the corporate governance evaluations undertaken by analysts. It reported that 
regulations of corporate governance as specified in stock market listing rules, 
international and national governance codes, company laws, and financial regulations 
were frequently referred to by analysts in their corporate governance evaluations. In 
particular, analysts directly and explicitly benchmarked the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by companies against these formal regulatory requirements. 
However, regulations were not neutrally applied by analysts. Instead, analysts unpacked, 
elaborated upon, and re-interpreted the regulatory requirements. When considering 
certain regulatory requirements as problematic, analysts proposed alternative or 
additional “best practice” recommendations regarding corporate governance, and 
employed them in their corporate governance evaluations.
In addition, chapter 3 documented that analysts frequently made comparisons of the 
corporate governance procedures adopted by different companies. These comparisons 
were not only made and represented in the narratives of the corporate governance 
reports, but were also facilitated by the various lists and tables created and deployed by 
analysts. The inscribing of the corporate governance procedures of different companies 
into narratives, lists, and tables allowed the creation of new forms of visibility of the 
governance of corporations. Chapter 3 further argued that the corporate governance 
procedures of companies were transformed into a form that they can be further 
examined and assessed by other participants in financial markets (e.g. institutional 
investors) ex-post the corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts.
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The other aspect of the doing of corporate governance by analysts, namely, the 
integration of corporate governance within investment analyses, was examined in 
chapter 4. That chapter argued that the linking of corporate governance to the financials, 
and the integration of governance issues within investment analyses, was shaped and 
animated by certain ideas, discourses, and idealised schemata that were widely 
articulated in financial markets. These included the ideas and discourses related to the 
potential link between corporate governance and the financials that were promulgated in 
academic research, institutional investment, and public policy making during the last 
two decades of the 20 century. They also consisted of the idea and objective of taking 
governance issues into consideration in asset management, securities brokerage services, 
and the associated buy-side and sell-side research functions, and the perception by other 
financial market participants that analysts have a “leading” and “active” role to play in 
linking governance issues to the financials. The work performed by analysts to integrate 
corporate governance within the investment decision making process was also attached 
to and linked with some broader aspirations and objectives. For instance, the 
consideration and incorporation of corporate governance within investment analyses 
came to be viewed as being able to help “contribute to stronger and more resilient 
investment markets” (The UN Global Compact, 2004: i).
Chapter 4 also argued that the ideas, discourses, ideals, and aspirations, however, were 
made operable by a bundle of mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by analysts in 
their concrete tasks and routines of linking corporate governance to the financials. 
Quantification of governance issues, corporate governance scores, portfolio analyses, 
event analyses, regression analyses, “govemance-to-profitability” analyses, 
“govemance-to-valuation” analyses, as well as the various graphs constituted the 
technologies deployed by analysts in the integration. They made operable the ideas 
related to the potential link between corporate governance and the financials. These 
technologies also operationalised the ideal of incorporating corporate governance in the 
investment decision making process, and facilitated the realisation of certain aspirations 
and objectives in financial markets. Furthermore, with these mechanisms, tools and 
devices deployed by analysts, the link between corporate governance and the financials
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was transformed from hypothetical and potential to material, visible, and factual. The 
category of corporate governance as a risk factor was made visible, and brought within 
the investment decision making process.
3. Analysts as agents of transparency deploying transparency making devices
Across the last three decades, “transparency” has come to be seen as an ideal to be 
sought and an objective to be achieved in various aspects of economic and social life, 
and across arenas of business governance, public policy making, and institutional 
design. Transparency has become a rationale for governing individuals, organisations, 
the economy, and society, and has constituted an “organising principle” that guides the 
administration and control of economic, political, and social affairs and activities (cf. 
Garsten & Lindh-de-Montoya, 2008). As one of the key constituents of contemporary 
“programmes of government” (e.g. Miller & Rose, 1990; Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose & 
Miller, 1992), ideas and discourses related to “transparency” have been elaborated in 
government documents, reports from business, financial institutions, and professional 
bodies, and academic publications. In the field of corporate governance, together with 
notions such as accountability, responsibility, and integrity, transparency has become 
one of the key ideas underpinning corporate governance reforms, and it has informed a 
range of proposals and documents concerning corporate governance, such as the UK 
Cadbury Report (1992), the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004b), and 
others. While a single and consistent definition of transparency is rarely found, 
transparency is often associated with revealing and disclosing information about the 
financial, operational, and governance aspects of corporations (e.g. Business 
Roundtable, 2002; Cadbury, 1992; FRC, 2003; NYSE, 2003; OECD, 2004b). Certain 
technologies, such as accounting and auditing, have traditionally been considered as 
capable of operationalising the abstract ideal of transparency, and helping to make the 
various aspects of corporations visible to shareholders and other stakeholders. In so far 
as accounting and auditing have the capacity to make visible certain aspects of corporate 
conduct, they have been viewed as “transparency making devices” (Grossman et al.,
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2008b: 98)127.
In doing corporate governance, as this thesis has argued, analysts have rendered 
corporate governance visible and transparent. Transparency has specifically been 
referred to in the current study as the visibility of the corporate governance procedures 
adopted by companies, of the link between corporate governance and the financials, as 
well as of the category of corporate governance as a risk factor in the investment 
decision making process. This thesis has concentrated on the form and format of 
visibility of the various aspects of corporate governance. It has also concentrated on the 
technologies deployed by those analysts that have transformed the ways in which these 
aspects of corporate governance have come to be perceived, and how they have created 
new forms and modes of visibility. Information about the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by a company is often disclosed and presented in the annual reports 
of the company, and can also be found in reports issued by corporate governance rating 
firms to the individual company. In the corporate governance evaluations undertaken by 
analysts, analysts collected and compiled information about the corporate governance 
procedures adopted by different companies. This facilitated the creation of a new 
comparative space in which different governance systems could be readily compared. 
Comparisons were further facilitated through the deployment by analysts of various 
types of representational devices, such as narratives, lists, and tables, that allowed the 
corporate governance procedures adopted by different companies to be made newly 
visible, comparable, and assessable.
The link between corporate governance and the financials was initially conceived in 
terms of its potential. Through the integration of corporate governance within the 
investment analyses performed by analysts, this link was not only ascertained by 
analysts through portfolio analyses, event analyses, and regression analyses. This link 
was also represented and visualised in various forms of graphs that were created and 
deployed by analysts. In other words, the link between corporate governance and the 
financials was no longer simply hypothetical and potential; instead, it became factual, 
material, and visible. Furthermore, with the deployment of other tools and devices by
127 Chahed (2009) also views accounting as “technology o f  transparency” that operationalised 
programmes o f  co-govem ing the British economy in public-private partnership around the mid-1990s.
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analysts in the integration, such as the “govemance-to-profitability” and “govemance- 
to-valuation” analyses and graphs, the category of corporate governance as a risk factor 
was rendered calculable, and brought within the investment decision making process. 
Through these developments, corporate governance, which was previously invisible, or 
somehow hidden in the investment decision making process, became visible, and could 
be explicitly considered together with the financial metrics, such as firm profitability, 
stock price performance, and equity valuation.
The mechanisms, tools, and devices, such as narratives, lists, tables, graphs, and 
financial and statistical models, that analysts deployed to make aspects of corporate 
governance visible, are largely material, mundane, and humble in nature (cf. Miller & 
Rose, 1990). However, these mechanisms, tools, and devices came to be endowed with a 
much wider significance. They made the corporate governance procedures of 
companies, the link between corporate governance and the financials, and the category 
of corporate governance itself as a risk factor in the investment decision making process, 
something that could be known to and examined by constituents of the investing public. 
They rendered these aspects of corporate governance visible, measurable, comparable, 
calculable, and amenable to being acted upon. These mechanisms, tools, and devices 
also made aspects of corporate governance susceptible to further evaluation, calculation, 
and intervention that can potentially be performed by institutional investors and other 
financial market participants. No matter how material, mundane, and humble they were, 
these mechanisms, tools, and devices unveiled certain hitherto hidden aspects of 
corporate governance, prompted a kind of visibility, and opened new windows for a 
wide range of financial market participants to look into and focus on. These 
mechanisms, tools, and devices contributed to the operationalisation of the ideal of 
“transparency”, and helped realise the aspiration of making corporate conduct visible in 
financial markets. These mechanism, tools, and devices constituted a bundle of 
“transparency making devices” (cf. Grossman et al., 2008b: 98) that can potentially add 
to and supplement the prevailing devices, such as accounting and auditing, in helping 
make things visible and transparent in financial markets.
Analysts, as a subset of the important and significant counterparts and stakeholders of
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corporations, have recently been proposed as having a potential role to play in corporate 
governance (e.g. Cadbury, 2006; Engwall, 2006; World Bank, 2000). However, what 
analysts can potentially do to add to and supplement the prevailing mechanisms of 
corporate governance, the extent to which and the ways in which they might contribute 
to the governing of corporate life, have not been explicitly suggested or explored. As 
this thesis has documented and argued, the deployment of a bundle of transparency 
making devices for doing corporate governance has allowed analysts to make key 
aspects of corporate governance visible and transparent. Hence the argument advanced 
here is that analysts should be viewed as agents o f transparency in financial markets. 
This means that analysts are potentially capable of inventing and injecting visibility in 
the corporate system, contributing to unveiling certain hidden aspects of corporate 
conduct, and enabling and facilitating the operationalisation of the perceived ideal of 
transparency in financial markets. Traditionally, accountants and auditors have been 
assumed at least by regulatory bodies and policy makers to be responsible for revealing 
aspects of corporate conduct to shareholders and other stakeholders (e.g. Business 
Roundtable, 2002; Cadbury, 1992; FRC, 2003; NYSE, 2003; OECD, 2004b). Analysts, 
who have been viewed as agents of transparency, can potentially contribute to 
complementing accountants and auditors in making aspects of corporate governance 
visible and transparent. Furthermore, analysts have traditionally been regarded as 
information intermediaries and as “gatekeepers” in the corporate system (e.g. Coffee, 
2006; Fuchita & Litan, 2006; Healy & Palepu, 2003). The role of analysts as agents of 
transparency is, however, not to be considered as replacing these existing roles. Instead, 
it is considered as extending and expanding the overall role played by analysts in 
financial markets. In short, by making aspects of corporate governance visible and 
transparent through the deployment of a bundle of transparency making devices for 
doing corporate governance, analysts extended their role in financial markets to become 
agents of transparency, and constituted an expanding mechanism of corporate 
governance (cf. Brennan & Solomon, 2008). Analysts as a subset of the significant and 
important counterparts of corporations, it is suggested, should be explicitly brought 
within debates over corporate governance, and within studies of corporate governance.
4. Explaining the doing of corporate governance by analysts: reflections on
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theoretical lenses and empirical materials
This thesis has drawn upon a set of interrelated theoretical lenses and concepts from 
several fields of the social sciences to make sense of the different dimensions of the 
doing of corporate governance by some analysts in the US and the UK across the past 
decade. These have included notions of eventalisation, arena, problematisation, 
translation, programme, technology, inscription, critic, and carrier. The concentration on 
the corporate governance reports produced by analysts and on the other textual 
documents as the main empirical materials in this thesis have also been largely informed 
by these theoretical concepts. This section offers some reflections on the uses of the 
theoretical concepts in different parts of this thesis, and on the adoption of the various 
textual documents.
4.1 Reflections on the “arena” analysis
The concept of “arena”, which has affinities with the Foucauldian genealogy and with 
the notion of “eventalisation” (Foucault, 1991b; Smart, 2002), has been formulated, 
adopted, and revised by scholars in accounting to examine the emergence of new modes 
of calculation (e.g. Burchell et al., 1985; Mennicken, 2008; Robson, 1991,1994). As an 
analytical lens rooted in the discipline of accounting, the concept of “arena” has mostly 
been utilised to inform studies of the emergence of financial accounting and auditing 
ideas, techniques, and institutions. This thesis has extended the analysis of “arenas” to 
investigate the emergence of a new form of economic action and calculation that 
appeared and developed in financial markets in the US and the UK in the early 21st 
century, namely, the doing of corporate governance by analysts. This thesis has sought to 
offer a “history of the present” of the doing of corporate governance by analysts, and of 
the multiple processes which constituted this phenomenon. In order to locate the 
phenomenon within a broad social and historical context, this thesis has traced the 
complex interplay of various ideas, issues, events, agents, and agencies out of which the 
doing of corporate governance by analysts emerged. The three arenas identified in this 
thesis, namely, investment research, the regulatory framework for sell-side financial 
analysts, and corporate governance, constituted the multiple and dispersed conditions
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under which the doing of corporate governance by analysts appeared and developed. As 
informed by previous analyses of arenas, this thesis has suggested that it was not simply 
the concern about corporate governance, or the technical problem associated with sell- 
side investment research that had triggered the emergence of the corporate governance 
work undertaken by analysts. Instead, the current study of this “event” has revealed the 
emergence of the doing of corporate governance by analysts as “a product of a 
multiplicity of processes”, and located this phenomenon in “a complex field of 
relations” (cf. Smart, 2002) that extends significantly beyond the immediate issue of 
corporate governance.
Following Mennicken (2008) and Robson (1991; 1994), this thesis has drawn upon the 
concepts of “problematisation” and “translation” to further operationalise the analysis of 
arenas. For the current study, the corporate governance work performed by analysts was 
perceived as indispensable, and came to be seen as the focus of varied attention in the 
three arenas identified. In particular, the corporate governance work pursued by analysts 
was considered as a proposed solution to the various problems widely articulated in 
different aspects of institutional life. In this regard, the concept of problematisation has 
helped this thesis to frame the analysis of the process through which a certain issue was 
constructed as a problem, and through which the corporate governance work undertaken 
by analysts was proposed and articulated as a potential solution to the problem. As 
informed by the notion of problematisation, this thesis has also attended to a diverse and 
heterogeneous group of agents and agencies pronouncing on the deficiencies or failures 
of certain practices in financial markets, and calling for actions to correct the mistakes or 
resolve the problems (cf. Miller & O’Leary, 1994). For instance, in the arena of 
“investment research”, corporate leaders, investors, financial intermediaries, 
governmental bodies, professional associations, and other constituents of the investing 
public came to view “short-termism” as a problem in the US and the UK financial 
markets, and called for fundamental reforms to tackle the problem. Some of these agents 
and agencies, such as the Enhanced Analytics Initiative, the Trades Union Congress in 
Britain, and the Conference Board, argued that the short term focus of sell-side 
investment research contributed to the more general problem of “short-termism”. They 
proposed and articulated the view that long term investment research that takes into
- 172-
account corporate governance and other extra-financial issues can potentially provide a 
solution to the problem of “short-termism”. While these different agents and agencies 
may originally differ in their interests, concerns, and agendas, they eventually came to 
share views on particular issues considered to be problems.
The process through which the originally distinct and different concerns and interests of 
the various agents and agencies were transformed in a way that these agents and 
agencies defined and interpreted an issue as a common problem has been analysed in 
this thesis as a process of translation (e.g. Callon, 1980; Callon & Law, 1982; Robson, 
1991). The notion of translation has also focused the attention of this thesis on the 
actions, mostly discursive in nature, taken by some agents and agencies in financial 
markets to promote and legitimise a proposed solution to a certain problem by changing 
the interests of others, and by encouraging other organisations and institutions to join 
their formal or informal networks. Furthermore, in the arenas identified in this thesis, 
certain issues were problematised in the name of wider concerns and broader aspirations 
in the economy and society. The notion of translation has again helped the thesis to 
analyse this as a process through which a local problem (e.g. analyst conflicts of 
interest) was interpreted in a way that it was attached to and made consistent with wider 
concerns and objectives in financial markets (e.g. the loss of tmst and integrity in capital 
markets and the aspiration of restoring investor confidence) (cf. Mennicken, 2008; 
Miller, 1991; Robson, 1991).
4.2 Reflections on the concepts o f “programme” and “technology”
This thesis has paid particular attention to the mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed 
by analysts in their evaluations of the corporate governance procedures adopted by 
companies, and in their integration of governance issues within investment analyses. 
These mechanisms, tools, and devices have been examined in light of the concept of 
“technology” (e.g. Miller & Rose, 1990; Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose & Miller, 1992). In 
particular, most of the technologies created and deployed by analysts for doing corporate 
governance, such as narratives, lists, tables, graphs, financial and statistical models, have 
been viewed in this thesis as “inscriptions” (e.g. Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986).
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Inscriptions have been regarded as “technologies of government”, for it is through 
inscription that a domain is rendered visible, measurable, comparable, calculable, and 
amenable to being acted upon (Rose & Miller, 1992). The notion of “inscriptions” has 
enabled this thesis to conceptualise the mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by 
analysts as transparency making devices, which created a kind of visibility in financial 
markets.
Technologies typically go hand-in-hand with “programmes” (e.g. Miller & Rose, 1990; 
Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose & Miller, 1992). The wider concerns, ideas, broader policy 
objectives, aspirations, and ideals in financial markets and in the economy and society 
have been analysed in this thesis in light of the notion of “programme”, a concept that 
has been elaborated in the “govemmentality” literature. More specifically, programmes 
have been considered in the present research as including the objective of restoring 
investor confidence and integrity in financial markets, the agenda for reforming 
corporate governance, the perceived ideal of “transparency”, the objective of integrating 
extra-financial issues within the investment decision making process, among others. As 
informed by the linkages between programmes and technologies conceptualised in prior 
research (e.g. Mennicken et al., 2008; Miller, 2008a, 2008b; Miller & Rose, 1990; Miller 
& Rose, 2008; Power, 1997; Rose & Miller, 1992), this thesis has argued that the ideals, 
aspirations, and objectives articulated in financial markets shaped, animated, and gave 
significance to the mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by analysts when doing 
corporate governance. In return, the mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by 
analysts have been viewed as helping to make the various programmes operable.
In light of the posited interrelationships between programmes and technologies, this 
research has viewed the corporate governance work performed by analysts as not neutral 
or purely technical. Instead, this work was, to varying degrees, attached to and linked 
with certain programmatic ideals that it was potentially able to help realise and achieve. 
Even though the mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by analysts have been 
thought of as “technologies”, both technological and programmatic dimensions of the 
corporate governance work undertaken by analysts have been seriously considered and 
attended to in this research (cf. Mennicken et al., 2008; Miller, 2008a, 2008b; Power,
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1997). It has been argued elsewhere that the work performed by analysts “cannot be 
understood except as part of the social arrangements that embed [this] work”128 (Fogarty 
& Rogers, 2005: 349). The notions of the “programmatic” and “technological” have 
been utilised here as a way of conceptualising the embedded and socially contingent 
nature of the corporate governance work performed by analysts, while also highlighting 
the ways in which this work can in turn potentially impact upon those social 
arrangements.
The attention paid in this thesis to the mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by 
analysts when doing corporate governance is consistent with the “technological turn” in 
economic sociology (e.g. Beunza et al., 2006; Callon, 2005; Callon & Muniesa, 2005; 
Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007; Muniesa et al., 2007). This “technological turn” in 
economic sociology has emphasised the material and technical nature of economic 
action and calculation. It has regarded equipment, texts, instruments, models, and tools 
as important elements that constitute various forms of economic action and calculation. 
The current study, however, has sought to go beyond the “technological turn” in 
economic sociology, in the sense that both technologies and programmes, or ideas and 
instruments, have been viewed as constituting the corporate governance work performed 
by analysts. In particular, for the integration of corporate governance within the 
investment analyses that analysts performed, this thesis has not only considered the tools 
and devices deployed by analysts, such as quantification of corporate governance, 
portfolio analyses, event analyses, regression analyses, “govemance-to-profitability” 
analyses, “govemance-to-valuation” analyses, as well as the various graphs, as elements 
of the integration. The thesis has also emphasised that this particular form of economic 
calculation was also constituted by the ideas and discourses related to the potential link 
between corporate governance and the financials, the ideal and objective of 
incorporating governance issues in the investment decision making process, and the 
perception that analysts have a “leading” role to play in this field. In short, the notions of 
“programmatic” and “technological” have allowed the current study to understand more
128 Fogarty & Roger (2005) draw upon neo-institutional theory (e.g. DiM aggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) and sociology o f  professional groups (e.g. Abbott, 1988) to examine the institutional and 
social context that shapes the work performed by sell-side financial analysts. They claim that the 
“institutions that surround the delivery o f  opinions regarding the merits o f  equity investments are 
powerful influences on the work product o f  analysts” (Fogarty & Rogers, 2005: 331).
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fully the pre-conditions and implications of a particular form of economic calculation 
and action. It is suggested that this sheds new light on economic sociology, by 
supplementing the “technological turn” with consideration of programmes, ideas, and 
discourses, and the ensembles formed between the programmatic and the technological 
(cf. Mennicken et al., 2008; Miller, 2008a, 2008b).
4.3 Reflections on the concepts o f  “critic” and “carrier”
The notion of “critic” was initially formulated by some economic sociologists to explain 
and conceptualise the evaluative nature of critical reviews on cultural products 
performed by cultural commentators (e.g. Becker, 1982; Hirsch, 1972; Shrum, 1991). It 
has subsequently informed studies of other forms of evaluation undertaken by other 
assessment bodies, for instance, equity research performed by sell-side financial analysts 
(e.g. Beunza & Garud, 2007; Zuckerman, 1999). This thesis has added to these studies 
through investigating the evaluations of the corporate governance procedures adopted by 
companies performed by analysts, and by viewing analysts as critics of corporate 
governance. The “critic” lens has served as a reminder regarding the governing effects 
that can potentially be generated from the critical review process, and the possible 
normative pressure that may impose on objects being reviewed, given that critics have 
been considered in economic sociology as “institutional regulators” (Boskoff, 1964; 
Hirsch, 1972; Shrum, 1991). However, this thesis has sought to refine and extend the 
notion of “critic” in two respects.
First, while most existing research on critics has tended to consider the institutional 
environment that shapes the critical review process or the impact of critical reviews on 
the objects being evaluated, this thesis has concentrated on the ways in which a specific 
form of critical review, namely, the corporate governance evaluation undertaken by 
analysts, was performed. In particular, by making reference to the notion of “inscription” 
(e.g. Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986), this thesis has specifically examined the 
technologies, namely, the mechanisms and devices deployed by analysts in their 
corporate governance evaluations. As documented in chapter 3, inscriptions such as 
narratives, lists, and ranking tables, were created and deployed by analysts to represent
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and make possible comparisons of the corporate governance procedures adopted by 
different companies. This thesis, therefore, has shed new light on the “critic” lens by 
explicitly investigating the mechanisms and devices deployed by a particular set of 
critics in the critical review process. Critical review, it is suggested, is a material activity, 
and the technologies deployed by critics can be viewed as constituting the material
I 9 Q
infrastructures for the critical review process (cf. Beunza & Garud, 2007) .
According to the notion of “critic”, critics evaluate the quality of a product based on the 
aesthetic systems in a particular cultural field. Aesthetics, defined as the philosophy of 
arts, can be seen as the guiding principle informing the critical review performed by 
cultural critics. Similarly, in this study, the regulatory requirements of “best practices” 
inscribed in formal regulations of corporate governance have been viewed as the guiding 
principles for analysts assessing the quality of the corporate governance procedures 
adopted companies. Nevertheless, the “critic” lens on its own has failed to 
systematically address how the guiding principles or the evaluative schemata are 
operationalised by critics. To address this aspect of the critical review process, the 
concept of “carrier” (e.g. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002; 
Scott, 2001, 2003) has been drawn upon to supplement the notion of “critic”. The 
concept of “carrier” has allowed this thesis to argue that formal regulations of corporate 
governance were not used by analysts in a neutral manner. Instead, “best practices” of 
corporate governance contained in formal regulations were constantly unpacked, 
elaborated upon, edited, and re-interpreted by analysts in their corporate governance 
evaluations. This thesis has also found that analysts even proposed alternative or 
additional “best practices”, and employed the revised “best practices” to evaluate the 
relative merits of the corporate governance procedures adopted by different companies. 
In short, as informed by the notion of “carrier”, this thesis has sought to provide new 
insights into the manner in which a particular set of critics operationalised the guiding 
principles that were supposed to inform the critical review process, in the process 
transforming them, even if only to a modest extent. Further, the thesis has also aimed to
129 The corporate governance evaluations performed by analysts, as a form o f  critical review, can be 
material in nature. However, it is not suggested here that they are purely material. These evaluations, as 
this thesis has argued, have made a particular programme o f  corporate governance reforms, one that 
places “transparency” in a central position, operable. The corporate governance evaluations performed by 
analysts also have a programmatic dimension.
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shed light on how analysts with relatively little experience in dealing with regulatory 
issues related to corporate governance have unpacked and sought to make sense of new 
regulations and new regulatory arguments.
4.4 Reflections on the use o f textual documents
This thesis has made use of various types of textual documents to examine the different 
dimensions of the doing of corporate governance by analysts. These have included the 
corporate governance reports written by analysts, the official documents issued by 
various organisations and institutions, selected financial and business newspapers and 
magazines, textbooks of corporate governance, and academic and practioner 
publications on corporate governance.
The corporate governance reports produced by analysts have been intensively referred to 
and utilised in this thesis. In particular, the mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by 
analysts in their corporate governance evaluations, and in their integration of corporate 
governance issues within investment analyses, were identified largely on the basis of the 
corporate governance reports that analysts produced. The concentration on the corporate 
governance reports produced by analysts in this research is in line with recent studies of 
analysts that have recognised and emphasised the importance of the work product 
generated by analysts, namely, the written reports (e.g. Beunza & Garud, 2007; Fogarty 
& Rogers, 2005). Nevertheless, in addition to focusing on the arguments made and 
presented by analysts in the narratives of their reports, in line with prior studies, the 
present study has also paid special attention to the other elements that made up these 
reports. These comprised lists, tables, charts, figures, graphs, and financial and statistical 
models which have been viewed in this thesis as “inscriptions” that constituted the 
technologies deployed by analysts when doing corporate governance. The concentration 
on the corporate governance reports produced by analysts has also allowed this thesis to 
investigate the way in which formal regulations of corporate governance and 
information about the governance procedures of companies were elaborated upon, 
edited, and re-interpreted by analysts. It was largely through these written reports that 
the elaboration, editing, and re-interpretation of various ideas and information of
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corporate governance by analysts were presented and documented (cf. Sahlin-Andersson 
& Engwall, 2002).
To track and trace the programmatic, ideological, or normative aspect of the doing of 
corporate governance by analysts, this thesis has focused on official documents issued 
by national and international governmental and non-governmental organisations, 
professional associations, and informal networks formed between institutional investors 
and asset management firms, selected financial and business newspapers and magazines, 
textbooks of corporate governance, and academic and practioner publications on 
corporate governance. Ideas, ideals, aspirations, and objectives that were discursively 
articulated in financial markets mid in the wider economy and society were largely 
inscribed and represented in these textual documents. It was based on these documents 
that this thesis has identified and examined the various ideas, idealised schemata, and 
aspirations which shaped, animated, and gave significance to the concrete tasks and 
routines performed by analysts when doing corporate governance.
For instance, to trace the ideas and discourses related to the perceived importance of 
integrating corporate governance in the investment decision making process and the role 
of analysts in this field, this thesis has focused on the reports issued by the United 
Nations Global Compact and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance 
Initiative. Based on these reports, the thesis has argued that these ideas and discourses 
that had emerged and that were promulgated in financial markets not only gave 
significance to, but were also operationalised by the concrete work of linking 
governance issues to the financials in the investment analyses performed by analysts. 
Furthermore, in order to trace the dispersed conditions of possibility for the appearance 
and development of the doing of corporate governance by analysts, various textual 
documents have been drawn upon and analysed. These included reports issued by the 
CFA, the Business Roundtable, the Trade Union Congress, the EAI, the FSA, the SEC, 
and other organisations and institutions, selected financial newspapers and magazines, 
textbooks of corporate governance, among others. Based on these documents, an 
ensemble of ideas, events, processes, activities, and actors that made possible the 
emergence of the corporate governance work of analysts was identified. Beyond
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searching for the origin of the doing of corporate governance by some analysts in the US 
and the UK, the utilisation of a variety of textual documents has allowed this thesis to 
trace and investigate the multiple and dispersed historically-specific factors that 
facilitated and gave rise to the phenomenon.
5. Implications for future research
The doing of corporate governance by analysts that this thesis has investigated 
represents a case in which some sell-side financial analysts in the US and the UK have 
brought corporate governance within the boundaries of their work territory since the 
early 21st century. This thesis has examined the mechanisms, tools, and devices 
deployed by analysts in their corporate governance evaluations and in their integration 
of governance issues within investment analyses. Nevertheless, the extent to which and 
the ways in which analysts have developed a system of knowledge and expertise in these 
fields may deserve further systematic enquiry in the future. The extent to which the 
doing of corporate governance by analysts represents an expansion of their expertise and 
knowledge claims from financial analysis to the area of corporate governance may also 
be conceptualised in future studies. As a quasi-professional group (cf. Fogarty & Rogers, 
2005), analysts may engage in “jurisdictional contests” (Abbott, 1988) in which analysts 
may compete against other professions over a given jurisdiction of work in order to 
secure networks of support for their claims to expertise. Over the jurisdictions of 
corporate governance evaluation and corporate governance integration, sell-side 
financial analysts may seek to compete against auditors, credit rating analysts, corporate 
governance rating analysts, and buy-side analysts. However, instead of only competing 
against other professional groups, sell-side analysts may cooperate, collaborate, and 
coordinate with other professions to develop shared expertise and common abstract 
knowledge within a specific work jurisdiction (cf. Gendron et al., 2007). Future research 
could, for instance, examine the relations between analysts and other professional 
groups in the development of expertise and knowledge claims in the area of corporate 
governance. Also, Kurunmaki (2004) has pointed out that encounters within the system 
of professions can take the form of “hybridisation”, and that a profession can be
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hybridised. This means, a profession can acquire and adopt tools which were originally 
developed in a different work jurisdiction and become a so-called “hybrid 
profession”130. Future research could possibly explore the extent to which the sell-side 
financial analyst profession has become a hybrid profession, and the process through 
which tools for evaluating and integrating corporate governance initially developed by 
other professional groups are acquired and adopted by analysts. In addition, Gendron, 
Cooper, & Townley (2007: 103) have suggested that in order to understand the 
production and construction of expertise, the ways in which proponents promote their 
claims to expertise, and how target audiences react, should both be looked at. Future 
research may possibly consider not only the ways in which analysts seek to promote and 
legitimise their claims to expertise in the area of corporate governance, but also how 
corporations, institutional investors, and fund managers perceive and react to the actions 
taken by analysts.
This thesis has emphasised that the corporate governance work undertaken by analysts 
was, to varying degrees, attached to and linked with certain programmes in financial 
markets that articulated, animated, and gave significance to the technologies deployed 
by analysts. For instance, the integration of corporate governance within the investment 
analyses performed by analysts, it has been argued, was shaped by ideas and discourses 
related to the potential link between corporate governance and the financials that were 
widely promulgated in financial markets from the 1980s onward. Future research may 
be conducted to investigate the dynamics evolving between programmes and 
technologies for the corporate governance work pursued by analysts. More specifically, 
in what ways do the technologies deployed by analysts to work towards corporate 
governance issues change the contents of the programmes that these technologies have 
come to attach to? How do specific mechanisms, tools, and devices deployed by analysts 
in their corporate governance work potentially impact upon those ideas, ideals, 
aspirations, and objectives in financial markets that articulated and gave significance to 
the doing of corporate governance by analysts in the first place? Do analysts develop 
new tools and devices, to what extent are these new technologies shaped by new 
programmes articulated in financial markets and in the wider economy and society, and
130 In her study, Kurunmaki (2004) suggests that the Finnish medical profession acquired and adopted 
tools o f  budgeting, costing, and pricing that were initially deployed by management accountants.
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how do new technologies and new programmes co-emerge? In short, in addition to 
studying the pre-conditions that gave rise to the doing of corporate governance by 
analysts, the possible “consequences, paradoxes and dilemmas” triggered by the 
corporate governance work of analysts for the financial markets and the wider economy 
and society may also be subject to systematic enquiry in the future (cf. Mennicken, 
2005:193)131.
While the doing of corporate governance by analysts started to surface from the early 
21st century, it has begun to decline since the end of 2008. One indication of this 
seeming decline is that the ESG or SRI teams which provided corporate governance and 
extra-financial research were dis-continued in a few brokerage firms, such as Citigroup,
I ^
JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, and Merrill Lynch, from the end o f2008 . Commentators 
have somehow attributed these incidents to the credit crisis that was sparked in 2007133 
(e.g. Brooksbank, 2010; Wheelan, 2008,2010b). This credit crisis has been considered 
as forcing brokerage firms to save resources and reduce cost by cutting headcounts, 
including cutting staff initially employed in the specialised ESG or SRI teams (e.g. 
Wheelan, 2008)134. The emergence of the doing of corporate governance by analysts, as 
this research has documented, was conditioned by a complex interplay of rationales, 
discourses, institutions, practices, and events in financial markets. Similarly, it would be 
interesting to locate the seeming decline of the corporate governance work pursued by 
analysts within a broad institutional and social context. In particular, future studies could 
examine the extent to which and the ways in which the arenas that conditioned the initial
131 Mennicken (2005) proposes that in order to thoroughly understand how international auditing 
standards work and travel, not only the conditions that gave rise to their spread, but also “the unforeseen 
consequences, paradoxes and organisational dilemmas” that international auditing standards trigger are 
also needed to be attended to.
132 Some o f  these brokerage firms, however, decided to integrate ESG research into their mainstream 
equity research departments. In other words, there are analysts at these brokerage firms who may still 
work on ESG issues on an individual basis.
133 In brief, this credit crisis was initially triggered by problems with the repayment o f  subprime mortgage 
in the US. These problems further caused concerns about lending around the world from August 2007. 
Some notable outcomes o f  this credit crisis included the nationalisation o f  Northern Rock, the 
bankruptcies o f  Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers, the merger o f  Lloyds and HBOS, the acquisition o f  
Merrill Lynch by Bank o f  America, collapses o f  banking systems and recessions in countries across the 
globe, among others.
134 As Wheelan (2008) has described, “[f]ears that dedicated SRI research could become a victim o f  the 
credit crisis are proving prescient as banks look to tighten belts. N ew s [ .. .]  that Deutsche Bank had 
discontinued its corporate governance research service for clients added to the ending o f  dedicated ESG 
research coverage at JP Morgan and Citigroup’s decision to cut back staff at its in-house SRI research 
team”.
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emergence of the doing of corporate governance by analysts are ruptured and 
transformed (cf. Burchell et al., 1985). In other words, future research might focus on 
how the rationales, discourses, institutions, practices, and events in each arena are 
transformed in such a way that the attention paid to the corporate governance work 
performed by analysts wanes, or that this work is no longer perceived as constituting a 
potential solution to the existing perceived problems. Also, while it appears that the 
corporate governance work undertaken by analysts has declined somewhat, relative to 
its profile in the early years of the 21st century, this does not necessarily mean it is in the 
process of disappearing. The doing of corporate governance by analysts may be 
temporary and fragile in nature. The corporate governance work pursued by analysts 
may possibly rise in prominence in the future, as and when emerging factors that endow 
this work with a wider significance appear135. Agents o f transparency, the title of this 
thesis, has suggested a role for analysts in the field of corporate governance based on the 
current development of the doing of corporate governance by analysts. This role maybe 
subject to further transformation when the corporate governance work undertaken by 
analysts reaches a new stage. Nevertheless, this thesis has, it is hoped, contributed to the 
opening up for investigation of the corporate governance work performed by sell-side 
financial analysts.
135 Citigroup has announced in May 2010 that it is reforming its specialist SRI research by hiring a new  
SRI analyst. Wheelan (2010a) suggests that this announcement by Citigroup indicates that there is new  
demand for ESG research from brokerage firms.
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